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This volume collects papers presented on two different occasions. The first was a
debate entitled “Scepticism in Qohelet,” which took place in the framework of one of
the numerous activities held at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (MCAS),
a DFG-Kolleg-Forschungsgruppe at the University of Hamburg directed by Prof. Dr.
Giuseppe Veltri. This event was a “dialectical evening” held on 16 February 2016 and
the presenters were Reuven Kiperwasser and Carsten Wilke, both affiliated with the
centre at the time.
The second occasion was a workshop entitled “The Expressions of Sceptical
Topoi in (Late) Ancient Judaism,” which was also held at the Maimonides Centre
for Advanced Studies on 18 and 19 June 2016 and convened by Reuven Kiperwasser.
The first two papers are based on the presentations at the dialectical evening, while
the other five resulted from the workshop.
Both the “dialectical evening” and the workshop were directly inspired by
Kiperwasser’s research in Hamburg, about which a few words of description are in
order. The project consisted of two structural units: “Sceptical Meditations within
the Book of Ecclesiastes in Rabbinic Midrash” and “The Embodiment of Scepticism
in Rabbinic Narratives.”
In the rabbinic tradition, Ecclesiastes is regarded as a prophetic book composed
by King Solomon. It contains verses expressing doubt about divine justice or even
about God’s involvement in earthly events. It also articulates a pessimistic point of
view concerning the nature of mankind as a whole. The earliest midrash had al-
ready sought to reconcile such tendencies with more familiar Jewish theological
beliefs by ascribing to many of them a prophetic hidden meaning. The rabbis re-
interpreted problematic verses, often apologetically. Does this mean that they
sought to distance themselves from the doubts of Ecclesiastes, or that they perhaps
found it inappropriate for the wise king to be a proto-sceptical thinker? Another
question relates to the characteristics of rabbinic culture that are implied by such
activity. What kind of sceptical reasoning was appropriate for the rabbis, and what
needs of rabbinic culture did it serve? Exegetical phenomena are undoubtedly
placed at the centre of rabbinic intellectual life, but it is important to bear in mind
that behind the ongoing process of proposing different readings of the sacred texts
is the constantly changing theological thought. Reading Ecclesiastes through a
seemingly non-sceptical exegetical lens, rabbis express their own doubts, which, as
will be argued within this volume, are sometimes quite similar to the inquiries of a
sceptical theist.
The reader of rabbinic literature, therefore, should not only address rabbinic
scepticism in a narrow sense, looking for direct expressions of ideas similar to those
found in the works of Greek authors. Rather, as was argued within the framework
of this project, one should approach the cultural expressions of scepticism manifest
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2 Introduction
in rabbinic exegetical narratives based on verses from Ecclesiastes and other such
ostensibly problematic verses from the biblical wisdom literature.
This project was, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic attempt to
address sceptical modes of thought in rabbinic culture, as well as the first to explore
their role in rabbinic thought in general. The second part of the project, the embodi-
ment of scepticism in rabbinic narratives, was the inspiration and background of
the lion’s share of this volume. As part of an attempt to locate sceptical thought in
rabbinic culture, Kiperwasser determined to analyse the representation of sceptical
thinking in the ancient Jewish texts as a whole.
The term scepticism has its origins, as is well known, in the Greco-Roman realm.
Philosophical scepticism questions the possibility of certainty in knowledge. Scepti-
cal philosophers adopted different doctrines, but their ideology can be generalised
as either the denial of the possibility of all knowledge or the suspension of judge-
ment due to the inadequacy of the evidence. Sceptical ideas were shaped in the
works of ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, leaving us numerous literary monu-
ments, and scepticism was both a driving force in the development of past cultures
and also the impetus for far-reaching scientific achievements and philosophical in-
vestigation. The first wave of sceptical thought was Pyrrhonism, founded by Pyrrho
of Elis (ca. 360–270 BCE), and the second was the so-called Academic scepticism;
namely, the sceptical period of ancient Platonism dating from around 266 BC. The
interest of this approach seems to have dissipated in the course of the late Roman
empire. An impressive revival of scepticism took place much later during the Re-
naissance and the Reformation, after the complete works of Sextus Empiricus were
translated into Latin leading to far-reaching philosophical developments.
As is well known, early Jewish culture, in contrast to its Greco-Roman peer,
avoided creating consistent representations of its philosophical doctrines. Jews of
the first centuries of the common era, however, were engaged in persistent intellec-
tual activity devoted to the laws, norms, regulations, exegesis, and other traditional
areas of Jewish religious knowledge. An effort to detect sceptical ideas in ancient
Judaism requires, therefore, a closer analysis of this literary heritage and its cultural
context. In accordance with this, the aim of the workshop was to explore elements
of sceptical thought in ancient and late antique Judaism through a new analysis of
pertinent texts. The participants discussed a wide spectrum of texts: Jewish writings
from the Second Temple period, rabbinic literature, magical texts, and the reflec-
tions of Jewish thought in early Christian and patristic writings. These textual corpo-
ra show little direct influence from Greek philosophical thought more generally and
from sceptical thought in particular. Therefore, with the understanding that when
reading Jewish texts in search of scepticism, we are to some extent looking for the
equivalent of a concept taken from another culture, we nevertheless found it of
heuristic value to embrace the term and concept as a hermeneutical lens through
which to view classical Jewish culture.
It could be argued that the application of the philosophy of scepticism to the
study of early Jewish thought is problematic, being, as it were, an eclectic and for-
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eign cultural approach for the investigation of distant cultural phenomena. How-
ever, this argument does not present a challenge in our situation, since within the
framework of this volume, our purpose is not to analyse the sceptical approach as
a system of knowledge, but rather to employ certain basic components of sceptical
thought in order to see whether there are analogies with chosen Jewish textual tra-
ditions. From a variety of the formal aspects of sceptical methodology, we concen-
trate mostly on presupposing a limited epistemology, reflections of doubt, a ques-
tioning spirit, and a rejection of dogma. These are the sceptical topoi disseminated
among the texts produced by different communities of faith, which have often bare-
ly been recognised by readers.
We have deliberately chosen to use the term “topoi” (plural of topos) in the title
of this volume, assuming that it is more suitable for expressing the rudimentary
state of sceptical ideas in classical Jewish texts. The term “topos” is itself borrowed
from ancient rhetoric. Its meaning was expanded by Ernst Robert Curtius in his
ground-breaking Europaïsche Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter (1948), and it has
become a term for “commonplaces.” These commonplace features are the product
of reworkings of traditional material, particularly the descriptions of standardised
settings, but can be extended to almost any literary pattern. Early medieval Latin
literature, for instance, inherited traces of motifs and fragments of plots from classi-
cal Greco-Roman literature and used them without being aware of their source. In
this way, individual texts may include elements that were not invented by the au-
thor, but which rather belong to his or her culture. We aimed to find these modest
manifestations of sceptical thought within the fields of classical Jewish culture and
to shed light on them, employing modern methods of critical textual analysis. The
collective efforts of the authors in this volume reflect this quest for expressions of
these topoi in the various literary corpora.
Of the many historical intersections between philosophical scepticism and the
Jewish tradition, the earliest possible and only canonical one is the Book of Qohelet
(Ecclesiastes), which is traditionally attributed to King Solomon, but can be dated
to the Hellenistic period on linguistic grounds. Under the aphorism ha-kol hevel,
“all is vanity” (KJV), the author insists on the futility of any quest for knowledge,
labour, virtue, or happiness and dismisses the belief in both divine providence and
human agency. The book’s competing maxims of enjoying a meaningless life and
fearing an incomprehensible God have intrigued Jewish and Christian exegesis
since antiquity. Contemporary scholarly research is divided between a philosophical
reading affirming that the author shared his sources and critical stance with the
Greek sceptical tradition and a religious reading that places the book within Levan-
tine and biblical reflections on theodicy and divine transcendence. Based on a new
look at the reception, structure, and context of the book, Carsten Wilke, in the first
paper, “Doubting Divine Justice and Human Knowledge: Qohelet’s Cultural Dialec-
tics,” seeks to show that Qohelet’s inner contradictions should be read dialectically
as a way of coping with a historical moment of economic expansion and cultural
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transformation. Dating the book to the peak of Hellenisation in Jerusalem during
the years 175 to 172 BCE, he argues that it took advantage of sceptical inquiry in
order to encompass the claims of both biblical theism and Greek science.
The second paper in this volume, “‘Matters That Tend towards Heresy’: Rabbin-
ic Ways of Reading Ecclesiastes,” deals with how the main message of Ecclesiastes—
its scepticism—is perceived by the modern reader. Earlier scholarship assumed that
references to efforts to proscribe the Book of Ecclesiastes in rabbinic literature
stemmed from the rabbis’ inability to cope with its sceptical tendencies and attest to
a struggle over its acceptance within the canon. Kiperwasser claims that the rabbis
accepted the closed canon, with all its twenty-four books, and did not question the
inclusion of any of the books therein. They were in fact unaware of how the process
of canonisation had been conducted and the reasons for the acceptance of certain
exceptional books, such as Ecclesiastes. And yet, as sensitive readers and experi-
enced exegetes, they felt that the book was different. For this reason, it received
plenty of attention from the rabbis and featured extensively in their exegetical art
form. The stories of the difficulties in accepting of Ecclesiastes and the Song of
Songs essentially come as a defence of their enormous appeal and broad exegetical
use as valuable resources for interpretation. The rabbis were fully cognisant of Ec-
clesiastes’s unconventionality and aspired to produce etiological explanations in
order to account for its oddity.
The third paper, “Wisdom Scepticism and Apocalyptic Certitude; Philosophical
Certitude and Apocalyptic Scepticism,” which analyses the attitude towards scepti-
cism in Jewish literature of the Second Temple period, is by Cana Werman. The
paper begins by discussing writings from the beginning of the Hellenistic era which
express sceptical notions based on the recognition that man cannot comprehend
God’s role in the world. These include Ecclesiastes, where God is pictured as being
detached from the world, the Book of the Watchers of 1Enoch, and the biblical Book
of Daniel, where evil heavenly forces rebel against God. The paper further points to
two kinds of works that grappled with similar challenges but made an effort to avoid
scepticism. The first group is semi-apocalyptic compositions such as the Aramaic
Levi Document and the Apocryphon of Jeremiah, where calamity and disaster are
considered not as the consequences of a God who is removed from humanity, but
rather as the result of human deeds and misbehaviour. The second collection is
formed of works that adopted philosophical ideas claiming that God’s sovereignty
over the world can be perceived by the mind’s eye.
The fourth paper, “Reasonable Doubts of the ‘Other’: Jewish Scepticism in Early
Christian Sources” by Serge Ruzer, is devoted to reading early Christian sources
which describe polemical encounters with “unbelieving Jews.” Such encounters,
whether real or imagined, attribute to the Jews a rejection of Christian beliefs. This
paper posits the question of whether such descriptions faithfully represent a real
external rival, or, alternatively, whether they are tailored to overcome an internal
problem of the Christian outlook, conveniently disguised as a struggle with the eter-
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nal Jewish Other. Discussing a few representative examples, this study highlights a
meaningful dynamic in the focus of the supposed Jewish scepticism. Thus, it takes
us from Jesus’s resurrection through claims about his messianic mission and stories
of his miraculous birth to insistence—in spite of the obvious delay in the Parousia—
on his future triumph and all the way up to theological concepts. While various
combinations of the internal and external directions of the polemic are definitely
possible, the paper takes a particular interest in the cases where the disbelief is
perceived not as resulting from Jewish spiritual corruption, but rather as a reason-
able, “sceptical” reaction, for example, in light of the absence of sufficiently con-
vincing external signs of salvation. It is argued that especially in such cases, behind
the scepticism of the “Other” might be looming the Christians’ own internal doubts.
Geoffrey Herman, in his paper “Idolatry, God(s), and Demons among the Jews
of Sasanian Babylonia,” argues against the opinion of many earlier scholars that
for the Jews in the Second Temple period and afterwards, an interest in gods and
the issue of idolatry was not a major factor in their beliefs. This paper considers the
situation with respect to the Jews in Sasanian Babylonia in light of the polytheistic
religious scene. Non-Jewish evidence points to a pervasive polytheistic religious cul-
ture that embraced numerous deities, some of which were demonised. The Jewish
magical material from Babylonia indicates an awareness of and an engagement with
these deities and demons among some of the Jews. The Babylonian Talmud also
speaks of idolatry as a contemporary issue for Babylonian Jews, or interprets bibli-
cal sources, which suggest its continued relevance for them. In view of all this evi-
dence, the paper argues that polemical and other reflections on idolatry in the Baby-
lonian Talmud would appear to be more significant than previously assumed. The
rabbis, it would seem, being a part of this religious world, accepted many of the
assumptions of their non-Jewish contemporaries regarding the reality of demons
perceived by others as gods and were grappling with a tangible religious reality that
was impinging upon their world.
The sixth paper, “Facing Omnipotence and Shaping the Sceptical Topos” by
Reuven Kiperwasser, is a narratological inquiry into late antique rabbinic stories
told from the point of view of sceptical theists. Sceptical theists accept that we can
know general truths about God but deny that we can know the reason for God’s
decision to act in a particular way in any given case. A sceptical theist will maintain
his belief in God but will deny his involvement in the politics of evil. However, the
rabbinic narrator’s approach is different. God is involved in the world and is aware
of the existence of evil; however, despite being omniscient, omnibenevolent, and
omnipotent, God has decided not to change anything in the world. These theologi-
cal ideas are embodied in narratives in rabbinic literature. This paper aims to show
how behind the narrative fabric, serious doubts about how God controls the world
are revealed, yet notwithstanding the intensity of such doubts, no expressions of
disrespect for accepted religious values appear.
The final paper in this volume, “If a Man Would Tell You,” is by Tali Artman-
Partock. It examines the groups of texts in rabbinic literature which start with varia-
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tions of the phrase that appears in the title, arguing that it functions as a discursive
marker that signals doubt in a rabbinic teaching which paradoxically serves to erad-
icate doubt about rabbinic authority. The texts often serve to reinforce the sense of
belonging and the favoured status of the members of the rabbinic group as inter-
preters of the Bible, so much so that they might accept as true arguments that would
normally be conceived as challenges to accepted rabbinic theology and epistemol-
ogy.
The product of our joint efforts is offered to the reader in the hope of both
expanding and intensifying a scholarly discussion on expressions of doubt and reli-
gious enquiry in Jewish sources in particular and in antiquity more generally. We
would like to express our immense appreciation to the Maimonides Centre, and
especially to Prof. Dr. Giuseppe Veltri, both for supporting the conference and for
supporting us in this publication of the proceedings. This is also a suitable opportu-
nity to thank the staff of the centre in Hamburg—Karolin Berends, junior professor
Dr. Racheli Haliva, Dr. Patrick Koch, Dr. Anna Lissa, Yonatan Meroz MA, Dr. des.
Felix Papenhagen, Dr. Bill Rebiger, Silke Schaeper M.L.S., Prof. Dr. Stephan Schmid,
Dr. Michela Torbidoni, and Maria Wazinski MA—and the fellows of the centre in
Hamburg in 2016, namely Prof. Marietta Horster, Prof. Dr. Almut Renger, and Dr. Li-
bera Pisano, and others who attended and participated in the workshop.
Carsten L. Wilke
Doubting Divine Justice and Human
Knowledge: Qohelet’s Cultural Dialectics
Julius Guttmann was explicitly reluctant to begin his narrative of Jewish philosophi-
cal thought with Qohelet. He argued that this biblical book, which is also known as
Ecclesiastes, may document the first known encounter between Jewish literature
and Greek philosophy, but that it was a failed encounter, since the biblical author
proved unable to understand philosophical ways of thought; worse, he even main-
tained his utterly “un-Greek” disrespect for the human cognitive faculties, denying
their power, nobility, and efficiency.1
Our conception of antique intellectual culture has evolved, and we are more
likely to acknowledge that cognitive pessimism and the sceptical quest are as much
a part of Greek thought as the Platonic and Aristotelian systems. Qohelet has often
been represented in analogy with the Greek Sceptics,2 and Charles Whitley even
sensed this dimension in the author’s moniker: if Qohelet “is to be represented by
one term in English, perhaps ‘The Sceptic’ would have some measure of adequacy.”3
As I will argue in this chapter, Qohelet does indeed stand on the threshold of Jewish
philosophising, and of Jewish scepticism in particular, and there are good reasons
to locate him inside rather than outside of the doorway. What I will undertake here
is a reappraisal of the book’s dialectic quest based on a review of its reception4 and
a new hypothesis about its structure and date.5 By “dialectics,” I mean the proce-
dure of explaining a text on the basis of its unresolved inner contradictions. For
example, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s dialectical ethics reflect the tension between the
immanent “other” and the transcendent “good-beyond-being” in opposition to ethi-
1 Julius Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Judentums (Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1933), 27: “Die ebenso
ungriechische Verwerfung der Erkenntnis, das Wort, daß Mehrung der Erkenntnis Mehrung des
Schmerzes ist.”
2 Martin Alfred Klopfenstein, “Die Skepsis des Qohelet,” Theologische Zeitschrift 28 (1972): 97–109.
3 Charles F. Whitley, Kohelet: His Language and Thought (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979), 6.
4 I have used the overviews by Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger, “Kohelet: Stand und Perspekti-
ven der Forschung,” in Das Buch Kohelet: Studien zur Struktur, Geschichte, Rezeption und Theologie,
ed. Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), 5–38; and Jean-Jacques Lavoie,
“Où en sont les études sur le livre de Qohélet?” Laval théologique et philosophique 69, no. 1
(2013): 95–133; Jean-Jacques Lavoie, “Où en sont les études sur le livre de Qohélet (2012–2018)?”
Studies in Religion 48,1 (2019): 40–76.
5 The present article develops ideas that were exchanged during the dialectical evening held at
the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies in Hamburg on 16 February 2016, when the two theses
presented below were respectively defended by Reuven Kiperwasser (who at that was time was
affiliated with Humboldt University of Berlin) and myself.
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cal reasoning founded on one essential principle, such as divine lawgiving or the
self-sufficient human subject.6
As has often been remarked, Qohelet diverges from Jewish tradition through its
generic and depersonalised conception of the divine, which acts through determin-
istic forces such as time, fortune, and fate. He never mentions the Israelite God by
name, nor does his book refer to divine law, the Torah, the ideas of creation, revela-
tion, redemption, or other dimensions of historical religion. His view of cultic reli-
gion, expressed in 4:17–5:7, is cautious at best, and ethical religion is discarded
outright.
Qohelet also, however, diverges from what we might associate with the Greek
ideal of autonomous human knowledge. Man cannot know anything for certain,
nor can he influence the world through his activity. As a conclusion, the author
recommends that one suspend the quest for knowledge, power, and perfection and
instead enjoy life without any wish to understand, dominate, or improve it. This
quintessential (im)moral conclusion is reiterated in the body of the text on seven
(or rather, as we will see below, ten) occasions. The very end of the text at 12:1–8,
12–14, however, is a chapter on theistic morals.
In sum, while arguably marking the start of a controversy between biblical the-
ism and Greek science, the book expresses ideas that are strongly at variance with
both. As James L. Crenshaw succinctly put it: “The author of Ecclesiastes lacked
trust in either God or knowledge. For him nothing proved that God looked on crea-
tures with favor, and the entire enterprise of wisdom had become bankrupt.”7 Our
dialectic reading will have to address one basic observation—namely the presence
of multiple contradictions in Qohelet’s thought—which, with appropriate contextu-
alisation, will lead us to disagreements both between eastern Mediterranean wis-
dom traditions and within them.
Harmonistic, Agonistic, and Dialectical Approaches
As a deliberately sceptical text, Qohelet is a model case for the possible strategies
we can use to deal with internal contradiction, which the ancient rabbis already
considered to be the major crux of the book.8 One strategy proceeds by logical de-
6 Lauren Swayne Barthold, Gadamer’s Dialectical Hermeneutics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2010), 127.
7 James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster
John Knox Press, 2010), 127.
8 b. Šabb. 30b: “His words contradict one another”; compare Abraham ibn Ezra on Eccl 7:3: “In one
place it may say something and in another the exact opposite is said.” Sefer Qohelet: im Perushei ibn
Ezra, edited by Mordechai Shaul Goodman (Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-Rav Kook, 2012). On the Talmudic
quotation, see below.
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duction, either fitting the author’s thought into a coherent norm or imagining a
harmonic balance of opposites. For historical-critical scholars, only a single stroke
of the pen was necessary to dismiss the pietistic conclusion as a conformist gloss
and to keep a more or less coherent text built around the hedonistic ethics that are
made explicit in its main part. On the other side, theologians have often felt obliged,
following their religious convictions and duties, to explain away the central parts
of the book or to diminish their relevance. Crenshaw, for instance, finds Qohelet’s
insistent commendation of earthly pleasure to be “empty” of meaning and does
not believe that the author seriously intended to promote it.9 A good example of a
harmonistic reading is given by Alexander A. Fischer, who in 1997 argued that Qo-
helet could have been both a sceptical philosopher and a Jewish sage:
Indeed, both issues, scepticism and the fear of God, are vital to our understanding of Qohelet’s
teachings. While attempts have repeatedly been made to pit the one against the other and to
thereby reduce the book to a one-way interpretation, we will be sure to show that the fear of
God and scepticism go together in this work and that they depend on one another.10
From a modern theological perspective, it may not be much of an issue whether we
believe in or deny divine providence, but classical exegesis did not treat this point
with the same nonchalance. Both the rabbis and the Church Fathers had strong
feelings about the contradiction between ethical attitudes that would follow from
Qohelet’s calls to enjoy a meaningless life while simultaneously fearing an incom-
prehensible God.11 In their approach, which we may call agonistic, the Book of Qo-
helet was interpreted as a debate in which an impious sceptic voices his objections
to faith and is finally vanquished by a pious opponent. In the thirteenth century,
Menahem ha-Meiri wrote that Qohelet “mentions in a number of places views that
contradict fundamental beliefs such as reward and punishment and God’s provi-
dence in his world; but he mentions these views so as to use knowledge to search
for the correct path.”12 The great majority of Qohelet’s speculative propositions
could thus be explained away as counter-truths concocted by the unruly antagonist,
the conclusion in chapter 12 being the only straightforward expression of the book’s
true message. Following this tradition, later Jewish commentators read Qohelet as
a dialectical controversy between the good and evil impulses.13 Modern Christian
9 Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 138–40.
10 Alexander A. Fischer, Skepsis oder Furcht Gottes? Studien zur Komposition und Theologie des
Buches Kohelet (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), 1.
11 For a survey of patristic interpretations, see Elisabeth Birnbaum, “Qohelet,” Reallexikon für An-
tike und Christentum 28 (2017): 523–36.
12 Menachem ha-Meiri, Perush ‘al Sefer Mishlei, ed. Menachem Mendel Zahav (Jerusalem: Otsar
ha-Poskim, 1969), on Prov 1:1.
13 See the interpretation of Eccl 9:7–10 in Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-ʼIkkarim, 4.28, developed in Menas-
seh ben Israel, De la fragilité humaine et de l’inclination de l’homme au péché, trans. Henry Méchou-
lan (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 143–44.
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scholars since Johann Gottfried Herder have likewise assumed a clash between vari-
ous worldviews on Qohelet’s pages, possibly in the form of an internal dialogue. In
1875, Franz Julius Delitzsch wrote: “One might therefore call the Book of Koheleth,
‘The Song of the Fear of God,’ rather than, as H. Heine does, ‘The Song of Scepti-
cism;’ for however great the sorrow of the world which is therein expressed, the
religious conviction of the author remains in undiminished strength.”14 At the turn
of the twentieth century, with the then-fashionable search for various redactional
layers, Paul Haupt assumed that an Epicurean Sadducee and a Stoic Pharisee suc-
cessively intervened in the redaction of the text,15 while Arthur Lukyn Williams read
it as a dialogue between a ḥakam and a ḥasid.16 In all these constructions, the text’s
final voice recommending the fear of God overrules the cheerful commendations
that the book expresses elsewhere. Some dialogue constructions have also been
proposed in recent years,17 but twentieth-century scholarship has generally pre-
ferred to discard the unwelcome passages of the text as “glosses” or “quotations.”18
The third and last approach is dialectical: it chooses to state Qohelet’s contra-
dictions as strongly as can be and to leave them unresolved. As a revealing exam-
ple, allow me to quote a forgotten booklet by an Israeli author, Asher Sakal, who in
1959 expressed this perceived opposition with particular emphasis. For Qohelet,
“God is an omnipotent entity that acts arbitrarily, uncontained by any legal order.
In his world, being righteous does not help, and being evil does not harm, since
God could not care less about a man’s good or evil deeds.” All Jewish exegesis,
Sakal claims, was written in order to fit this provocation into the norms of dogmatic
biblical theology. However, all of these efforts have been futile, and Qohelet’s words
against God’s providence and justice, as well as against man’s moral nobility, can
in no way be reconciled with the understanding that Jewish tradition was used to
giving them.19 As James Alfred Loader argued in his Polar Structures in the Book of
14 Franz Julius Delitzsch, “Einleitung das Buch Koheleth,” in Biblischer Commentar über das Alte
Testament. Vierter Theil: Poetische Bücher. Vierter Band: Hoheslied und Koheleth (Leipzig: Dörffling
und Franke, 1875), 185–97, here 190; translation in Franz Julius Delitzsch, Commentary on the Song
of Songs and Ecclesiastes, trans. M. G. Easton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1891), 183. Delitzsch mis-
quotes Heinrich Heine, who in 1854 referred to Job, not Qohelet, as the “Canticles of Scepticism.”
See Friedrich Ellermeier, “Randbemerkung zur Kunst des Zitierens: Welches Buch der Bibel nannte
Heinrich Heine ‘das Hohelied der Skepsis’?” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 77, no.
1 (1965): 93–94.
15 Paul Haupt, trans., The Book of Ecclesiastes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1905),
2–4.
16 Arthur Lukyn Williams, trans., Ecclesiastes in the Revised Version with Introduction and Notes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 56–57.
17 T. A. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet: The Book of Ecclesiastes (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1993).
18 For the latter approach, see Robert Gordis, Kohelet—The Man and His World: A Study of Ecclesi-
astes, 3rd augmented ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).
19 Asher Sakal, Sefer Qohelet: Shenei panim, peshuto shel miqra mi-zeh vehashqafat ḥakhmei Yis-
ra’el mi-zeh (Holon: A. Sakal, 1959), 10–11.
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Qohelet (1979), we should also abstain from minimising the book’s inner contradic-
tions, but should rather try to understand them as elements of a systematically self-
contradictory kind of thought.20
Competition between these options for meeting Qohelet’s ideological challenge
runs throughout the entire history of exegesis. For modern critics, the problem is
also linked to different possible means of contextualisation. In sociological terms,
we are dealing with a “multi-cleavage” situation, in which the logical problem of
intratextual conflict overlaps with sociocultural contradictions that may ultimately
be identified with the difference between Greek and Jewish ethnicity.
The Hellenistic and Orientalist Theses
The question of whether a hedonistic or an ascetic mood—and hence a secular or a
religious meaning—should ultimately prevail in the interpretation of Qohelet also
drives the debate about its proper cultural context. To put the matter in Straussian
opposition, the “joy of life” option appears linked to Athens, while the “fear of God”
alternative is associated with Jerusalem.
Since the Enlightenment period, Qohelet’s readers have employed considerable
bilingual erudition in order to prove that the book owes its linguistic and intellectu-
al singularities to Greek language, literature, and philosophy. Preceded in this en-
deavour by Harry Ranston (1925),21 in 1973, Rainer Braun published what is still the
most extensive collection of textual parallels which allegedly prove that there were
Greek influences on many features of the book’s phraseology, worldview, and gener-
al mood.22 Braun’s observations on these parallel motifs were largely accepted and
frequently reissued,23 but scholars have not yet reached any consensus about
them.24
Parallels with expressions from archaic and classical works such as those of
Homer, Hesiod, Theognis, Sophocles, and Euripides may suggest an acquaintance
with the Greek canon. However, Braun’s key observation is that the philosophical
20 James A. Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1979); Jimyung
Kim, Reanimating Qohelet’s Contradictory Voices: Studies of Open-Ended Discourse on Wisdom in
Ecclesiastes (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
21 Harry Ranston, Ecclesiastes and the Early Greek Wisdom Literature (London: Epworth Press,
1925).
22 Rainer Braun, Kohelet und die frühhellenistische Popularphilosophie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1973).
23 A sample of the most convincing observations appears in studies such as Otto Kaiser, Der
Mensch unter dem Schicksal: Studien zur Geschichte, Theologie und Gegenwartsbedeutung der Weis-
heit (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1985), 138–39, and Leo G. Perdue, The Sword and the Stylus: An Introduction
to Wisdom in the Age of Empires (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 234–36.
24 Reinhold Bohlen, “Kohelet im Kontext hellenistischer Kultur,” in Das Buch Kohelet, 249–73,
here 255.
12 Carsten L. Wilke
topoi that spread in the Levant during the Hellenistic period did not derive from the
systems of the Athenian schools, but rather represented a popularised form of scep-
tical thought—that is, Pyrrhonian, Cynic, and Epicurean inspiration.25 These minor
genres of philosophical thought were not propagated through formal study, but as
gnomic sayings in both oral and written transmission. Sextus Empiricus later af-
firmed that the Sceptics—just like the Cynics before them—would boil their argu-
ments down into certain philosophical “slogans” (ϕωνάι). In this provocative sim-
plification, their ideas could reach an audience that aspired to a philosophical
worldview, but despised bookish culture or was excluded from it.
An example of such a “slogan” is the key phrase in Qoh 1:2, לל , literally
meaning “it is all vapour.” This expression, translated as “all is vanity” (KJV), “ev-
erything is meaningless” (NIV), and “nothing matters” (CJB), has an exact parallel
in a slogan coined by the Cynic Monimos, τΰφος τὰ πάντα, which uses the same
metaphor to refer to the same horizon of meaning.26 The famous sentence that fol-
lows in 1:3, ה-ןֹורםל-ֹוללתׁש , “What is the gain for a
man from all the labour that he performs under the sun?”, is also thought to have
a Greek semantic resonance. The expression “there is no gain” mirrors the Homeric
idiomatic phrase οὐδὲν ὄφελος (Il. 22.513), where the commercial term for “profit”
is used as a metaphor with an existential meaning. The same is true for the term
ל , “labour,” referring to the troubles of human life in general, just as πόνος does
in Greek mythology, tragedy, and the speeches of the Cynics.27 “Under the sun,”
meaning “on earth,” is another Homeric expression (Od. 4.539–40). The example
shows how Qohelet’s author recomposed Greek phrases and ideas in his own partic-
ular way. It has been noted that his ethics of pleasure is close to that of the Epicure-
ans, although his pessimism does not converge with the serenity of this school.28
Rudman argued that the author was exposed to the determinism of the Stoic school,
but that he was certainly not a Stoic himself,29 and a similar conclusion regarding
his scepticism was reached by Stuart Weeks.30 It has also been remarked that the
Cyrenaic philosophical school, with its close connection between pessimism, scepti-
cism, and hedonism, may be the Hellenistic tradition that is closest to Qohelet’s
thought.31
25 Norbert Lohfink, Kohelet (Würzburg: Echter, 1980), 9.
26 Braun, Kohelet, 45–46.
27 Braun, 48–49.
28 Emmanuel Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste (Paris: Lecoffre, 1912), 95–102; Dominic Rudman, Determin-
ism in the Book of Ecclesiastes (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 28.
29 Rudman, Determinism, 199.
30 Stuart Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (New York: T&T Clark International, 2012).
31 Rudman, Determinism, 28–29. On the combination of pessimism and scepticism, see also Mark
R. Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism in Ecclesiastes: A Social-Science Perspective (Atlanta: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2012), 7.
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These textual borrowings, it seems, do not indicate a precise doctrinal affilia-
tion, but rather a deeper intellectual affinity, which Martin Hengel attempted to
characterise in his extensive study of Greco-Jewish cultural interaction.32 Both Hen-
gel and Braun first point to the autonomous subjectivity of the disillusioned sage,
who subverts the traditional notions of religion and ethics through his reasoned
argument and individual observation (“I saw”).33 Individual judgment is not a crite-
rion of truth in earlier biblical literature, where legitimacy is sought in prophecy or
in the verdict of sacred texts. Even Ben Sira, the author of Ecclesiasticus, belongs
to a more nomistic intellectual climate than the author of Qohelet.34
Qohelet’s individualism is not only speculative, but practical as well. The au-
thor praises a personal eudaimonía disconnected from social or political values.35
This happiness is, as it is among the Sceptics, the fruit of a radically disillusioned
attitude, which rejects unattainable goals, including the purposeful pursuit of hap-
piness itself. He confesses that his active search for pleasure as a means to perfec-
tion led him to despair (2:1–11), but that he attained happiness the moment he gave
up his futile search and passively accepted pleasure as a gift from God, not as a
reward for some achievement (2:24–26).36 To illustrate their similarly contradictory
view, the Sceptics tell an anecdote about Apelles the painter, who achieved through
an unconscious gesture what he could not achieve through his art.37
In the Hellenists’ reading, even this paradoxical turn underscores Qohelet’s
“Greek” worldview, which is manifest in the independent quest for knowledge and
happiness, as well as in the fatidic character of divine power. In Otto Kaiser’s view, the
belief in fate thoroughly banalises the author’s final call to fear God. As a deus abscon-
ditus, God does not reward or punish humans for their actions; He only negatively lim-
its their scope of happiness and can therefore inspire no confidence, only fear.38
As a reaction to the Hellenistic thesis, which sees the thrust of Qohelet’s scepti-
cism mainly in the attack on the belief in a personal and just God, a group of schol-
ars inserted Qohelet into a sceptical tradition of “Oriental” coinage that turns its
doubt mainly, if not exclusively, against human autonomy. Qohelet is “not Greek,
but Oriental,” as the Finnish Lutheran bishop Aarre Lauha put it.39 This may mean
32 Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine during the Early
Hellenistic Period, trans. John Bowden (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1974), i:115–30.
33 Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger, “Nicht im Menschen gründet das Glück” (Koh. 2,24): Kohelet
im Spannungsfeld jüdischer Weisheit und hellenistischer Philosophie, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: Heder, 1996),
237.
34 Kaiser, Der Mensch, 122–23.
35 Schwienhorst-Schönberger, “Nicht im Menschen,” 253–73.
36 Schwienhorst-Schönberger, 296, 311.
37 Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 1.28.
38 Kaiser, Der Mensch, 128.
39 Aarre Lauha, Kohelet (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1978).
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for some that there is no demonstrable trace of Greek philosophy in his book;40
others—such as Guttmann—have held that occasional borrowings were not relevant
to the author’s spirit, and a third position argues that the author consciously de-
fends Middle Eastern traditions. In any case, Qohelet’s line of thinking is believed
to be part of a tradition of doubt and inquiry that, anterior to Greek scepticism,
derives its inspiration from pessimistic tendencies in the Oriental literatures of the
early second millennium BCE. According to the Orientalists, Qohelet’s conjunction
between a pessimistic outlook on life and the call to partake of whatever can be
enjoyed goes back to such texts as the speech of the alewife Siduri in the Old Baby-
lonian epic of Gilgamesh41 or the Egyptian “Harpist’s Songs.”42 The intertextual re-
lations are less precise in these cases and mainly consist of shared commonplaces,
some of them being of a fairly general character. Their comparisons are taken from
writings from various millennia, and this long-term chronology not only makes any
historical contextualisation impossible, but also obliges one to operate with the du-
bious assumption of a timeless Oriental wisdom tradition in which a corpus of mo-
tifs could be transmitted unchanged across the ages.43 Moreover, pessimism means
something quite different in the Gilgamesh epic and the Egyptian songs, where the
joy of life is always recommended in the face of inescapable death and a gloomy
afterworld. The doubts about virtue, knowledge, and providence that create the dis-
tress presented in Qohelet have no parallel in this literature.
Qohelet’s gnomic form of expression is not, according to the Orientalists, due
to the influence of the Greek Cynics or Sceptics; rather, it is due to the author’s
continuation of an age-old “wisdom literature” with its ancient genre of proverbs
(Eccl 12:9)44 and its great themes such as providential history,45 human knowl-
edge,46 and, as mentioned above, theodicy. In sum, while the Hellenists credit scep-
ticism for the turn to an anthropocentric model of knowledge, the Orientalists link
Qohelet to an “old Levantine” tradition of scepticism, which insists upon the su-
premacy of divine forces over human ones.
40 Menachem Fisch, “Ecclesiastes (Qohelet) in Context: A Study of Wisdom as Constructive Skepti-
cism,” in Critical Rationalism: The Social Sciences and the Humanities. Essays for Joseph Agassi, Vol-
ume 2, ed. Ian C. Jarvie and Nathaniel Laor (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 167–87.
41 Oswald Loretz, Qohelet und der Alte Orient: Untersuchungen zu Stil und theologischer Thematik
des Buches Qohelet (Freiburg: Herder, 1964).
42 Stefan Fischer, Die Aufforderung zur Lebensfreude im Buch Kohelet und seine Rezeption der ägyp-
tischen Harfnerlieder (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999).
43 See the criticism in Schwienhorst-Schönberger, “Kohelet,” 25–26.
44 Christian Klein, Kohelet und die Weisheit Israels: Eine formgeschichtliche Studie (Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer, 1994).
45 John F. Priest, “Humanism, Skepticism, and Pessimism in Israel,” Journal of the American Acad-
emy of Religion 36, no. 4 (1968): 311–26, here 323–24.
46 Annette Schellenberg, Erkenntnis als Problem: Qohelet und die alttestamentliche Diskussion um
das menschliche Erkennen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).
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The Structure of the Book
Even the debate between literary historians backing either the Hellenistic or the
Orientalist thesis centres on the question of the respective authority of the book’s
two moral maxims, the “joy of life” of the main part of the book and the “fear of
God” of its last chapter. Do we have to give a preference to one of the two maxims,
or can they be harmonised on an equal footing? The answer depends largely on the
structural patterns that one discovers in the book. The majority of the critics pre-
sume that Qohelet is a planless collection of aphorisms, while the minority proposes
a merely associative succession of themes held together by keywords and key phras-
es. Individual scholars have tried to prove the existence of a sophisticated plan:
the suggestions most discussed are Addison Wright’s numerological hypothesis and
Norbert Lohfink’s chiastic model, according to which Qohelet’s argument moves
back and forth between sections devoted to such anachronistic themes as “social
criticism” and “ideology criticism.”47
One comparatively solid thesis, however, has put forward a structural analysis
on purely formal grounds, focusing on periodically reappearing leitmotifs, especial-
ly the exhortation to enjoy sensual pleasures always designated by words derived
from the root חמש . Since 1904, when John F. Genung referred to these exhortations
as “landing-stages of inference or counsel,”48 exegetical tradition has commonly
counted seven such passages (Eccl 2:24–26; 3:12–13; 3:22; 5:17–19; 8:15; 9:7–10; 11:7–
10) and has convincingly argued them to be structuring devices. I would add three
more such exhortations (4:6; 7:10–14; 10:19) and come to the conclusion that Qohelet
is divided into ten parts, each one starting with a claim to experience (“I saw” and
similar formulas) and ending on one of the ten commendations of pleasure. The
first of the ten sections is the author’s autobiography, forming an introduction to
his wisdom, and if we examine the content of the other nine, there is a rough the-
matic partition between speculative and practical subjects that recalls the guiding
idea of the Aristotelian division of the sciences, with the science of knowledge,
originally called “analytics” and later called “logic,” being counted among the prac-
tical sciences.49 The shift from natural cycles to the afterlife and divine judgment
in chapter 3 recalls the common epistemic succession of physics followed by meta-
physics (or, in Aristotle’s terms, “theology”), and the same is true for the shift from
politics to economics at the end. We can imagine the model of the book as a sweep-
47 Lohfink, Kohelet, 10.
48 John Franklin Genung, Ecclesiastes: Words of Koheleth, Son of David, King in Jerusalem; Trans-
lated Anew, Divided According to Their Logical Cleavage, and Accompanied with a Study of Their
Literary and Spiritual Values and a Running Commentary (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin, and Com-
pany, 1904), 183–84, until Martin Alfred Klopfenstein, “Kohelet und die Freude am Dasein,” Theolo-
gische Zeitschrift 47 (1991): 97–107.
49 Arist. Metaph. 6.1.5, 1025b26.
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ing blow to the entirety of the Hellenistic canon of studies (ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία)50
following a sceptical literary genre of which books 7–11 of Sextus’s Adversus mathe-
maticos may still give us an idea. If we tentatively identify the Greek equivalents to
the subjects of Qohelet’s wisdom, the overall structure of the book looks like this:
1:1–12: Preliminaries
– 1:1: first title, which identifies the author as King Solomon
– 1:2–11: prologue with a summary of the book’s teachings
– 1:12: second title, again affirming the royal dignity of the author
1:13–2:26: Introduction detailing the author’s experience of the pursuit of happiness,
beginning with the phrase ית-יׁשֹוררּותה and ending with a
hedonistic exhortation; this part is structured in four sections:
– 1:13–18 on knowledge ( ת )
– 2:1–11 on pleasure ( ה )
– 2:12–16 on wisdom ( ה )
– 2:17–26 on labour ( ל )
Chapters 3–11: Main part structured in nine sections on different sciences, all of
them ending with a hedonistic exhortation:
– 3:1–12 on physics: everything is governed by time and fortune. This section has
no introductory formula, but יי (“I saw”) is present in the text.
– 3:14–21 on metaphysics: both humans and beasts have the same end. Incipit:
ַדי (“I knew”).
– 4:1–6 on anthropology: humans generally cause evil to each other. Incipit י
ָויה (“and I saw again”).
– 4:7–5:19 on psychology: humans have no control over their suffering and joy.
Once again, the incipit is יָויה .
– 6:1–7:14 on history: we have no foreknowledge of life except that it will finally
be erased by oblivion. Incipit: יי (“I saw”).
– 7:15–8:15 on ethics: there is no righteousness and no reward for virtue. Once
again, the incipit is יי (“I saw”).
– 8:16–9:10 on analytics: there is no knowledge of anything. The incipit is similar
to that of the experience section: ית-יַדתה .
– 9:11–10:20 on politics: warfare, glory, and government are unjust. Incipit י
ה .
– 11:1–10 on economics: the maxims of commercial prudence are paradoxes. This
last section, like the first, opens without an introduction.
50 This term, attested from ca. 50 BCE, came to designate an educational practice whose content
and structure remained remarkably stable from the third century BCE to the seventh century CE,
according to Teresa Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 42.
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12:1–8: Conclusion recommending piety
12:9–14: Epilogues
– 12:9–12: First epilogue: Wisdom epilogue
– 12:13–14: Second epilogue: Piety epilogue
The very order of Qohelet’s “public teaching of knowledge” (12:9) seems to result in
a strong polemical challenge to the truth claims of Greek science. On the other
hand, if we assume that all the hedonistic passages conclude basic structural units
of the text, we are much closer to a coherent discourse focusing on pleasure than
we are to a controversial dialogue in which all these hedonistic passages belong to
the discourse of a sceptic and are later refuted by a God-fearer.
Author and Date
One of the major harmonising devices found in Qohelet in its present form is the
attribution of the book to King Solomon, the builder of the Jerusalem Temple. This
attribution is found only in two title verses (1:1, 1:12), which closely resemble the
stereotypical formula by which Proverbs (1:1), Canticles (1:1), and two Psalms (72:1;
127:1) attribute later compositions to the same prestigious author. The attribution of
wisdom literature to monarchs was a legitimation strategy employed to equate the
hierarchies of knowledge with those of the social order, and the midrash still places
a great deal of emphasis on the author’s supposed royal background.51
While linguistic analysis of the text of Qohelet has made the traditional attribu-
tion implausible, most modern scholars see two possible means of rescuing the fu-
sion of knowledge and power: first, although Qohelet may not have been written by
a king, the author presumably belonged to an elite circle of courtly councillors,
temple scribes, or other tenured intellectuals, and second, his text develops a liter-
ary fiction of kingship, and if the book is not by King Solomon, it is at least about
him. As the Jewish Encyclopedia cautiously writes regarding this king, “it seems to
be probable that his life formed the basis of the Book of Ecclesiastes, and possibly
of some elements of the Song of Songs.”52 This is specifically referring to Qohelet’s
literary autobiography in chapter 2, which a widespread scholarly convention has
called the “Royal Experiment.”53
51 David Kimhi on 1Kgs 11:41; see also Reuven Kiperwasser, “The Midrashim on Kohelet: Studies
in their Formation and Redaction” [Hebrew]. (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, 2005).
52 Ira Maurice Price, Emil G. Hirsch, Wilhelm Bacher, M. Seligsohn, Mary W. Montgomery, and
Crawford Howell Toy, “Solomon,” in Jewish Encyclopedia, Volume 11, ed. Isidore Singer et al. (New
York and London: Funk and Wagnells, 1905), 436–48, here 438.
53 James L. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1988), 68; R. N. Whybray,
Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 34; Y. V. Koh, Royal Autobiography in the Book of
Qoheleth (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006).
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While the scholarly consensus seems to back one of the two above-mentioned
“alternatives to the original attribution, these constructs have no firm basis in the
text. As Qohelet clearly states, the author of the aphorisms was a ḥakam (12:9), and
his references to kingship deliberately assume the point of view of the subject, who
disagrees with the way in which vile and incapable people obtain public office (3:16;
4:13; 10:5–6) and yet fears to criticise the king for such political abuses (8:2; 10:20).
Not even the allegedly “royal” experiment with the pursuit of happiness gives any
internal evidence regarding the author’s royal identity. Aside from wisdom and la-
bour, the author only enumerates such material means that were available to any
wealthy individual: wine-drinking, residences, vineyards, gardens, orchards,54 irri-
gation pools, slaves, cattle, sheep, gold, silver, and entertainers. The last element
in the enumeration, התֹוּד , is a cryptic hapax that the Babylonian Talmud (b.
Giṭ. 68a) explained as referring to male and female demons, Rashi to carriages, and
still others to sportive games, while Abraham ibn Ezra postulated a reference to
concubines simply because he expected the list to contain a mention of Solomon’s
many women and sexual infatuations.55 Qohelet, however, is a monogamous misog-
ynist (7:26; 9:9), and his literary self-portrait lacks indeed any decipherable refer-
ence to Solomon’s emblematic harem. He likewise glosses over the latter’s temple
and stables: he boasts of his cows and sheep, but never mentions horses. More
revealingly still, his “experiment” does not contain any mention of political justice,
monumental constructions, public piety, military glory, or anything that would have
pertained to a king’s individual achievements. It therefore seems safe to conclude
that the politics of canonisation attributed to King Solomon a book whose author
was never meant to be a king, nor was he a member of a wisdom circle at court. He
does not speak like a man who lives off his wisdom, but like an independent propri-
etor and merchant (see 11:1) who, in the Greek style, used his prosperity to fund,
among other prestigious occupations, his search for wisdom (7:11–12). Some of his
more interpretable statements—that he accumulated more wisdom and wealth than
any Jerusalemite before him (1:16; 2:7.9), that he received money from kings and
faraway provinces (2:8), and that he mused about the effects of dynastic succession
(2:12)—were probably not initially meant as a means of claiming royal dignity,
though they would retroactively become proof of the tradition of Solomonic author-
ship.
The exuberant delights accumulated during the “experiment” thus portray a
lifestyle that is patrician without any distinctively royal features. The frugal pleas-
54 Of all the items mentioned in the list, the garden has been claimed as a proof of royal privilege;
see Arian Verheij, “Paradise Retried: On Qohelet 2.4–6,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament
16, no. 50 (1991): 113–15. However, wealthy individuals also practised horticulture, and philosophers
such as Theophrastus and Epicurus were known for their gardens. See Louise Cilliers and François
Pieter Retief, “Horticulture in Antiquity, with Emphasis on the Graeco-Roman Era,” Akroterion 54
(2009): 1–10, here 5.
55 Mordecai b. Solomon Plungian, Kerem li-Shelomoh (Vilnius: R. M. Romm, 1857), 34.
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ures that are subsequently praised in the ten exhortations are even more at variance
with the alleged courtly setting. The reader is advised to enjoy ordinary life, which
consists of food and drink (2:24; 3:13; 5:17; 8:15; 9:7; 10:19), work (3:22), rest (4:6),
friends (4:9), property (5:18), cleanliness and body care (9:8), conjugal intimacy
(9:9), ready money (10:19), the sight of sunlight (11:7), and all stages of the lifecycle
(11:9). In sharp contrast to the ambitious hedonism of the initial autobiography, the
book concludes on an Epicurean ethics of the golden mean, aurea mediocritas,56
which is ideally located in a moderately affluent private home.
If Qohelet’s author was an educated parvenu and not a king or a councillor,
where does he fall in the history of the Levant and, more particularly, that of Jerusa-
lem? While the Orientalists tend to favour an earlier dating, the Hellenists mostly
agree that the author lived in the third century BCE under Ptolemaic rule, when
Judean society had reached the levels of luxury and social inequality that the text
seems to presuppose.57 The foremost representatives of Qohelet scholarship in the
twenty-first century have taken this dating for granted.58 Only a few historians have
placed Qohelet at a later date, after the Seleucid takeover in 198 BCE. Joseph Klaus-
ner famously attributed the book to the Tobiad warlord Hyrcanus who committed
suicide in 175 BCE when King Antiochus IV rose to power, another hypothesis which
is based on the allegedly royal or princely character of the “experiment.”59 Whitley
claims that the book was written around 150 BCE under the latter king, who promot-
ed Epicureanism as his state doctrine.60
The almost complete consensus in favour of dating Qohelet to the Ptolemaic
period is based on simple but rather weak arguments.61 First, there is an implicit
bias against the second century, which is considered to be a time of religious turmoil
because of the Maccabean revolt that began in 167 BCE, and second, there is the
56 Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger, “Via Media: Koh 7,15–18 und die griechisch-hellenistische
Philosophie,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom, ed. Antoon Schoors (Leuven: Leuven University
Press, 1998), 181–203.
57 According to Elias Bickerman, he is “a product of Ptolemaic Jerusalem”; see Elias Bickerman,
“Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) or the Philosophy of an Acquisitive Society,” in Elias Bickerman, Four
Strange Books of the Bible: Jonah, Daniel, Koheleth, Esther (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 139–
67, here 141; Bohlen, “Kohelet,” 261: “Es sind exakt die Ungerechtigkeiten des Systems, deren Kohe-
let sich bewußt wird.”
58 Rudman, Determinism, 13; Perdue, The Sword and the Stylus, 198–255; Sneed, The Politics of
Pessimism, 85–124; Lavoie, “Où en sont les études,” (2019) 43.
59 Joseph Klausner, “Meḥabbero shel Sefer Qohelet,” Ha-Shiloaḥ 42 (1927): 46–57. The thesis has
even found its way into popular publications such as Martin Sicker, Kohelet: The Reflections of a
Judean Prince. A New Translation and Commentary (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2006). It is all the
more surprising that JiSeong James Kwon and Matthias Brütsch fail to mention their predecessors
when citing it in “Gemeinsame intellektuelle Hintergründe in Kohelet und in der Familientradition
der Tobiaden,” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 130, no. 2 (2018): 235–51.
60 Whitley, Kohelet, 182.
61 I follow their enumeration in Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 19–20.
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thesis that Jesus ben Sira knew the Book of Qohelet and that the latter must there-
fore have been written before Ben Sira’s presumed composition, Ecclesiasticus,
which is dated to around 180 BCE.62 However, the parallels between the two books
can be explained either way.63 Finally, the complaints about the gains of the rich
and the exploitation of the poor allegedly fit nicely with a date somewhere during
the Ptolemaic Empire, which was known for its exorbitant taxation system—al-
though this monarchy certainly did not have a monopoly on this economic ill.
Thus, none of the chronological arguments is particularly conclusive. On the
contrary, it seems to me that the Ptolemaic dating overestimates the economic and
intellectual vitality of Jerusalem in the third century BCE. Archaeological excavation
shows that the temple city was a minor townlet confined to the eastern slope of
present-day Silwan Hill. It was only the change of government in 198 BCE that
brought about a remarkable period of urban growth.64
Wine is the most frequently mentioned consumer item in Qohelet’s hedonistic
exhortations (2:3; 9:7; 10:19). If, like Sneed, we attempt to trace wealth and luxury
via the spread of wine connoisseurship, which in turn is quantifiable through the
archaeological finds of the stamped handles of jars containing high-quality wine
from the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Chios,65 we must seriously reflect on the chro-
nology of these imports that the digs in the City of David have revealed. The number
of stamped jar handles from Ptolemaic times that were found in the excavations is
below five per lustrum; it rises constantly for finds of handles dating to the early
Seleucid period, crossing the mark of twenty around 190 BCE and then peaking
above sixty during the years 175 to 167 BCE. After the rebellion, wine imports plum-
met, and by the fall of the Seleucid garrison in 141 BCE, they have disappeared
entirely.66
In sum, the material evidence regarding the consumption of fine wines in Jeru-
salem allows us to make a case for dating Qohelet to the early years of King Antio-
62 According to Lohfink, Qohelet, 7, “setzt das Buch Jesus Sirach das Buch Koh voraus.”
63 Rudman, Determinism, 31: “The precise relationship between Ben Sira and Ecclesiastes remains
unclear.”
64 Oded Lipschits, “Jerusalem between Two Periods of Greatness: The Size and Status of the City
in the Babylonian, Persian and Early Hellenistic Periods,” in Judah between East and West: The
Transition from Persian to Greek Rule (ca. 400–200 BCE), ed. Lester L. Grabbe and Oded Lipschits
(London: T&T Clark International, 2011), 163–75. On the causes of urban growth after 198 BCE, see
G. G. Aperghis, “Jewish Subjects and Seleukid Kings: A Case Study of Economic Interaction,” in
The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC, ed. Zosia Archibald, John K. Da-
vies, and Vincent Gabrielsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19–41, here 36.
65 Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism, 99.
66 Gérald Finkielsztejn, “Du bon usage des amphores hellénistiques en contextes archéologiques,”
in Céramiques hellénistiques et romaines: Productions et diffusion en Méditerranée orientale (Chypre,
Égypte et côte syro-palestinienne), ed. Francine Blondé, Pascale Ballet, and Jean-François Salles
(Lyon: Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée-Jean Pouilloux, 2002), 227–33. On the sources and
interpretation of the data, see also Jodi Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in
the Time of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 214–15.
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chus’s reign, which was the high tide of Hellenisation in Jerusalem. There may be
another basis for such a hypothesis. I am referring to a historical allusion in Qoh
4:13–15, which scholars have most frequently judged to be an assemblage of prover-
bial or prototypical topoi,67 but which deserves to be read in search of Qohelet’s
concrete political context.
Better is a poor and wise child ( דןם ) than an old and foolish king ( ֶּמָזּוןלי ),
who knoweth not how to receive admonition ( ר ) any more. For out of prison ( תי
ּוסםי ), he came forth to be king, although in his kingdom he was born poor ( ׁשדַלֹונ ). I saw
all the living that walk under the sun, that they were with the child, the second, that was to
stand up in his stead ( דירדוי ).68
The detail of the king’s past imprisonment is certainly not a proverbial topos. If
we look for a historical model of this dynastic conundrum among three Hellenistic
contenders, with one being qualified as old and the two others as minors, the allu-
sions seem to fit the conditions in 175 to 170 BCE.69 Indeed, Antiochus IV Epiphanes
was the only Hellenistic king who ever ascended his throne after being held captive.
As a younger brother of the ruling King Seleucus IV, he was held hostage in Rome
for a decade, from 188 to 178 BCE, after which time he was exchanged for Seleucus’s
young son and heir, Demetrius I Soter, whom the Romans would hold captive until
164 BCE. Seleucus was assassinated by the usurper Heliodorus in 175 BCE and Antio-
chus, now released, in turn ousted Heliodorus by force. Though he was not the
dynastic successor, Antiochus ruled the Seleucid kingdom from 175 BCE together
with a second nephew, Demetrius’s brother, also named Antiochus, who was assas-
sinated on his orders in 170 BCE.
With his allusion to the Seleucid succession conflict, Qohelet’s author seems to
have been expressing his support of the legitimate heirs, the two child-age brothers,
against their uncle Antiochus. The latter was seen as an eccentric character by his
contemporaries, who turned his honorific Epiphanes (“[God] manifest”) into Epima-
nes (“madman”), as attested by Polybius.70 When he became king in 175 BCE, he
was in his forties, whereas the captive Demetrius was ten years old and his brother,
the co-ruler, was even younger. Qohelet’s contrasting of ןָז and ד describes with
only a little exaggeration the age difference between King Antiochus and the two
princes.
67 Lohfink, Kohelet, 39: “Sprichwörter”; Ze’ev Weisman, “Elements of Political Satire in Koheleth
4,13–16; 9,13–16,” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 111, no. 4 (1999): 547–60, here
547: “a common typological pattern”; Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism, 128: “popular pseudo-histo-
ry […] prototypical picture.”
68 Qoh 4:13–15; my translation is based on the American Standard Version.
69 For the following, see John D. Grainger, A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer (Leiden: Brill,
1997), 37, 52.
70 Polybius, Histories 26.10.
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Rulers of different ages are again compared in Qoh 10:16–17, albeit in an invert-
ed order of preference. This time, the author seems to juxtapose the two Hellenistic
empires, Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Syria:
Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a boy ( ר ), and thy princes (  ) feast in the
morning! Happy art thou, O land, when thy king is a free man ( ֹוח-ןםי ), and thy
princes eat in due season, in strength, and not in drunkenness!
While King Antiochus was an adult in 175 BCE, the Ptolemaic ruler Ptolemy VI was
only eleven years old, and the state was governed by his sister-wife Cleopatra II and
two regents.71 Qohelet’s author leaves no doubt about where his loyalties lay be-
tween the two kingdoms, which had become antagonistic by 172 BCE leading to
open war two years later. Our dating of the text to the years 175 to 170 BCE places
the author within a period during which the Hellenising tendencies were strongest
among the Jews, creating a dynamic of economic growth from which the priestly
and urban elite particularly profited. When Antiochus IV became king, he gave Ja-
son, the son of Simon II (Simon the Just), the dignity of Jewish high priest. Jason
offered to change the Jerusalem constitution in order to permit the foundation of a
Greek-style polis with cultural innovations such as the opening of a gymnasium
destined to educate young people. In 172 BCE, Jason was ousted by his brother Men-
elaus and had to flee to the Transjordan,72 while relations between Greeks and Jews
became more conflicted. In retrospect, Victor Tcherikover calls Jason’s time as high
priest (175/4–172/1 BCE) “the rule of the moderate Hellenizers”73 and a time of pros-
perity during which the new constitution had no effect on religious life.74 If, as I
propose, we date Qohelet to that period, then he must have witnessed a moment of
important social change brought about by cultural imperialism and by the success-
ful adaptation of an affluent colonised elite.
Conclusion
The Cynics, Epicureans, and Pyrrhonian Sceptics seem to have crossed boundaries
of language and ethnicity more easily than their counterparts from the more estab-
lished philosophical schools. This trend dominated the Levantine school of philo-
sophical thought, which was based in the city of Gadara (Umm Qais, Jordan) and
whose most notable figure was the satirist Menippus. The only Greek philosopher
quoted in rabbinic literature, Abnomos ha-Gardi, is probably identical with Oeno-
71 Günther Hölbl, A History of the Ptolemaic Empire, trans. Tina Saavedra (London: Routledge,
2001), 143–52.
72 2Macc 4:26.
73 Victor Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews, trans. Shimon Applebaum, 5th printing
(New York: Athenaeum, 1979), 171.
74 Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization, 166–67.
Doubting Divine Justice and Human Knowledge: Qohelet’s Cultural Dialectics 23
maus of Gadara, a Cynic of the second century CE.75 The epithet “Epicurean” was
preserved in rabbinic parlance as a term of abuse.
James A. Loader and James Crenshaw supposed that Qohelet’s author was influ-
enced by Greek models but that his arguments were directed against wisdom tradi-
tions in an internal Jewish context. As in the Book of Job, the “crisis of wisdom”
leads to the pessimistic conclusion that the world is inaccessible to human knowl-
edge and that man has no power over his life. But as we have seen, Qohelet’s scepti-
cism has a double thrust. It limits the Jewish view of history as an instrument of
divine retribution, but it also raises doubts regarding Greek science’s claims to ex-
plain nature, forecast history, and promote virtue. Qohelet’s location in the larger
context of the multilingual reception of Greek thought among the subdued nations
of the Levant has already been studied from a postcolonial perspective by Christoph
Uehlinger76 and Leo Perdue.77 While studies of biblical wisdom literature may have
exaggerated its “internationality” as an irenic syncretism and a “sapiential koiné”
of the antique eastern Mediterranean, a transcultural approach may detect the im-
pact of an ethnic conflict and the clash of wisdom traditions. Qohelet was produced
in the midst of a complex situation, in which members of the Jerusalem religious
elite are believed to have profited economically as well as intellectually from the
conditions of the polis privileges that came with the Hellenistic regime. Social con-
ditions not only prompted Qohelet’s author to cover his plutocracy with fatalism
and pleasure ethics, as Sneed has argued,78 but also to observe a sceptical distance
from the norms of both paideia and Torah.
Qohelet’s reception of popular oppositional undercurrents within a hegemonic
culture may be compared to the modern intellectual circles in the Global South
that appropriated Western culture via its dissidents. Chinese Marxists, for example,
pursued the goal of “accepting Western culture critically” in order to resist both
European imperialism and local conservatism.79 Through his selective reception of
the uncanonical trends from Greek philosophy, Qohelet could challenge providen-
tial theology using the means of individual doubt on the one hand and scientific
certainty via references to the hidden elohim on the other. The conflict between
Athens and Jerusalem was complicated rather than mirrored by the contradiction
between the joy of life and the fear of God. It was further complicated by the pres-
ence of social tension and intellectual controversy in both camps. To the elements
of dissident thought that he lifted from Greek scepticism, Qohelet assigned the task
of brokering a balance between the two wisdoms.
75 Yehoshua Amir, “Doch ein griechischer Einfluß auf das Buch Kohelet?” in Yehoshua Amir, Stu-
dien zum antiken Judentum (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985), 35–50.
76 Christoph Uehlinger, “Qohelet im Horizont mesopotamischer, levantinischer und ägyptischer
Weisheitsliteratur der persischen und hellenistischen Zeit,” in Das Buch Kohelet, 155–247.
77 Perdue, The Sword and the Stylus, 232.
78 Sneed, The Politics of Pessimism, 178.
79 Li Zonggui, Between Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the Modernization of
Chinese Culture (Oxford: Chartridge Books, 2014), 226.
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Reuven Kiperwasser
“Matters That Tend towards Heresy”:
Rabbinic Ways of Reading Ecclesiastes
The Book of Ecclesiastes has always troubled its readers, be they modern interpret-
ers, Second Temple Jews, or late antique rabbis. The most obvious problem with it,
in their opinion, is its recurring scepticism.1 Indeed, it seems to question the very
possibility that people might be able to shape their future or change their fate
through informed action. In fact, the author’s concern would appear to be those
problems that arise from this human inability to discern divine action or purpose.
Biblical scholars have suggested that Ecclesiastes’s scepticism was in part a reaction
to the more confident assertions found in other biblical works such as the Book
of Proverbs.2 Against this widespread tendency, Stuart Weeks has concluded that
Ecclesiastes’s ideas are not actually sceptical, but rather that they are driven by a
sense of disappointment with human nature. It is a feeling that people accept the
world naïvely and that they are guided by emotion, which inevitably leads them to
misperceive the true nature of the world.3 In this regard, the author of Ecclesiastes
seeks “to steer others away from the false expectations and disappointment which
he experienced himself, by opening their eyes to the reality of their situation.”4
According to Weeks, “the author has given us a character [in Ecclesiastes] who is
not supposed to command assent at every turn from his readers, but whose situa-
tion drives him to a provocative, poetic, and sometimes very personal re-evaluation
of the world and human priorities.”5 Readers, he continues, are “supposed to en-
gage with Qohelet’s ideas, not necessarily to identify with his priorities and con-
cerns.”6 Thus, modern readers, according to Weeks, mark Ecclesiastes as a sceptical
1 This has been argued by numerous authors. See, for example, Martin Alfred Klopfenstein, “Die
Skepsis des Qohelet,” Theologische Zeitschrift 28 (1972): 97–109; William H. U. Anderson, “What Is
Scepticism and Can It Be Found in the Hebrew Bible?”, Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testa-
ment 13, no. 2 (1999): 225–57; James Lee Crenshaw, “The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient Israel,” in
The Divine Helmsman: Studies on God’s Control of Human Events, Presented to Lou H. Silberman, ed.
James L. Crenshaw and Samuel Sandmel (New York: Ktav, 1980), 1–19. For criticism of these ap-
proaches, see Stuart Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (New York: T&T Clark International, 2012),
132–35.
2 See Milton P. Horne, “Intertextuality and Economics: Reading Ecclesiastes with Proverbs,” in
Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually, ed. Katharine Dell and Will Kynes (London: Bloomsbury, 2014),
106–17; Daniel J. Estes, “Seeking and Finding in Ecclesiastes and Proverbs,” in Reading Ecclesiastes
Intertextually, 118–29. See and compare further Werman, “Wisdom Scepticism and Apocalyptic Cer-
titude” in this volume.
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text because they are unsure quite how to classify it. Weeks’s point of view deserves
a more detailed discussion, although I am more interested here in the rabbinic re-
ception of Ecclesiastes.7 It is curious, however, that in many ways, rabbinic readings
of Ecclesiastes, as we shall see, resemble those of modern readers. As if following
Weeks’s advice, they engaged too closely with the scriptural verses of Ecclesiastes
and were attracted to the work’s unusual tone and content. Similar to modern schol-
ars, who have searched for foreign ideas in this biblical book in order to account
for its unconventionality, the rabbis attempted to uncover heretical undertones in
this ancient text, but at the same time to counterbalance them with their own read-
ings, thereby rendering it acceptable despite its problematic nature.
There is a broad consensus among scholars that rabbinic controversy surround-
ed the question of whether to include Ecclesiastes in the biblical canon.8 In this
article, I will first consider the early rabbinic discussion of the book, some of which
has been taken as evidence of such a controversy. I will then address later rabbinic
deliberations, which do indeed express genuine exegetical bewilderment about the
book, though still no evidence of canonical controversy.
7 It would be interesting to attempt to explain this unusual nature of Ecclesiastes and the source
of its attraction with the help of Umberto Eco and his idea of the open work (opera operta). Eco
refines the concept found in aesthetic theory that states that every text is open because it can be
read in an infinite number of ways, depending on what the reader brings to the text. For Eco, an
open work is a text that is not limited to a single reading or range of readings; it admits complexity
and encourages or requires a multiplicity of readings. Eco sees open works as essentially political,
as a work that openly expresses a pluralistic worldview. As examples, he cites texts which on the
surface are more traditional, although still enigmatic. Thus, in Kafka’s Metamorphosis, the reader
relates to the text on the level of metaphor, but without a clear mapping of metaphors (Umberto
Eco, The Open Work, trans. Anna Cancogni [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 9).
There is no fixed symbolism by which to unlock the meaning of Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosis.
However, if, in Kafka’s case, we can imagine that the author intentionally left the hidden room of
his work open—or, let us say, unfinished—did the author of Ecclesiastes construct his text as an
open work, or did some peculiarities of its redaction and reception render it an open work, a text
which invites us to interpret it and which expresses a worldview that can be understood as pluralis-
tic?
8 See, for instance, the following: Saul Lieberman, “Notes on Chapter I of Midrash Koheleth Rab-
bah” [Hebrew], in Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem, ed. R. J. Zwi
Werblowsky, Chaim Wirszubski, Gershom G. Scholem, and Ephraim E. Urbach (Jerusalem: Magnes
Press,1967): 163–70; Marc Hirshman, “Qohelet’s Reception and Interpretation in Early Rabbinic Lit-
erature,” in Studies in Ancient Midrash, ed. James L. Kugel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Center for Jewish Studies, Harvard University Press, 2001), 87–99; Sid Z. Leiman, The Canonization
of Hebrew Scripture: The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence (Hamden, CT: Academy, 1970), 51–56,
120–24.
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Tannaitic Approaches to Ecclesiastes and Solomon
The date and authorship of this very exceptional biblical book has always been a
matter of dispute. Modern Bible scholars place the composition of Ecclesiastes in
the Hellenistic period (third to second centuries BCE) and regard it both as one of
the latest books in the Hebrew Bible and as being of unknown authorship.9 The
rabbis, however, assumed that Ecclesiastes was a prophetic work and attributed it
to King Solomon along with Proverbs and the Song of Songs.10
Seder Olam, a historiographic tannaitic work dated to the second century CE,11
describes how in old age and close to death, King Solomon repented for his sins,
received the “holy spirit,” namely divine inspiration, and composed his three books
one after another:
Seder Olam 15
“And King Solomon loved many foreign ןמ'גותוירכנםישנבהאהמלשךלמהו
women” etc. “from nations which the אצמתשכ,)ב-אאי'אםיכלמ('גוםיוגה
Lord has said.., “You shall not enter בלהימרי('וגויתמחלעויפאלעיכרמול
into marriage with them” etc. (1Kgs ותתימלךומסהמלשתנקזתעללבא,)אל
11:1–2). As you will find it say “The השלשרמאו,שדקהחורוילעהתרש
city has aroused my anger and wrath” .תלהקוםירישהרישתולשמ,וללהםירפס
(Jer 32:31). But at the time of Solo-
mon’s old age, close to his death, the
Holy Spirit rested upon him, and he re-
cited these three books: Proverbs, Canti-
cles and Qohelet. 12
9 For recent discussion, see Antoon Schoors, Ecclesiastes (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 2–7, and Weeks,
Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 170–79 (and for further discussion on dating Ecclesiastes, see the con-
tributions in this volume by Carsten Wilke and Cana Werman).
10 This idea already appears in tannaitic literature (roughly second to early third centuries CE);
see also Sifre Deut. 1 (Finkelstein edition, 2). For another example, see, the following passage from
Seder Olam, although his name is absent from the long list of prophets in chapters 20 and 21;
see Milikowsky’s explanation in his commentary, Seder Olam: Critical Edition, Commentary, and
Introduction (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2013), 2:349. For a brief discussion of the attribution of pro-
phetic abilities to Solomon, see Milikowsky’s commentary on Seder Olam, Vol.2, 348–49, and n. 93.
The assumption of Solomon’s prophetic powers took further root in the writings of the amoraim:
see Marc Hirshman, “The Prophecy of King Solomon and Ruach HaKodesh in Midrash Qohelet
Rabbah” [Hebrew], Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 1, no. 3 (1982): 7–14.
11 See Milikowsky edition, introduction, Vol. 1, 116–29. The exact dating is problematic, because,
as Milikowsky suggests, the prototype of the text was composed before the rabbinic period, but it
was accepted by the rabbis and edited during the tannaitic period.
12 Milikowsky edition, 2: 266. The translation is taken from Chaim J. Milikowsky, “Seder Olam: A
Rabbinic Chronography” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1981), 2: 492.
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This tradition presents certain challenges. In the passage above, the author shows
that Solomon did not always possess the “holy spirit”; that is, he was not always
inspired by God, as this divine inspiration left him in the fourth year of his reign.13
Milikowsky proposes that the author of Seder Olam, which is based on 2Chr 11:17,
believed that unlike Rehoboam, Solomon returned to a righteous path at the end of
his life, at which point he composed these works.14 A similar tradition to this is
found in Song of Songs Rabbah (1:1:10), but in this case, it is questioned and an
alternative view is advocated, which is of amoraic provenance, according to which
Solomon composed each of these three works at different periods in the course of
his life: the Song of Songs in his youth, Proverbs in his maturity, and Ecclesiastes
in his old age. We shall take a closer look at this tradition below. Interestingly,
nobody has raised the possibility that Ecclesiastes was not composed in the author’s
later years. And indeed, the book does give the feeling that its author has already
lived a full life, that he has both known everything and doubted everything. Seder
Olam’s author appears to believe that all three books were composed under the
inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This idea, however, was not embraced by everyone,
as we shall see below. Notably, it appears that the author of Seder Olam does not
doubt that Ecclesiastes belongs in the canon or that Solomon regained his prophetic
abilities at the end of his years.
Lieberman’s Thesis: A Rabbinic Canonical
Controversy
With its statement that Solomon received the Holy Spirit prior to composing the
three books, this passage attributes a prophetic status to Ecclesiastes and the other
books attributed to Solomon. Moreover, it does not suggest that Ecclesiastes’s status
within the canon was ever in question. Saul Lieberman, however, suggests that this
was not the case; rather, he argues that its status had been in dispute. He recon-
structs this dispute, however, on the basis of later material, which is preserved in
amoraic literature. Lieberman suggests that the exclusion of Ecclesiastes from the
canon was proposed despite its attribution to Solomon, since the latter had com-
posed the book in his old age, after having worshipped foreign gods.15 He bases his
theory of rabbinic controversy on the fact that the only explicit discussion of the
biblical canon, order, and authorship in rabbinic literature does not mention Solo-
mon as the author of Ecclesiastes, but rather someone else:
13 See the explanation in Milikowsky, Seder Olam: Critical Edition, 2: 262.
14 Milikowsky, 2: 262.
15 Saul Lieberman, “Mishnah of Song of Songs” [Hebrew] in Gershom G. Scholem, Jewish Gnosti-
cism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition, New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of
America 1965, Appendix D, 118–126.
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b. B. Bat. 15a
Hezekiah and his party composed Isa- ריש,ילשמ,היעשיובתכותעיסוהיקזח
iah, Proverbs, the Song of Songs, .תלהקוםירישה
and Ecclesiastes.
The meaning of this passage, and particularly the identity of Hezekiah (and his
party), is obscure. Some scholars have suggested that the rabbis were thinking of
none other than King Hezekiah of Judah, who lived in the late eighth to early sev-
enth century BCE, and the members of his court. Others have proposed that this
passage refers to a group of imagined editors who began the process of canonising
the Bible, a process ostensibly completed during the generation of Yavneh.16 For his
part, Lieberman suggests that Hezekiah’s party was an ancient group of unknown
exegetes who offered a metaphorical interpretation of difficult biblical texts. This
interpretative activity allowed Ecclesiastes, which presented some difficulty for rab-
binic readers, to gain acceptance.17
The above-mentioned talmudic passage does not, however, explicitly refer to a ca-
nonical controversy over Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, or any of the other books in
the list. Lieberman bases his claim largely on another ancient rabbinic debate found in
m. Yadayim, which he understands as actually discussing the question of the inclusion
or exclusion of Ecclesiastes from the biblical canon. The source is as follows:
m. Yad. 3:5
All the Holy Scriptures render the .םידיהתאןיאמטמשדקהיבתכלכ
hands unclean. The Song of Songs and 'ר.םידיהתאןיאמטמתלהקוםירישהריש
Ecclesiastes render the hands unclean. םידיהתאאמטמםירישהרישרמואהדוהי
R. Judah says: The Song of Songs ren- תקולחמתלהקו
ders the hands unclean, but concern- רישוםידיהתאאמטמוניאתלהקא"יר
ing Ecclesiastes there is dissension. תקולחמםירישה
R. Yose says: Ecclesiastes does not ren- ה"בירמוחמוש"בילוקמתלהקא"שר
der the hands unclean, and concern- םויבןקזב"עיפמינאלבוקמיאזעןבש"רא
ing the Song of Songs there is dissen- םירישהריששהבישיבע"בא"רתאובישוהש
sion. R. Simeon says: Ecclesiastes is סחע"ררמאםידיהתאםיאמטמתלהקו
one of the issues concerning which the רישלעלארשימםדאקלחנאלםולשו
School of Shammai adopted themore לכןיאשםידיהתאאמטתאלשםירישה
lenient, and the School of Hillel the לארשילה"שובןתינשםויכיאדכולכםלועה
more stringent ruling. R. Simeon b. ‘Az- םישדקשדוקםירישהרישושדקםיבותכלכש
zai said: I have heard a tradition from ר"א.תלהקלעאלאוקלחנאלוקלחנםאו
the seventy-two elders on the day ע"בירבדכע"רלשוימחןבעשוהיןבןנחוי
when they appointed R. Ele‘azar b. ‘Az- ורמגןכווקלחנךכ
16 See also Leiman, The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture, 120–24.
17 Lieberman, “Mishnah of Song of Songs,” 163–67.
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ariah as an elder, that the Song of
Songs and Ecclesiastes both render the
hands unclean. R. ‘Aqiba said: God for-
bid!—no-one in Israel doubted [the
common opinion] about the Song of
Songs [by saying] that it does not ren-
der the hands unclean, for the whole
world cannot compare to the day on
which the Song of Songs was given to
Israel; for all of Scripture is sacred, but
the Song of Songs is the most sacred of
all. And if aught was in dispute, the
dispute concerned Ecclesiastes alone.
R. Yoḥanan b. Joshua, the son of R.
‘Aqiba’s father-in-law, said: According
to the words of Ben ‘Azzai so did they
dispute and so did they decide.18
This mishnaic passage discusses whether two of the books attributed to Solomon,
Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs, should be considered in the same legal category
as the rest of Scripture, which ritually defiles the hands. Underlying this discussion
is the halakhic principle that all holy scriptures have the capacity to transmit ritual
impurity upon contact.19 The same mishnaic passage cites R. Simeon bar Yoḥai’s
claim that the status of Ecclesiastes with respect to its capacity to render the hands
impure was a point of contention between the schools of Shammai and Hillel.
Challenges to Lieberman’s Thesis
Alongwith Lieberman, there have been other scholars who have sought to connect the
concept of the ritual defilement of the hands with the rabbinic process of canonisa-
tion.20 However, this view has been rejected because at the very least, it could not be
referring to a rabbinic controversy, as this ritual concept has pre-rabbinic roots.21
18 Herbert Danby, trans., The Mishna (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 781–82 (with some minor
changes).
19 This form of impurity is only mentioned in rabbinic literature. See Chaim Milikowsky, “Reflec-
tions on Hand-Washing, Hand-Purity and Holy Scripture in Rabbinic Literature,” in Purity and Holi-
ness: The Heritage of Leviticus, ed. Marcel Poorthuis and Joshua J. Schwartz (Leiden: Brill, 2000),
149–62, here 160–62.
20 Leiman, The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture, 102–20.
21 Menahem Haran, The Biblical Collection: Its Consolidation to the End of the Second Temple Times
and Changes of Form to the End of the Middle Ages (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996), 1:201–76 (He-
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Another problem with Lieberman’s thesis is that the surviving tannaitic inter-
pretations of Ecclesiastes hardly give any indication that the book was seen as prob-
lematic. In fact, the two major tannaitic schools did indeed interpret Ecclesiastes in
different ways.22 For R. Ishmael’s school, Ecclesiastes was fully integrated into the
exegetical canon, and they regarded its main theme to be coping with death, includ-
ing reward and punishment. The opposing school of R. ‘Aqiba conceded that Eccle-
siastes’s value had once been debated, primarily to defend his position regarding
the high status of the Song of Songs, which he interpreted mystically. There is no
indication of a problematic or even different status being attributed to Ecclesiastes
in the exegesis of R. ‘Aqiba or his school. Therefore, I believe that the school of
R. ‘Aqiba’s hypothesis regarding a dispute over the status of the Book of Ecclesiastes
is no more than their attempt to reconstruct the history of the book; namely, it is an
explanation that they themselves invented, not a genuine memory dating from the
period of the canonisation of the Scriptures.
The discussion about whether Ecclesiastes renders the hands impure implies
that the rabbis perceived there to be some difficulty with the content of this work.
Rabbinic literature, however, does not account for Ecclesiastes’s status with respect
to rendering the hands impure by appealing to the problem of its canonicity. The
only surviving tannaitic explanation of the problem cites a sage from the last gener-
ation of tannaim, Rabbi Simeon b. Menasya, who claims that while Ecclesiastes is
indeed a product of wisdom, it was not divinely inspired. Therefore, it differs from
the other books of the Bible. There is no question, however, about its canonicity.
t. Yad. 2:14
Rabbi Simeon b. Menasya says, the Song of רישרמואאיסנמןבןועמש'ר
Songs renders the hands unclean since it was ינפמםידיהתאאמטמםירישה
said with the holy spirit; Ecclesiastes does not הניאתלהק.שדקהחורבהרמאנש
render the hands unclean since it is Solo- איהשינפמםידיהתאאמטמ
mon’s wisdom23 המלשלשותמכחמ
Rabbi Simeon b. Menasya is concerned with a number of issues here. He is dealing
with matters of purity on the one hand, while on the other, he is attempting to
organise Solomon’s oeuvre by genre: one is prophecy, and another is wisdom. He
is not preoccupied with canonical controversy. The assertion that the author’s wis-
dom is not divinely inspired does not indicate that it is perceived as displeasing or
brew); Shamma Y. Friedman, “The Holy Scriptures Defile the Hands: The Transformation of a Bibli-
cal Concept in Rabbinic Theology,” in Minhah le-Nahum: Biblical and Other Studies Presented to
Nahum M. Sarna in Honour of his 70th Birthday, ed. Marc Brettler and Michael Fishbane (Sheffield:
JSOT Press, 1993), 117–32; Milikowsky, “Reflections on Hand-Washing,” 160–62.
22 Midrash Kohelet Rabbah 1–6, edited by Marc Hirshman, (The Midrash Project; Jerusalem:
Schechter Institute, 2016), 94–99.
23 Zuckermandel edition, 683.
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heretical. However, it is clearly polemicizing against the tradition in Seder Olam,
which supposes that all three books were the prophetic works of a repentant king.
The Amoraic Approach: Determining Ecclesiastes’s
Problem
There are, however, claims made in amoraic literature that suggest a more troubling
issue of status. We saw above how Seder Olam regarded Ecclesiastes to be a pro-
phetic book on a par with the other books attributed to Solomon. However, accord-
ing to a relatively late midrashic tradition preserved in Song of Songs Rabbah, the
composition of these books occurred sequentially over the course of Solomon’s life.
As such, they have different statuses.
Song of Songs Rab. 1:1:10
[Solomon] composed three books: Prov- םירישהרישתלהקוילשמבתכםירפס'ג
erbs and Ecclesiastes and the Song of יברוהבראייח'רהלחתבתכןהמהזיא
Songs. Which of these did he write first? הלחתבתכילשמרמאהבראייחיברןתנוי
Rabbi Ḥiyya the Great and R. Jonathan יתיימותלהקכ"חאוםירישהרישכ"חאו
[differ on this question]. Rabbi Ḥiyya the לשמ,לשמםיפלא'גרבדיוארקיאהמהל
Great said: He wrote Proverbs first, and הזףלאוהשמחורישיהיו,ילשמרפסהז
afterwards the Song of Songs, and then אתיינתמ,רמאףוסבתלהקו,םירישהריש
Ecclesiastes. He derived [this conclusion] ,אתעמשןידהלעאגילפהבראייחיברד
from this verse: “He composed three thou- תחאכבתכןתשלשהרמאאתינתמ
sand proverbs and his songs were a thou- ינת,ומצעינפבדחודחלכהרמאאתעמשו
sand and five” (1Kgs 5:12). “Proverbs” is התרשהמלשתנקזתעלקרהבראייחיבר
the book of Proverbs, “and his songs ילשמםירפס'גרמאוק"הורוילע
were a thousand and five” is the Song of ,םירישהרישותלהקו
Songs. And Ecclesiastes was said at the
end. Rabbi Ḥiyya’s [tannaitic] teachings
dispute this tradition. The teaching states
that he wrote all three of them at the
same time; but this tradition says that he
wrote each one separately. Rabbi Ḥiyya
the Great taught: Only in Solomon’s old
age did the holy spirit rest upon him and
he composed the three books: Proverbs,
Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs.
Rabbi Jonathan said: he wrote the Song כ"חאוהלחתבתכש"השרמאןתנוי'ר
of Songs first, then Proverbs, and then Ec- ןתנוי'רהליתיימותלהקכ"חאוילשמ
clesiastes. Rabbi Jonathan deduced this ,רמזירבדרמוארענםדאשכץראךרדמ
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from the way of the world: When a man is ןיקזה,תולשמירבדרמואלידגה
young he composes songs; once he has םילבהירבדרמוא
grown older he makes sententious re-
marks, when he becomes an old man he
speaks things of vanity (divrei havalim).
Rabbi Yanai, the father-in-law of Rabbi םידומלכהרמאימא'רדיומחיאני'ר
Ami, said: All agree that Ecclesiastes was .הרמאףוסבתלהקש
composed at the end.
The rabbis debate the question of which of the three books, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes,
or the Song of Songs, was composed first. According to Rabbi Ḥiyya the Great, it
was only in his old age, when the “holy spirit” rested upon him, that Solomon
composed all three books. R. Ḥiyya’s approach is more or less exegetical in that he
attempts to reconstruct the order of composition of the books according to the order
of the deeds in the biblical verse: the composition of proverbs as evidence of the
authorship of the Book of Proverbs, the composition of songs as the composition of
the Song of Songs. There is nothing about the composition of Ecclesiastes in the
verse, and so the midrashist assumes that it was written after the events described
in the verse. His opponent, R. Jonathan, proposes a psychological explanation,
which is not supported by any verse, but rather by “the way of the world” (derekh
ereṣ), an expression usually used to refer to the social order. Solomon composed
the Song of Songs in his youth, Proverbs in his maturity, and Ecclesiastes in his old
age, moving from the poetical mood of youth through mature reasoning and finally
to the sceptical disappointment of his old age. R. Jonathan argues that “when a
man is young, he composes songs, when he grows older, he makes sententious
remarks, when he becomes an old man he speaks things of vanity (divrei havalim).”
This last phrase, divrei havalim, could be translated as “the vanity of things,” “insig-
nificant things,” or, simply, “nonsense,” but it could also mean “the things of vani-
ty,” meaning that it is far from being conventional wisdom. I think that this is a
deliberate pun: he wants to say that the wisdom of Ecclesiastes would appear sense-
less, resembling the sayings of an old embittered elder, if you did not have the
special lens of interpretation in your hands. This diachronic view of the composition
of these books explains how one author could have written three works as diverse
in style and tenor as the sensual Song of Songs, the pious and conventional Prov-
erbs, and the somewhat unconventional Ecclesiastes. What remains unclear, how-
ever, is establishing exactly how Ecclesiastes is unconventional.
The first amoraic accusation against Ecclesiastes appears in y. Sanh. 2:6 (20c).
According to this tradition, Solomon, who was considered prone to conceit, was
once replaced on his throne by an angel who was impersonating him.24
24 The version of the story about Solomon being usurped by an unnatural being is better known
from b. Giṭ. 68a, although in this instance, it is a demon. See further, and also concerning its
relationship to the version in Palestinian Talmud, Eli Yassif, The Hebrew Folktale: History, Genre,
36 Reuven Kiperwasser
y. Sanh. 2:4 (20c)
It is written, “I said of laughter, ‘It is .ללוהמיתרמאקוחשל
mad’ (Eccl 2:2).” וזהרטעהמ.המלשלאוהךורבשודקהרמא
Said the Holy One, blessed be He, to רמאהנינחןביסוייבר.יאסכמדר.ךשארב
Solomon, “What is this crown [doing] המלשתומדכהמדנוךאלמדריהעשהתואב
on your head? Remove yourself from לערזחמהיהוויתחתבשיוואסכמודימעהו
my throne.” תלהקינארמואותושרדמיתבותויסינכיתב
R. Yose b. Ḥanina said, “At that mo- הילןירמווהוםלשוריבלארשילעךלמיתייה
ment an angel came down and took תלהקינארמיתוהידידןויליסבלעביתיאכלמ
on the appearance of Solomon and re- תרעקוינפלןיאיבמוהנקבותואןיכמויהו
moved Solomon from his throne and תיאיקלחהיההזו'מאהעש'תואב.ןיסירג
took the seat in his stead.” ןירמדתיאאינקןירמדתיאוארטוחןירמד
Solomon went around the synagogues היתרשוק
and schoolhouses, saying, “I, Ecclesi-
astes, have been king over Israel in Je-
rusalem” (Eccl 1:12). But they replied
to him: the king is sitting in his seat of
honour (Gk: basileon), and yet you
say: “I am Ecclesiastes?!” And they
beat himwith a reed and placed be-
fore him a dish of grits. At that mo-
ment, he wept and said, “and this was
my portion from all my labour” (Eccl
2:10).
There are those who say it was a staff,
and there are those who say it was a
reed, and some say that it was a belt of
knotted rope.
This story follows on the heels of a description of the legendary wealth of King
Solomon and is an exegetical bridge from the verse from Eccl 2:2, “I said of laughter:
‘It is mad’; and of mirth: ‘What doth it accomplish?’”,25 to the other verse from the
same chapter of Eсcl 2:10: “I denied myself nothing my eyes desired; I refused my
Meaning, trans. Jacqueline S. Teitelbaum (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 87–89, and
more recently, Rella Kushelevsky, “Gaps between Versions Constituting a Thematic Series: A Study
of the Legend ‘Solomon and Ashmedai’” [Hebrew], in Ma’aseh Sipur: Studies in Jewish Narrative
Presented to Yoav Elstein, ed. Avidov Lipsker and Rella Kushelevsky (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan Universi-
ty Press, 2006), 221–41. See also the recent overview in Gerhard Langer, “Solomon in Rabbinic
Literature,” in The Figure of Solomon in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Tradition: King, Sage, and
Architect, ed. Joseph Verheyden (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 127–42.
25 Here and later, I am using the old (1917) JPS translation of Ecclesiastes, with minor changes.
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heart no pleasure. My heart took delight in all my labour, and this was the
reward for all my toil.” As is well known, the verses of this biblical book often
contradict one another, prompting commentators to seek to harmonise them.
Those who attributed the authorship of the book to Solomon often explained
these contradictions by recourse to the events of the author’s life. According to
the proposed exegesis, the first verse, which condemns laughter and merriment,
would seem to be a typical reaction from an elitist intellectual to the foibles of
the common people. In his view, laughter is always mixed with a tinge of
sadness or cruelty, and fun is usually short-lived, giving way to sadness. In-
deed, for the author of Ecclesiastes, the human oscillation between gaiety and
sadness makes no sense. One should take the world as it is and leave aside
both joy and sadness. God, however, grows impatient with the king for express-
ing such scepticism and denial of simple human enjoyment. By way of punish-
ment, He determines to deprive Solomon of his crown and restore to him the
true perspective of the relationship between joy and sorrow. An angel descends
from heaven and assumes the king’s form, sitting on his throne and acting in
his stead. Thus, deprived of his throne, Solomon first seeks to return to his
palace and regain his stature. Visiting places of congregation, synagogues, and
academies, he announces that a usurper has removed him from the throne.
Here, the commentator adduces the verse “I am Ecclesiastes” (Eccl 1:2), reading
it as an urgent admonition to the people of Israel: “I, Solomon, was a king,”
but now I am banished. The people, however, are not willing to recognise the
king in the vagabond because they know for certain that the throne is not
empty. In this manner, the king learns true sadness: loss of recognition, uncer-
tainty regarding his fate, and, of course, humiliation. Believing the itinerant to
be impudent or insane, the people treat him accordingly, beating him with a
staff. Being punished by his own people is a lesson that the Solomon who
uttered Eccl 2:2 had not yet experienced. Bereft of his identity, the king is
forced to wander the streets and beg for food. The very people who are cruel
enough to beat him are merciful enough to feed him. He receives the typical
beggar’s fare—a barley brew that can satiate, but hardly satisfy one accustomed
to luxury. However, it turns out that the work of writing Ecclesiastes has contin-
ued, despite the king’s new living conditions. After tasting cooked barley, Solo-
mon can say, “And whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them; I
withheld not my heart from any joy, for my heart had joy of all my labour;
and this was my portion from all my labour.” According to the commentator,
the first part of the verse speaks of his magnificent past. The final part of the
verse (“and this was my portion from all my labour”) is a sober portrayal of his
present state. The wisdom of Ecclesiastes is wisdom acquired through suffering.
Suffering helps him to understand both the price of enjoyment and the cost of
sadness. The main problem is Solomon’s devaluation of the value of laughter
and mirth; however, in the end, the king sincerely repents of this sin, which
is echoed in Eccl 2:10.
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Lev. Rab. 28:1
Rabbi Benjamin b. Levi said: The Sag- רפסזונגלםימכחושקביולרבןמינבר"א
es wanted to store away (lignoz) the .תונימדצלןיטונשםירבדובואצמשתלהק
Book of Ecclesiastes because they רמולאבשהמלשלשותמכחלכאהורמא
found in it matters that tend towards תחתלומעישולמעלכבםדאלןורתיהמ
heresy. They said: Behold! all of Solo- ורזח,הרותלשולימעב'יפאלוכי,שמשה
mon’s wisdom comes to teach “what ,ולמעלכבאלאלמעלכברמאאלורמאו
profit has a man of all his labour אוהליעומלבאליעומוניאולמעב
wherein he laboured under the sun?” .הרותלשהלימעב
(Eccl 1:3). Could it be even when he
laboured in the Torah? But then they
responded [to themselves]: it is not
written “in any labour,” but “in his la-
bour.” There is no profit in his la-
bour, but there is profit in the labour
of the Torah.
R. Samuel b. Isaac said: The Sages זונגל'ימכחושקבקחציבררבלאומשר"א
wanted to store away the book of Ec- דצלןיטונשםירבדובואצמשתלהקרפס
clesiastes because they found in it אבשהמלשלשותמכחלכאהורמא.תונימ
words that tend towards heresy. They ימיבךבלךביטיוךתודליברוחבחמש'מול
said: Behold! all of Solomon’s wis- ךניעהארמבוךבליכרדבךלהוךיתורוחב
dom comes to teach: “You who are ירחאורותתאלו'מאהשמ,)ט,איתלהק(
young, be happy while you are אוהו,)טל,וטרבדמב(םכיניעירחאוםכבבל
young, and let your heart give you ןידאל,ךיניעהארמבוךבליכרדבךלהו'מא
joy in the days of your youth.” (Eccl יכעדו'מאשןויכ,העוצרההרתוה,ןיידאלו
11: 9). Moses said: “you shall not fol- תלהק(טפשמבםיהלאהךאיביהלאלכלע
low after your own heart and your המלש'מאהפיורמא,)ט,א"י
own eyes” (Num 15: 39), and yet he
states: “Follow the ways of your heart
and whatever your eyes see”! Is there
neither judgment nor judge?! Is the re-
straint removed? But since he said:
“but know that for all these things
God will bring you into judgment,”
they responded, indeed Solomon has
spoken well.”
R. Yudan said: “Under the sun,” there is שמשהינפלוניאשמשהתחת'מאןדוי'ר
no [profit], but before the sun there is.26 .ונשי
26 Mordecai Margulies, Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah: A Critical Edition based on Manuscripts and
Genizah Fragments with Variants and Notes (New York: JTS Press, 1972), חמרת .
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According to Lev. Rab. 28:1, an unknown group of rabbis wanted to put the book
into storage27 in order to prevent its circulation, because they found in it “matters
that tend towards heresy” (devarim še-noṭin le-ṣad minut).28
The first example is Eccl 1:3, from which the rabbis have suggested, through a
hyper-literal reading, that it implies a lack of respect for the study of the Torah, for
the verse indicates a deficiency in all human labour. However, this concern is over-
come through the understanding that Ecclesiastes speaks only of earthly labour,
not of the toil in Torah study. What we ultimately see here is nothing more than a
typical exegetical device of reading a verse in a hyper-literal manner, or conversely,
by extending its meaning to embrace something additional that was not originally
included. The first critical reading by R. Benjamin b. Levi turns out to be superficial
and wrong, while the second reading in the name of R. Samuel b. Isaac reveals its
pious character. Thus, the first exegete concluded with Eccl 1:3; however, immedi-
ately after the tradition of R. Samuel b. Isaac, a third statement appears that is
attributed to R. Yudan, which is based on the same verse. This is based on the words
“under the sun,” and the solution of the same problem evoked by Eccl 1:3 is that it
only applies to human labour under the sun, but not to toil that is unbound by the
limits of the universe.
The second example of the “matters that tend towards heresy,” according to
this source, is Eccl 11:9. The following midrashic explanation of this verse builds
on the collision between the verse’s beginning and end. The beginning could be
understood as a hedonistic call to enjoy the world regardless of God’s presence in
it. However, the end adds a well-balanced dose of fear of God, at least according
to the midrashist. It transpires that the sceptical reader of the verse, who saw
heretical overtones in it, had been reading it superficially, without appreciating
the end of the verse. This discussion of the challenges of Ecclesiastes, then, looks
more like a narrative frame for exegetical discussion and not like real evidence of
the problematic acceptance of the biblical book. The third amoraic source is as
follows:
27 See Shamma Friedman, “The Primacy of Tosefta in Mishnah-Tosefta Parallels (Shabbat 16.1),”
[Hebrew] Tarbiz 62 (1993): 313–38. Friedman shows that the verb g-n-z is used primarily in the
negative sense of making a book unusable without destroying it (323–24).
28 I cannot discuss the problematic term minut here, which is usually translated as “heresy,” but
I can mention that it serves as a term for all deviant customs, not only religious, but also ethical.
The meaning of minut remains contested. See Stuart S. Miller, “The ‘Minim’ of Sepphoris reconsid-
ered,” Harvard Theological Review 86 (1993): 377–402; Martin Goodman, “The Function of ‘Minim’
in Early Rabbinic Judaism,” in Geschichte—Tradition—Reflexion: Festschrift für Martin Hengel zum
70. Geburtstag. Band I: Judentum, ed. Peter Schäfer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 501–10; Adiel
Schremer, Brothers Estranged: Heresy, Christianity, and Jewish Identity in Late Antiquity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 102–3, 210 n. 9; Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Ju-
daeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 221.
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b. Šabb29
Rav Judah, son of R. Samuel b. Shilat, רבלאומשברדהירבהדוהיבררמא
said in the name of Rav: The Sages זונגלםימכחושקב:ברדהימשמתליש
wished to store away the Book of Ecclesi- תאהזןירתוסוירבדשינפמתלהקרפס
astes because its words are self-contradic- ותליחתשינפמ−והוזנגאלהמינפמו,הז
tory. Yet why did they not hide it? Be- ותליחת,הרותירבדופוסוהרותירבד
cause it begins with words of Torah and לכבםדאלןורתיהמביתכד−הרותירבד
ends with words of Torah. Its beginning יבריבדירמאושמשהתחתלומעישולמע
is words of Torah, as it is written, “What םדוק,ולןיאדאוהשמשהתחת:יאני
profit has man of all his labour wherein .ולשי−שמש
he labours under the sun?” And the
school of R. Yannai commented: Under
the sun he has none, but he has it before
the sun.
The end thereof is words of Torah, as it לכהרבדףוסביתכד−הרותירבדופוס
is written, “Let us hear the conclusion of רומשויתוצמתאואריםיהלאהתאעמשנ
the matter, fear God, and keep His com- .םדאהלכהזיכ
mandments: for this is the whole of
man” […] ]...[
And how are its words self-contradic- ביתכ−?הזתאהזןירתוסוירבדיאמו
tory? It is written, “anger is better than יתרמאקוחשלביתכוקוחשמסעכבוט
laughter” (Eccl 7: 3) but it is written, “I החמשהתאינאיתחבשוביתכ.ללוהמ
said of laughter, it is to be praised”(Eccl ,אישקאל.השעהזהמהחמשלוביתכו
2: 2) It is written, “Then I commended סעוכשסעכבוט−קוחשמסעכבוט
joy,” but it is written, “and of joy I said, ,הזהםלועבםיקידצהלעאוהךורבשודקה
What does it do?” There is no difficulty: לעאוהךורבשודקהקחשמשקוחשמ
“anger is better than laughter,” the an- .הזהםלועבםיעשרה
ger which the Holy One, blessed be He,
displays to the righteous in this world is
better than the laughter which the Holy
One, blessed be He, laughs with the wick-
ed in this world.
This tradition seems to be partially based on the first part of the tradition from
Leviticus Rabbah cited above. It deals with Eccl 1:3; however, the interpretation of
R. Benjamin’s verse and of the words “under the sun” are seemingly taken from the
words of R. Yudan, which are an addition in Leviticus Rabbah. Here, however, the
book is considered as a whole, and the interpretation is not concerned with the
particular difficulties evoked by certain problematic verses. According to the Baby-
29 This pericope is slightly abbreviated.
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lonian Talmud, the main problem with Ecclesiastes is its inconsistency, as it contra-
dicts itself. Ecclesiastes is a polyphonic book, constructed from many brief mono-
logues which are very often contradictory. If for Leviticus Rabbah, the main issue of
Ecclesiastes is its hedonistic tendency, for the Babylonian rabbis, it is the logical
inconsistency of the composition. Nevertheless, both works similarly resolve or
overcome these contradictions by evoking the God-fearing intentions of the author.
Diachronically, the author of Ecclesiastes has been accused of pessimism, he-
donism, and a lack of consistency in three different works of amoraic literature.
However, no doubts have been expressed concerning the sacral status of the book.
Most importantly, all these approaches seem to reflect amoraic concerns and amora-
ic exegesis rather than a real historical debate over the acceptance of the book that
might conceivably have taken place in the past.
In conclusion, the rabbis accepted the closed canon, with all its twenty-four
books, and they did not question the inclusion of any of the books within this can-
on. They were not aware of how the process of canonisation had actually been con-
ducted, nor of the reasons for the acceptance of certain exceptional books, such as
Ecclesiastes or the Song of Songs. And yet, as sensitive readers and experienced
exegetes, they felt that these books were different. They therefore received plenty
of attention from the rabbis and were extensively used in their exegesis. The stories
about difficulties in accepting of Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs essentially
came about as a defence of their enormous appeal and broad exegetical use as a
valuable resource for interpretation.
Ancient (rabbinic) readers, I would argue, invented the story about the struggle
for the inclusion of the book within the canon in order to apologise for its presence
therein. They were fully cognisant of the book’s unconventionality and aspired to
produce etiological explanations in order to account for its oddity. Firstly, they as-
serted, the book was not a book of wisdom at all; rather, it was a book of prophecy.
Secondly, it was claimed that it was a book of obscure parables, like the Song of
Songs. Finally, it was said to be a book of wisdom which seemed odd, but could
still be accepted—as was shown in numerous interpretations which provided an
appropriate context for the odd verses. The rabbis were the first readers of Ecclesias-
tes to give some thought to its unusual nature, and modern approaches to the book
have, in many ways, merely echoed an ancient perplexity.
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Cana Werman
Wisdom Scepticism and Apocalyptic
Certitude; Philosophical Certitude
and Apocalyptic Scepticism
It is a common assumption among scholars that the Greek invasion of Judea in the
last third of the fourth century BCE, during which time the Judeans were obliged to
accept another foreign rule that was stranger and more culturally aggressive than
previous ones, was perceived by the Judeans as a watershed.1 A number of develop-
ments towards the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third centuries BCE
in Judean Jewish literature lead to this assumption. Firstly, biblical works composed
during this period do not present themselves as contemporary, but claimed to date
from a much earlier period.2 Secondly, compositions from the third century BCE
reveal traces of scepticism, an acknowledgement that man is incapable of under-
standing God’s conduct and rules. Scepticism appears overtly in biblical wisdom
literature and covertly in the apocalyptic writings that emerge in this era.3
This phenomenon of scepticism will be the focus of the current paper. I wish to
point to the ambivalent relationship that both wisdom literature and apocalyptic
literature have to scepticism from the third century BCE onwards. I intend to show
that the expression of scepticism was accompanied by efforts to abandon it and to
offer an alternative historiography and view of reality. Tracing the move from wis-
dom-scepticism and apocalypse-scepticism to apocalypse-certitude and wisdom-
certitude will enable us to understand the ancient debate regarding the place of
God in a shaky world. It will also provide us with the opportunity to observe the
penetration of a new component in the intellectual “adventures” of Second Temple
Judaism: Hellenistic philosophy.
This contribution was supported by the ISF grant no. 1913/17.
1 On the reaction of the nations of the ancient Near East, see John Joseph Collins, The Apocalyptic
Vision of the Book of Daniel (Missoula, MT: Scholar Press, 1977), 101–4; 191–93.
2 Consequently, this point in time—the transition from the Persian to the Hellenistic period—was
regarded by later generations as the end of prophecy. See Chaim Milikowsky, “The End of Prophecy
and the Closure of the Biblical Canon in Rabbinic Thought” [Hebrew], Sidra 10 (1994): 83–94.
3 For a similar observation, see Leo G. Perdue, “Wisdom and Apocalyptic: The Case of Qoheleth,”
in Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the Biblical Tradition, ed. Florentino
García Martínez (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 231–58, here 232. Perdue, however, point-
ed to the transition from the Ptolemaic to the Seleucid regime as the crucial moment, not the Greek
invasion of Judea.
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Scepticism in the Third Century BCE
Ecclesiastes, the best representative of scepticism, will be our starting point. Its
author, Qohelet,4 maintains that the old wisdom tradition is of no use. He questions
wisdom sayings, cites accepted proverbs in order to refute them,5 and conveys the
message that the wise man should rely not on wisdom accumulated by previous
generations, but on his own personal experience.6 This move taken by Qohelet is
the result of his perception of the world. While wisdom literature maintained that
man has the ability to comprehend nature and humanity because they are ordered
by God or the gods in justice and reason,7 Qohelet is of the opinion that there is no
correlation between man’s conduct and God’s conduct. Indeed, God is active in the
world, but man is unable to fathom His deeds and His government.8 Man can nei-
ther comprehend his own destiny nor determine the course of his life. One need
express no surprise, then, that there is no difference between the wise man and the
fool (e.g., 2:14–16; 7:15–20). Ecclesiastes offers no hope: man has no choice but to
accept his tragic fate and to enjoy the very few moments in life in which he can
take pleasure (9:7–9). His toil through his life is worthless since the property, skills,
or wisdom he obtains are all lost at his death (e.g., 2:24–26; 5:17–19; 9:7–9).
We have the right, perhaps, to admire Qohelet for his courage and his willing-
ness to portray God as foreign to the world, abandoning man with no mercy or
compassion.9 Yet to my mind, Qohelet was not alone, and the new genre of apoca-
4 Following Goff, I use “Ecclesiastes” to refer to the book and “Qohelet” to refer to the author.
See Matthew Goff, “Wisdom, Apocalypticism and Intertextuality: The Book of Ecclesiastes and the
Sociolect of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually, ed. Katharine Dell and Will
Kynes (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 214–25, here 214 n. 1.
5 For a short summary, see Alexander Rofé, Introduction to Psalmody and to Wisdom Literature
[Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2004), 115–18. Compare: Michael V. Fox, Qohelet and His Contradic-
tions (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989), 19–28.
6 Michael V. Fox, A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Re-Reading of Ecclesiastes (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 75–77.
7 Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1–9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York:
Doubleday, 2000), 17–19; Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, Proverbs: Introduction and Commentary. Vol-
ume 1: Chapters 1–9 [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 2012), 50–54.
8 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 121; Fox, A Time to Tear Down, 85–86. Compare: Stuart
Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (New York: T&T Clark International, 2012). Weeks is of the opin-
ion that Qohelet’s ideas are not sceptical, but rather driven by the sense that “humans are missing
the point.” In this regard, Qohelet seeks “to steer others away from the false expectations and
disappointment which he experienced himself, by opening their eyes to the reality of their situa-
tion” (169).
9 Tremper Longman III, The Book of Ecclesiastes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 35: “Reading
Qohelet’s statements about God in context leads one to side with those who characterize Qohelet’s
God as distant, occasionally indifferent, and sometimes cruel”; Fox, A Time to Tear Down, 137:
“Qohelet’s God is hard and mostly indifferent but not hostile.”
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lyptic literature, which emerged during the same century that Ecclesiastes was writ-
ten, reveals a similar attitude.
A few compositions deserve our attention. The first half of the third century BCE
presents two that are considered pre-apocalyptic, chapters 9 to 14 in the biblical
book of Zechariah (labelled Deutero-Zechariah)10 and chapter 2 of the book of Dan-
iel. Both have a national dimension. The second half of this century produced three
others, two of which concentrate on the cosmos and on humanity as a whole. These
are the book of the Watchers and the book of Luminaries, both in the Enochic cor-
pus. The third work from this critical period is the Aramaic Levi Document.
Deutero-Zechariah
Scholars have observed that the unique features of Deutero-Zechariah distance this
collection of chapters11 from the known (and early) prophetic books,12 bringing it
closer to apocalyptic literature.13 Launching an attack on prophets and prophecy
(13:2–6), Deutero-Zechariah allots man a very limited role in history. There is hardly
any direct speech in this text, and it voices no demands from the people of Israel,
nor does it point to any misdeed committed by the people. Moreover, it envisions
only a minor role for the House of David (9:9–10).14 God is the one who is expected
10 On the difficulties in dating Deutero-Zechariah, see Lena-Sofia Tiemeyer, “Will the Prophetic
Texts from the Hellenistic Period Stand Up, Please!” in Judah between East and West: The Transition
from Persian to Greek Rule (ca. 400–200 BCE), ed. Lester L. Grabbe and Oded Lipschits (London:
T&T Clark International, 2011), 272–76. See, however, Michael H. Floyd, Minor Prophets, Part 2
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 315–16; 452–57.
11 Deutero-Zechariah itself consists of the combination of a few units. See (among many) Floyd,
Minor Prophets, Part 2, 313–15; Mark J. Boda, The Book of Zechariah (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2016), 23–25.
12 I reject the current trend of seeing Zechariah chapters 1–8 and chapters 9–14 as one unit. Thus
Boda, The Book of Zechariah, 28 (“There are several pieces of evidence that suggest to me that
Zechariah 1–14 should be treated as a single book”) and Byron G. Curtis, Up the Steep and Stony
Road: The Book of Zechariah in Social Location Trajectory Analysis (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Lit-
erature, 2006). Time and time again, Curtis points to the differences between chapters 1–8 and
chapters 9–14 of Zechariah, yet he insists that the same author composed both sets of chapters, but
in different circumstances.
13 Matthias Henze, “Invoking the Prophets in Zechariah and Ben Sira,” in Prophets, Prophecy and
Prophetic Texts in Second Temple Judaism, ed. Michael H. Floyd and Robert D. Haak (London: T&T
Clark International, 2006), 120–34, here 125–29. The arguments I will make in what follows differ
from those of Paul Hanson: see Paul Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic: The Historical and Sociologi-
cal Roots of Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology, rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 300–15.
Stephan L. Cook’s effort to declare Zechariah’s first chapters apocalyptic (Stephan L. Cook, Prophecy
and Apocalypticism: The Postexilic Social Setting [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995]) has been re-
jected by John Joseph Collins: see John Joseph Collins, Apocalypse, Prophecy, and Pseudepigraphy:
On Jewish Apocalyptic Literature (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 23–33.
14 Cook’s assertion that “Zechariah 9:9 depicts the future entrance into Jerusalem of the coming
king” (Prophecy and Apocalypticism, 137) ignores the fact that chapter 9 portrays the coming king
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to “go forth” (9:14–17), and, as in the apocalyptic literature, against an enemy who
has no distinct identity. God is also expected to change the course of nature and the
topography of the land (chapter 14).
My claim that Deutero-Zechariah’s attitude is sceptical is rooted in the observa-
tion that its author or editor detaches himself from history and moves to meta-histo-
ry (or to the “transhistorical realm,” to use Mayer and Mayer’s terminology15). His
perception of the present and the future makes no effort to cope with reality, with
the questions his period poses. No explanation is given for the course of history that
his generation is witnessing. Furthermore, the author is convinced that God will
intervene at the End of Days, but does not substantiate this conviction, nor does he
link it to a change of heart or behaviour. The End of Days is a deus ex machina in
Deutero-Zechariah, not a logical consequence of previous events.
It seems to me that if there were attempts to cope with the Hellenistic invasion
of the Land of Israel and to offer an explanation for it in the first half of the third
century BCE, the kind of meta-history that Deutero-Zechariah offers would be reject-
ed or forgotten. The fact that Deutero-Zechariah entered the biblical canon indicates
that a feeling of confusion and an inability to grasp the order in world history and
in the fate of the Judeans was the zeitgeist of the era.
Daniel Chapter 2
The same confusion and inability to grasp the order in world history emerge in
Daniel 2. Paradoxically, we deduce the feeling of disorder from the chapter’s evident
attempt to impose an order on past and present events. This chapter presents an
idol made of four parts, each made of a different metal (gold, silver, copper, and
iron mixed with clay). We learn later that the four metals represent four world em-
pires (Babylon, Media, Persia, and Greece). The fourth empire is indeed more com-
plex and less noble than the three previous ones, hence the clay, but in essence, it
is no different from them. The image of the unmovable object, presented via a very
brief and general description, bears the message that the four empires followed a
fixed and identical route. They are actually one unit with one fate: a great stone,
representing God or the people of Israel, will crush them in one step and will then
grow to become a large mountain that will fill the earth.
as helpless. See Yair Zakovitch, “Humble, Riding on a Donkey,” in The Messianic Idea in Jewish
Thought, ed. Yair Zakovitch [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Science and Humanities, 1982),
7–17. See also Boda (The Book of Zechariah, 42), who, while exploring the attitude expressed towards
the various leading groups in chapters 9 to 14, admits that these chapters show “a shift in Zechari-
ah’s perspective on the royal house.”
15 Carol L. Meyers and Eric Mark Meyers, Zechariah 9–14: A New Translation with Introduction and
Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 21.
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As noted by Jacob Licht,16 one of the main features of the apocalyptic writings
is the artificial framework imposed on the various details that constitute history.
Thus, even though chapter 2 holds to biblical symbols (an idol that should and will
be crushed) and biblical terminology (a king’s dream that can be explained by a
human being), the chapter presents a new way of thinking. The crucial point for
our discussion is that by claiming that the four empires followed a fixed and identi-
cal route, the author frees himself from providing an explanation for the changes
that he and his generation are witnessing in their own time. Like Deutero-Zechariah,
Daniel 2 does not voice any demands from the people of Israel or from humanity as
a whole. God has full control over history; man has no power over it, nor does he
have a way of understanding God’s decisions. Evidently, the fact that Daniel 2 en-
tered the canon implies that the feeling of confusion and frustration due to the
inability to understand world history and the fate of the Judeans was prominent.
The Book of the Watchers
The second half of the third century BCE yields writings that intensified the feeling
of scepticism by taking the bridle from God’s hands. The portrayal of a helpless God
becomes central to the apocalyptic worldview of this era. This is first found in the
early parts of the book(s) of Enoch.17 Six chapters, 6–11, of the Book of the Watchers
(= 1Enoch 1–36) will serve as representatives of the two earliest Enochic books, the
Book of the Watchers and the Astronomical Book (= chapters 72–82).18
Chapters 6–11 are a retelling of Genesis 6. The author uses the Urzeit catastro-
phe of the Flood as a tool for depicting the Endzeit. Chapter 6 expands the enigmatic
verses of Gen 6:1–4, in which the sons of God have intercourse with the daughters
16 Jacob Licht, “The Attitude to Past Events in the Bible and in Apocalyptic Literature” [Hebrew],
Tarbiz 60 (1990): 1–18. See also George W. E. Nickelsburg, “Enochic Wisdom and Its Relation to the
Mosaic Torah,” in The Early Enoch Literature, ed. John Joseph Collins and Gabriele Boccaccini (Lei-
den: Brill, 2007), 81–94, here 92.
17 For the date of the earliest two Enochic books, see Józef Tadeusz Milik, ed., The Books of Enoch:
Aramaic Fragments of Qumran Cave 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 7 ff.; 22 ff.
18 I am avoiding the term “Enochic Judaism.” Popularised by Gabriele Boccaccini, this term has
been an obstacle to the precise and accurate study of the Enochic corpus. The five books included
in this corpus come from diverse periods and groups and should not be considered as one unit.
The Book of the Parables has been dated to the first century CE by most scholars. Only the two
mentioned here are from the first century of the Hellenistic era, and they were written as a reaction
to this century. The other two, the Book of Dream Visions and the Epistle of Enoch, were written a
century later than the first two by a group close to the Qumran community. They are reacting to a
different crisis and voice a different ideology. See Menahem Kister, “Concerning the History of the
Essenes” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 56 (1986): 1–18; Cana Werman, The Apocalyptic Writings of the Second
Temple Period [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: The Broadcast University; Ministry of Defense, 2003), 68–75, and
Cana Werman, “Present Eschatology, a Messiah who Came and Passed away” [Hebrew], Teudah
(forthcoming).
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of man. 1Enoch turns this into a story about low-ranking angels, the Watchers, who
decide to leave their heavenly posts and descend to earth in order to sin with the
daughters of man. In 1Enoch chapters 7 and 8, we are told that the Watchers harmed
humanity in two ways. They beget Nefilim, giants with endless appetites, who first
consume the crops, then devour all the cattle and animals, and finally, when no
animals or crops of the field are left, they turn to consume human beings and one
another. They also teach their wives and later the entire human race how to produce
weapons and cosmetics, as well as the science of magic/medicine and astrology/
astronomy.
Following an appeal to God from the “good angels” Michael, Gabriel, Rafael/
Sariel, and Uriel (chapter 9), the time of revenge comes. Chapter 10 simultaneously
reports the punishments of the past (the earthly flood) and the future (the cosmic
flame): the son of Lamech will escape disaster; the Nefilim will kill each other; the
Watchers will be imprisoned beneath the earth in the Urzeit, but will perish along
with the evil spirits, other descendants of the forbidden union, in the Endzeit. The
purified world will then flourish (chapter 11) and “those who escaped,” such as the
son of Lamech, will be there to enjoy it. Note that this transition from the past to
the future and back helps the author to sustain his description concerning the End
of Days.
An analysis of the Enochic chapters leads to the conclusion that their early layer
consists of biblical interpretation and is intended to create a new coherent picture
out of the various sections embedded in Genesis 6–8. Genesis 6 does not reveal a
clear connection between the sons of God and their offspring and the Flood. The
Book of the Watchers, while coating the components of Genesis 6 with myth, posi-
tions them as one continuum.19 The union between the Watchers and the daughters
of man was a rebellious act on the Watchers’ part. They openly declared their plan
to disobey God. This union, forbidden and regarded as fornication, produced not
spiritual beings like their fathers, but Nefilim, flesh like their mothers. These giants
have no option but “to corrupt”; that is, to murder and drink blood, the very acts
Noah is warned about in Genesis 9. In other words, the author deduces what went
wrong before the Flood from the warning after the Flood.
There is, however, a second layer in 1Enoch 6–11. This second layer moulds the
early stratum and turns it into an attack on the Hellenistic era. The Book of the
Watchers illustrates Hellenism, with its admiration for “Chaldean science”—that is,
astrology/astronomy and its passion for medicine—as a rebellious force. In their
unauthorised visit to earth, the Watchers teach these skills. Their “down to earth”
operation leads the earth and its innocent creatures into chaos and decline.20
19 Cana Werman, “The Story of the Flood in the Book of Jubilees” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 64 (1995): 183–
202.
20 George W. E. Nickelsburg, “Apocalyptic and Myth in 1 Enoch 6–11,” Journal of Biblical Litera-
ture 96 (1977): 383–405. Compare: Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “Early Enochic Tradition and the Restora-
tion of Humanity: The Function and Significance of 1 Enoch 10,” in Judah between East and West,
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It is clear that these chapters reflect the worldview of a group that despised
Hellenistic culture. We can also assume that the educated elite was responsible for
their composition and redaction. However, it is difficult to say more than that.21 We
cannot assume, for example, that the writer (and his circle?) had left Jerusalem. For
our discussion, the apocalyptic dimension of these chapters is the point that should
be stressed. The author of 1Enoch 6–11 depicts a revolt in the higher realm. There is
no human cause for the Urzeit deterioration which ended with the Flood, nor for
the Endzeit one, that of the Hellenistic era. Human beings become guilty only later
and only partly: their sins are the result of the forbidden knowledge brought to
them by the Watchers and because of the influence of their offspring, the evil spirits
(10:15). In sum, humanity is not to blame.
Why, then, did the heavenly forces have the right to act, to initiate a revolt? In
its reply, 1Enoch both positions God as inferior to the heavenly creatures that He
made and detaches Him from the world. God did not approve of the Watchers’ ac-
tions; He stood aside, not noticing or unable to govern His world. It becomes clear,
then, that 1Enoch is much more daring than Daniel 2 and Deutero-Zechariah. While
the latter accept—without being able to provide an explanation or proof—the basic
biblical claim that God is in control of history, 1Enoch rejects this claim.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that 1Enoch offers a worldview
that is close to the scepticism of Ecclesiastes. Qohelet’s God is indifferent to man;
1Enoch’s God does not willingly abandon man, but has been forced to do so. By
looking at man (Qohelet) and society (1Enoch), neither author can identify God’s
traces and both express scepticism.
Admittedly, the conclusions we have drawn from Deutero-Zechariah, Daniel 2,
and the Book of the Watchers shake the very foundations of apocalyptic literature.
The central claim of apocalyptic literature is that hidden knowledge is at hand since
from time to time, God decides to channel it to man through visions and angels.22
However, the very need to rely on visions and angels for knowledge about rebellious
heavenly figures is an acknowledgement that from man’s perspective, historical and
225–41. Stuckenbruck maintains that we should not “regard the fallen angels and giants simply as
a decipherable metaphor for the late fourth century BCE Diadochi […] or wayward priests” (231),
but rather as a metaphor for the influence of the Hellenistic culture and its inclusion in the Judean
way of life.
21 On the methodological question whether it is correct to draw historical and sociological conclu-
sions from a literary work, see Gabriele Boccaccini, “Enochians, Urban Essenes, Qumranites: Three
Social Groups, One Intellectual Movement,” in The Early Enoch Literature, 301–27, here 302–4. As
to Boccaccini’s hypothesis regarding the origin of what he calls “Enochic Judaism,” this hypothesis
should be rejected as it depends upon mistaken assumptions and notions regarding the priestly
house(s) of ancient Israel and the Second Temple period. See Cana Werman, “Levi and Levites in
Second Temple Period,” Dead Sea Discoveries 4 (1997): 212–25; Cana Werman, “The Sons of Zadok,”
in The Dead Sea Scrolls Fifty Years after their Discovery, ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman, Emanuel Tov,
and James C. VanderKam (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society and the Israel Museum), 623–30.
22 John Joseph Collins, “The Jewish Apocalypse,” Semeia 14 (1979): 21–59.
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personal events do not make sense. Apocalyptic visions are a mask beneath which
scepticism is found.
The shared sceptical attitude, however, should not blur the gap between Eccle-
siastes and apocalyptic writings. While Ecclesiastes offers no hope, Deutero-Zecha-
riah, Daniel 2, and 1Enoch 6–11 all express the belief that at some point, God will
intervene in the world. Deutero-Zechariah (and Daniel 2) cope with the question of
knowledge and understanding from a national perspective and envision cosmic
change from which Judea will benefit (Zechariah 14). 1Enoch, which looks at the
question from a universal point of view, established justice in human destiny by
adding the belief in reward and punishment after death, either through judgment
after resurrection or the judgment of souls (chapters 22), to the cosmic change de-
scribed in chapters 10–11. Apocalyptic literature, contrary to Ecclesiastes, expects
God to be back, at the end of history.
Aramaic Levi Document
One might assume that there were Second Temple Jews/Judeans who agreed with
the worldview offered in 1Enoch 6–11.23 Yet this daring position, the presentation of
God as a victim of rebellious forces and the scepticism that accompanied it, could
seem too threatening to monotheistic belief. Consequently, it could stir up antago-
nism. We detect such antagonism in the Aramaic Levi Document (henceforth ALD),
which was composed by the priestly elite24 and produced, like 1Enoch, at the end
of the third century BCE. A comparison between 1Enoch and the ALD makes it clear
that the ALD presents a less threatening picture.
The ALD contains a prayer followed by angelic discourse, a heavenly tour, a
sequence of halakhot related to sacrifices and purity, a memoir of Levi that men-
tions his participation in the revenge against Shechem, and a poem praising learn-
ing and wisdom. The fragmentary nature of the composition does not allow a defi-
nite conclusion, but it is clear that the surviving parts of the ALD do not include a
description of revolt in the heavenly realm. Indeed, there are two hints of heavenly
entities with unjust conduct in the ALD, Satan (3:9) and the kingdom of the sword
(4:9), while the Testament of Levi, a later reworking of the ALD, refers to “spirits of
errors” and “Belial” that are destined to be punished at the End of Days (2:3). The
ALD thus evokes forces that might be defined as rebellious. However, it does not
elaborate on their role, and on other occasions it draws a more nuanced picture. In
Levi’s prayer, the author uses terms such as היועחור , “unrighteous spirit,” and
שיאבאנויער , that is, “evil thought”, which denote both metaphysical forces that
23 See note 21.
24 For the text, see Jonas Carl Greenfield, Michael Edward Stone, and Esther Eshel, The Aramaic
Levi Document: Edition, Translation, Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2004).
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cause man to go astray and the human heart’s own inclination to sin.25 The ALD
also does not hesitate to put the blame for evil on human beings. Dina’s rape was
not the consequence of evil spirits or their influence; the Shechemites are the guilty
party. The author of the ALD sketches a complex reality, with a tribal perspective
and good and evil humans as well as obedient and disobedient angels and spirits.
He gives the readers the impression that it is possible for man to understand reality
and make his way through it. Scepticism evaporates in the ALD. In this, it stands in
contrast to 1Enoch.
Scepticism in the Second Century BCE
The hidden dialogue or disputes between the two apocalyptic writings described
above might not be the only dialogue that took place circa 200 BCE. A composition
dated to the first decade of the second century BCE, the Book of Ben-Sira, can be
seen as a rejection of Ecclesiastes. This second-century book returns to the classic
assumptions that governed wisdom literature, the ability to understand the world.26
Its optimistic view is rooted in the author’s political stance. Ben Sira chose not to
wonder about the place of Hellenistic rule in God’s plan, but to accept it. For him,
the autonomy that the Hellenistic kingdoms granted to Judea is ideal. It gives the
high priest, God’s representative on earth (“Greatest among his kindred, the glory
of his people […] like a star shining among the clouds […] like the sun shining on
the temple of the King” [48:1, 6–7]), the right to rule. Furthermore, it prevents the
“evil” House of David (“Some of them did what is right but others were extremely
wicked” [48:16]) from taking over.27
However, the priests whose voices we find in Ben-Sira were not able to cling to
their optimistic view when things started to deteriorate at the beginning of the sec-
ond quarter of the second century BCE. The confrontation between Antiochus IV
and the people of Judea started at this point and continued until Antiochus’s death
25 Compare: “Second Temple literature alternates between two substances with which human evil
is connected: an inner substance, which depends also on man’s choice, and an outer substance,
governed by evil and good spirits”; Menahem Kister, “Body and Purification from Evil: Prayer For-
mulas and Concepts in Second Temple Literature and Their Relationship to Later Rabbinic Litera-
ture” [Hebrew], Meghillot 8–9 (2010): 243–84, here 263.
26 John Joseph Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster, 1997),
81–96.
27 On the preference of priests over kings in Ben-Sira’s “Praise of the Fathers” section, see Martha
Himmelfarb, “The Wisdom of the Scribe, the Wisdom of the Priest, and the Wisdom of the King
According to Ben-Sira,” in For a Later Generation: The Transformation of Tradition in Israel, Early
Judaism, and Early Christianity. Festschrift for George W. E. Nickelsburg, ed. Randal A. Argall, Beverly
A. Bow, and Rodney Alan Werline (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), 89–99.
54 Cana Werman
in 164 BCE.28 As in the situation at the end of the third century BCE, we witness a
daring apocalyptic response. And likewise, we also witness a counter-response in
which scepticism is denied.
Daniel 7–12
The second part of the Book of Daniel reflects on Antiochus’s decrees and the defile-
ment of the Jerusalem Temple between 167 and 164 BCE. Daniel 7–8 depicts the
Hellenistic kingdom(s) and Antiochus himself as mythological forces combating
God and his temple.29 Chapter 7, echoing chapter 2 mentioned above, describes a
vision shown to Daniel where four beasts emerge from the great sea. The features
of the fourth beast refer to the Seleucid kingdom (“fearsome, dreadful and very
powerful, with great iron teeth—that devoured and crushed and stamped the re-
mains with its feet” [7:7]) in general, and to Antiochus, a small horn protruding
from the beast’s head (“There were eyes in this horn like those of a man and a
mouth that spoke arrogantly” [7:8]), in particular. In chapter 8, a monstrous he-goat
attacks “the host of heaven and it hurled some stars of the host to the ground and
trampled them. It vaunted itself against the very chief of the host” [8:10–11]). God
is under attack from evil angelic forces.
The presentation of Antiochus as the earthly representative of the heavenly
rebels is at the same time a declaration that no finger is being pointed toward the
Judeans/Jews. Besides Daniel’s standard prayer in chapter 9, the aim of which is
mainly to explain Daniel’s presence in a foreign land, there is no call for repentance
or self-examination. According to Daniel 7–12, Antiochus is not a punishment for
the people’s misbehaviour. God is not willingly abandoning His temple and His
people: He was forced to do so, and could not resist despite the fact that the chain
of events was known 490 years before it took place (chapter 9).
The above conclusion regarding 1Enoch 6–11 is thus also true here. Daniel’s
authors cannot identify God’s traces in history; instead they express scepticism. It
is no wonder, then, that when the Danielic authors bring God back into the world,
it is not into history, but into the end of history. Their attention is drawn to the out-
of-this-world reality: the holy angels will rule in heaven and the dead will resurrect,
“some to eternal life; others to reproaches to everlasting abhorrence” (12:2).30
28 For a summary of the events between 175 and 162 BCE, see Cana Werman, “On Religious Perse-
cution: Studies in Ancient and Modern Historiography” [Hebrew], Zion 81 (2017): 463–96.
29 See John Joseph Collins, Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1993), 323–24; 342–43; Collins, The Apocalyptic Vision of the Book of Daniel.
30 Collins, Daniel, 393–98.
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The Apocryphon of Jeremiah
An effort to offer an alternative to Daniel’s rebels and scepticism was discovered in
one of the scrolls found in cave 4 near the Qumran site.31 This is a composition
written at the same time as the second part of Daniel, relating the same events and
using the same time frame of 490 years (albeit counted not as seventy periods of
seven weeks, but as ten jubilees).32 It has rightly been called the Apocryphon of
Jeremiah.
According to the Apocryphon, on the eve of the destruction of the first temple,
Jeremiah received a survey of the expected events from God:33
1. Jeremiah first learned that due to the Israelites’ sins, God would hide His face
from His people for 490 years. Throughout this period, the people would experi-
ence exile and suffering: “[And they will se]e[k] My pre[s]ence in their affliction,
but I shall not respond to their inquiry because of the trespass [wh]ich they
have trespassed [against] M[e], until the completion of ten jubilees of years; and
you will be wa[l]king in ma[dness] and in blindness and bewilderment of the
heart” (ll. 14–17).
2. These 490 years will start with a loss of sovereignty: “And because of the sin of
that generation, I shall [tear away] the kingdom from the hand of those who hold
it, and [I sha]ll raise up over it others from another people, and [the in]solence
will rule over all [the l]and, and the kingdom of Israel will be lost” (ll. 17–19).
3. Further foreign regimes will follow: “In those days there [will] b[e a king and
h]e (will) be a blasphemer and he will commit abominations, and I shall tear
away [his] king[dom, and] that [king will be handed over] to other kings. And
My face shall be hidden from Israel and the kingdom will turn to many nations”
(ll. 19–22).
4. God will show no mercy: “And the children of Israel will be crying out [becau]se
of the heavy yoke in the lands of their captivity, and there will be none to deliver
them because they spurned My statutes and abhorred My Torah, therefore I have
hidden My face from [them until] they accomplish their iniquity” (ll. 22–26).
5. Another wave of sins is expected at the end of these 490 years: “And this is the
sign to them of the requital of their iniquity [for] I shall leave the land because
of their haughtiness towards Me, and they will not know [tha]t I have spurned
them and they will once again do evil, and the evil will be gr[eat]er than the
former evi[l] [and they will violate the covenant which I made] with Abraha[m]
31 Devorah Dimant, Qumran Cave 4. 21: Parabiblical Texts, Part 4: Pseudo-Prophetic Texts (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2001).
32 Cana Werman, “Epochs and End-Time: The 490-Year Scheme in Second Temple Literature,”
Dead Sea Discoveries 13 (2006): 229–55.
33 For the full text, see Elisha Qimron, ed., The Apocryphon of Jeremiah, in The Dead Sea Scrolls:
The Hebrew Writings. Volume 2: Between Bible and Mishnah [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press,
2013), 94–100.
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and wi[th I]saac and with [Jacob] […] and I shall abandon the land in the hand
of the angels of Mastemot, and I shall hide [My face from Is]rael. And this shall
be the sign for them in the day when I abandon the land [in desolation] the
priests of Jerusalem [will retur]n to worship other gods [and to act] according
to the abominations [of the Gentiles]” (ll. 26–30; 34–38).
6. The punishment for these misdeeds will be Antiochus: “[In those days] will arise
a king of the Gentiles, a blasphemer and a doer of evil and in his [days I shall
remove] Israel from (being) a people. In his days I shall break the kingdom of
Egypt. [and I will save] Egypt, and I shall break Israel and deliver it up to the
sword [and] I [shall lay wa]ste the [l]and and I shall drive man away”; “[ ] the
altar [those ki]lled by the sw[ord ] [ ] be polluted [ ]” (ll. 30–34; 45–46).
There is a clear logic to the events described here. Unlike Daniel, the Apocryphon of
Jeremiah claims that Antiochus’s decrees are the result of Israel’s sins at the end of
the First Temple period (“the trespass [wh]ich they have trespassed [against] M[e]”;
“their iniquity”; “because they spurned my statutes and abhorred my Torah”). In
response to these iniquities, God proclaimed 490 years during which He would exile
Himself from Israel: “But I shall not respond to their inquiry […] until the comple-
tion of ten jubilees of years”; “And my face shall be hidden from Israel”; “Therefore
I have hidden My face from [them until] they accomplish their iniquity.” At some
point in that long period, the angels of Mastemot were appointed to rule the people
of Israel, who in turn were again dragged into idol worship: “The priests of Jerusa-
lem [will retur]n to worship other gods [and to act] according to the abominations
[of the Gentiles].” The conflict with Antiochus, then, with its disastrous outcome
(“[ ] the altar […] [those ki]lled by the sw[ord ] [ ] be polluted [ ]”) is the direct
outcome of that second sin, subjecting Israel to the same punishment it received at
the end of the First Temple period, a blasphemer king, the defilement of the Jerusa-
lem Temple, and Jerusalem lying in ruins.
First Temple Period Second Temple Period
In those days there [will] b[e a king [In those days] will arise a king of the
and h]e (will) be a blasphemer and he Gentiles, a blasphemer and a doer of evil
will commit abominations
I shall [tear away] the kingdom from and in his [days I shall remove] Israel
the hand of those who hold it, and from (being) a people.
[I sha]ll raise up over it others from
another people, and [the in]solence
will rule over all [the l]and, and the
kingdom of Israel will be lost.
Thus, while in the second part of Daniel, heavenly forces are blamed for Antiochus’s
deeds, according to the Apocryphon of Jeremiah, history is not only under God’s
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control, but also fully understandable. Only Israel’s blindness, which was caused
by the people’s sins at the end of the First Temple period, prevents them from seeing
the logic behind the course of events. Man can comprehend God’s hand in the world
if he correctly evaluates the sins of his generation and those of previous genera-
tions. It is no wonder that the Apocryphon of Jeremiah accepts human agents in the
promised healing: “… three priests who will not walk in the ways of [the] former
[priests]. By the name of the God of Israel they will be called. And in their days will
be brought down the pride of those who act wickedly against the covenant and the
slaves of foreign things.”
Escaping Scepticism at the End of the Second
Century BCE
An evaluation of the literature written at the end of the second century BCE reveals
the same tendency detected in the Apocryphon of Jeremiah: a constant effort to avoid
heavenly rebels and to express scepticism. It is not that there was no crisis. On the
contrary, most of the writings identified as products of this era were written by the
Qumran community, a priestly group that left Jerusalem due to a halakhic dispute
with the new Judean government, the Hasmonean regime.34 The aim of these writ-
ings was to cope with their loss of status and power and to provide an answer to
the question of how God can approve the persecution of His devotees. Yet it seems
that the authors were reluctant to portray God as a victim and to accept their own
inability to find logic in the world.35 To avoid rebels and scepticism, they employed
a myth that made no reference to revolt. Furthermore, they quieted the myth by
adopting a new mode of thinking introduced in the Land of Israel during the third
to second century: Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy.36
Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy retains both the universalistic approach and the
optimistic approach of the old biblical wisdom writings. It accepts man’s mental
ability to understand the cosmic law that God has embedded in the world and to
34 Cana Werman, “Introduction” [Hebrew], in Cana Werman and Aharon Shemesh, Revealing the
Hidden: Exegesis and Halakha in the Dead Sea Scrolls (Jerusalem: Bialik, 2011), 9–21.
35 Is this a hint that the group that composed the Apocryphon is the same group that founded the
Qumran community? See Werman, “Present Eschatology.”
36 One of the earliest published scrolls, the Hodayot scroll, contains the philosophically opposed
terms of “spirit” and “flesh” and the unique combination רשבחור . Awareness of the Qumranites’
use of philosophical terms and of their mixing of philosophical terms and the apocalyptic outlook
has grown tremendously since the publication of 4QInstruction twenty-five years ago. See, for ex-
ample, Jörg Frey, “Flesh and Spirits in the Palestinian Jewish Sapiential Tradition and in the Qum-
ran Texts: An Enquiry into the Background of Pauline Usage,” in The Wisdom Texts from Qumran
and the Development of Sapiential Thought, ed. Charlotte Hempel, Armin Lange, and Herman Lich-
tenberger (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 367–404.
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conduct himself according to it. The difference between biblical wisdom and Jewish-
Hellenistic philosophy is found in the use of Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy’s main
novelty, the response to death. Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy holds that every hu-
man who conducts himself properly, suppressing his desires and his bodily needs,
will be rewarded after death; his soul will exist forever.
This novelty separates Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy from the biblical wisdom
writings.37 At the same time, it brings the Second Temple wisdom literature, which
incorporated and adopted philosophical terms, closer to apocalyptic literature.38
Furthermore, its appearance on the intellectual scene enhances the tendency we
detected above, the avoidance of scepticism in the apocalyptic writings. Thus, in
the Qumranic wisdom work 4QInstruction, we find the term היהנזר —“the mystery
that is to be”—which denotes the divine plan governing the world from the creation
to the eschatological creation. Man can apprehend היהנזר by himself by looking at
the historical events of the past and present,39 if he belongs to the “spiritual people”
and not to the “fleshly spirit.”40 This optimistic view stands in contrast to the mean-
ing ascribed to raz in the books of Daniel (chapter 2) and Enoch (8:3; 106:19), where
raz can be learnt only by disclosure from God or the angels.
In the following, I will analyse two compositions where philosophy is combined
with the “no rebels” apocalyptic perspective. I will start with the Two Ways treatise,
which is found in the Community Rule, and will then move to the Book of Jubilees.
My intention is to show the efforts undertaken to avoid scepticism.
1QS 3–4: The Two Ways Treatise
The Two Ways treatise, an independent treatise, was used by the editors of the
Community Rule41 in order to explain why the righteous experience humiliation
37 John Joseph Collins, “The Mysteries of God: Creation and Eschatology in 4QInstruction and the
Wisdom of Solomon,” in Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 287–305, here 287. As
to Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy and Ecclesiastes, see Lester L. Grabbe, “Intertextual Connections
between the Wisdom of Solomon and Qoheleth,” Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually, 201–13.
38 Collins, who was among the scholars who were assigned the publication of 4QInstruction, was
the first to note the closing gap between the wisdom literature found in the scrolls and apocalyptic
thought. See John Joseph Collins, “Wisdom Reconsidered in Light of the Scrolls,” Dead Sea Discov-
eries 4 (1997): 265–81.
39 This statement contradicts the common assumption in scholarship that raz is imparted through
supernatural revelation. See Cana Werman, “What Is the Book of Hagu?”, in Sapiential Perspectives:
Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. John Joseph Collins, Gregory E. Sterling, and
Ruth A. Clements (Leiden: Brill, 2004): 125–40. For a summary of the common view, see, for example,
Matthew Goff, ed. and trans., 4QInstruction (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 15–17.
40 “The ‘spirit’ of the ‘spiritual people’ denotes […] their mental acumen and psychological bearing
to meditate properly upon heavenly knowledge”; the ‘spirit’ of the fleshly spirit does not include
this capability (Goff, 4QInstruction, 168).
41 The treatise is included in the manuscript found in cave 1. However, it is only found in one of
the manuscripts discovered in cave 4.
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while sinners prosper. It is a message that the Maskil, the intellectual leader, should
present to the community members. An Iranian myth42 where evil, with its three
levels—cosmic, heavenly, and earthly—is part of the created world, is the framework
on which the treatise is built. The evil angel of the heavenly realm, the source of
iniquity on the cosmic level, and the sons of darkness on the human level are all
planned by God. The message conveyed is that the self-exiled priests’ current strug-
gle is part of an overall divine plot. No revolt is taking place, and no offence is
committed against God:
From the God of Knowledge comes all that is and shall be. […] He has created man to govern
the world, and has appointed for him two spirits in which to walk until the time of His Visita-
tion: the spirits of truth and of evil. Those born of truth spring from a fountain of light, but
those born of evil spring from a source of darkness. All the sons of righteousness are ruled by
the Prince of Light and walk in the ways of light; but all the sons of evil are ruled by the Angel
of Darkness and walk in the ways of darkness (1QS 3.13; 3.17–21; the translation here and below
is my own).
In this account, the synonyms “truth,” “light,” and “righteousness” are notable.
Furthermore, “truth,” “light,” and “righteousness” are the way in which תועדלא ,
the God of knowledge, prefers to conduct His world. The author has written an apo-
calyptic treatise where angels and spirits appear (the spirits of truth and of evil;43
the Angel of Darkness; the Prince of Light) while maintaining the assumption that
governs wisdom literature, where God’s commands are directed by truth and are in
full harmony with it; hence, righteousness equals truth.
The complex relationship between wisdom and the apocalyptic outlook contin-
ues in the next statement. In full accordance with the apocalyptic view and contrary
to the assumption found in wisdom literature, the treatise declares that there are
periods through which the righteous man, despite being aware of the path he
should follow, cannot cling to God’s command:
The Angel of Darkness leads all the children of righteousness astray and until his end, all their
sins, iniquities, wickedness, and all their unlawful deeds are caused by his dominion […].
Every one of their chastisements, and every one of the seasons of their distress, shall be
brought about by the rule of his persecution; for all his allotted spirits seek to lead the sons
of light astray (1QS 3.21–24).
42 Shaul Shaked, “Qumran and Iran: Further Considerations,” Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972): 433–
46. See a survey in John Joseph Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls (London: Routledge,
1997), 152; John Joseph Collins, Scriptures and Sectarianism: Essays on the Dead Sea Scrolls (Tübing-
en: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 186–88.
43 Frey interprets these spirits as psychological entities: see Jörg Frey, “Different Patterns of Dual-
istic Thought in the Qumran Library: Reflections on Their Background and History,” in Legal Texts
and Legal Issues: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran
Studies, Cambridge, 1995, Published in Honour of Joseph M. Baumgarten, ed. Moshe Bernstein, Flor-
entino García Martínez, and John Kampen (Leiden: Brill, 1997): 275–335.
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There is no explanation as to why God allows the Angel of Darkness and his allotted
spirits “to lead the sons of light astray.” What the authors want to stress, and here
the optimistic view of wisdom literature is evident, is that it is “in accordance with
the mysteries of God.” God is in full control of his creation. This fact enables the
authors to have full confidence (with no need for any revelation) that this period of
distress and persecution will end. Anti-scepticism is at work here.
The role of philosophy in the anti-sceptical attitude is evident at the end of the
treatise, which elaborates upon the destruction of evil. While the multi-level evil
demands a three-step destruction, we find only two steps at the end of the treatise.
In an attempt to lessen the apocalyptic tone, the author refers to level 1, the cosmic,
and level 3, the earthly while he blurs level 2. Angels are not mentioned, only spir-
its. Furthermore, the author expresses the expectation of freeing man from the ob-
stacles posed by his body in his effort for spiritual achievement.
1. God will first destroy evil on the cosmic level:
.דעלהנדימשיהדוקפדעומבוהלועתיוהלץקןתנודובכתמכחבוולכשיזרבלאו
But in the mysteries of His understanding, and in His glorious wisdom, God has
ordained an end for the essence of evil, and at the time of the Visitation He will
destroy it forever (1QS 4.18–19).
2. In accordance with the first paragraph, truth (a wisdom term) is triumphant:
טפשמדעומדעהלועתלשממבעשריכרדבהללוגתהאיכלבתתמאחצנלאצתזאו
.הצרחנ
Then truth, which has wallowed in the ways of wickedness during the dominion
of evil until the appointed time of judgment, shall appear in the world forever
(1QS 4.19–20).
3. Turning now to the earthly level:
God will then purify every deed of man by רבגישעמלוכותמאבלאררביזאו
His truth
He will refine the human body for man’s שיאינבמולקקזו
sake
Rooting out all spirit of evil from the ורשבימכתמהלועחורלוכםתהל
bounds of his flesh.
Cleansing him of all wicked deeds with the תולילעלוכמשדוקחורבורהטלו
spirit of holiness; העשר
Like purifying waters He will sprinkle upon הדנימכתמאחורוילעזיו
him the spirit of truth (to cleanse him) of all רקשתובעותלוכמ
abomination and falsehood and of plunging הדנחורבללוגתהו
in the spirit of impurity (1QS 4.20–22).
The combination of purity/impurity (“purify,” “refine,” “cleanse,” “purifying wa-
ters,” “spirit of impurity”), holiness, heavenly entities (“spirit of evil,” “spirit of
truth”), and transgression (“wicked deeds,” “abomination and falsehood”) is sig-
nificant. The current account goes beyond the first paragraph where heavenly enti-
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ties bring man to sin; there is no blame for causing impurity there, nor for the
penetration of man’s body. To my mind, the new components included in the escha-
tological paragraph are the outcome of the writer’s desire to extend his apocalyptic
treatise not only towards wisdom terminology, but also towards philosophical dis-
course. The emphasis the author wishes to put on the spiritual state that man will
achieve at the End of Days due to God’s intervention is probably the reason for the
inclusion of flesh and body, which goes through a transformation. The author’s aim
is to stress that at the End of Days, the righteous man will be able to attain knowl-
edge ( תעד ) and wisdom ( המכח ) through his mind because with God’s help, he will
be able to overcome his bodily existence:
ךרדימימתליכשהלםימשינבתמכחוןוילעתעדבםירשיןיבהל
So that he may instruct the upright in the knowledge of the Most High and teach the wisdom
of the sons of heaven to those of perfect behaviour (1QS 4.22).
According to the treatise, the End of Days will turn the sons of light not only into
unblemished, righteous people, but also into men of philosophical facilities who
understand the heavenly perspective, the world, and the entire cosmos.
Jubilees
Interestingly, even this mildly apocalyptic and philosophically oriented piece did
not satisfy the author of Jubilees. The idea of God creating evil (on three levels!)
might have seemed inexplicable to him. It is also possible that he did not approve
of the universalistic tone of the Two Ways treatise.44 In any case, the author of
Jubilees, while sharing with the Two Ways treatise a willingness to adopt philoso-
phy into his thought-world, created an alternative apocalyptical worldview where
there is no myth at all and where philosophical terms play an integral part from the
beginning.45 The following will explore Jubilees’s way of presenting its apocalypti-
cal perspective with neither rebels nor scepticism.
1. Jub 2:2 (preserved in 4Q216) includes the following list of angels:
[… the angels of] the presence and the angels of holi[ness]
and the a[ngels of the spirits of fire; and the angels of the spirits of the wind]s;
[and] the angels of the spirits of the clouds for fo[g and for dew]; [and the angels
of the spirits of snow and hail and fr]ost; and the angels of the sound[s]; and
44 On the reaction to the universalistic tone found in Jewish-Hellenistic writings in Jubilees, see
Cana Werman, “Jubilees in the Hellenistic Context,” in Heavenly Tablets: Interpretation, Identity and
Tradition in Ancient Judaism, ed. Lynn LiDonnici and Andrea Lieber (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 133–58.
45 Cana Werman, “Two Creations for One Nation: Apocalyptic Worldview in Jubilees and Qumran
Writings,” in The Religious Worldviews Reflected in the Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. Ruth A. Clements,
Menahem Kister, and Michael Segal (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 264–83.
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the angels of the spirits [of the lightnings; and the angels of the spirits of cold
and] heat, of winter and summer
[and of all] the spirits of His creatures [which He created in heavens and which
He created on ear]th and in every (place).
The idea of angels who are in charge of natural phenomenon is also found in
the Enochic Book of the Watchers (6:7). What makes the list in Jubilees unique
is the differentiation between the meteorological phenomena and their spirits,
a move I would attribute to the Hellenistic dichotomy of spirit or soul vs. flesh
or body.
The fact that Jubilees does not elaborate on the difference between the phenom-
ena and their spirits leads to the conclusion that the author’s main interest lies
in the extremities of the list, where the three-tiered hierarchy is necessary. The
list ends with a group of spirits, መንፈስ, or souls, ነፋስ, which are related to
creatures, תוירב . Contrary to the other items in the list, where each meteorologi-
cal phenomenon contains spirits ruled by angels, here, no angel is mentioned.
We find the missing angel in chapter 10: it is Mastema, the prince of the spirits
(v. 8). Mastema, as we learn in the same chapter, is the appointed executive of
the just conduct of humankind; that is, of bringing punishment upon those who
sin. Thus, the triad of angel—spirit/soul—physical reality (Mastema—spirits of
the living things—the physical world) applies to humans as well. Philosophy
and apocalypse are aptly combined here.
2. Verse 5 of chapter 10 supplies another detail that is important for understanding
Jubilees’s apocalyptic worldview. Jubilees comments that Mastema, in his wish
to aggravate people’s sins, is assisted in his enterprise by the evil spirits, the
descendants of the Watchers. The evil spirits operate on the soul (or heart) and
cause men to sin. Moreover, whereas Mastema is part of the good world created
by God, the evil spirits are not. Their existence is due to a revolt against God:
they are the offspring of the union of the Watchers with the daughters of man.
In Jubilees, however, the union is only partly the outcome of disobedience and
revolt, since here, the Watchers descended to teach justice and only later trans-
gressed by copulating with the daughters of man (5:1). While the Watchers dis-
appeared in the Flood, the evil spirits are to stay, and “they neither conduct
themselves properly nor fight fairly” (10:10). The rebellious forces in Jubilees
are assigned a very low rank and their disobedience is minor.
3. The evil spirits have power over man, but only after man independently chooses
to stumble (7:26–27; 10:3). Why are people likely to sin? The influence of Jewish-
Hellenistic philosophy enables Jubilees’s author to provide an explanation. Ju-
bilean humans are neutral, consisting of a body and a soul (or heart). The body
in Jubilees is neither good nor bad, but rather a helpless entity leaning mostly
toward the wrong side.
4. The people of Israel, even if they are not created differently and are inclined to
sin like other nations, are granted protection from Mastema and the spirits of
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his dominion (15:30–32). God is their guardian and He recruits servants to assist
Him in this duty. The second part of chapter 2 teaches that Israel has a heavenly
counterpart in the angels of the presence and the angels of holiness (the first
to be mentioned in the list above). Wishing to impose complete, firm justice on
the world, Mastema keeps sending the evil spirits to tempt and harm Israel. As
long as this world continues to exist, Mastema continues to cling to his assign-
ment, while the holy angels continue to cling to theirs. In Jubilees, the heavenly
struggle between the angels (an apocalyptic approach) is the outcome of man
being created to consist of both a body and a soul (a philosophical view).
5. Taking chapter 1 of Jubilees as well as chapters 15, 17, 18, and 49 into account,
it becomes clear that only the circumcised Israel will be safe from Mastema’s
hands. Furthermore, in order to receive current protection (and to later enjoy
eschatological bliss), they have to obey the Torah and make the Paschal sacri-
fice on time each and every year. This analysis could lead to the conclusion
that the Jubilean division of the earthly and heavenly realms into two camps is
carried out according to nationalistic considerations. A closer look, however,
reveals a more complex picture. The terms of the covenant made with Israel
have two facets because two Torot were given in Sinai: (a) the five books of
Moses, written on the stone tablets, and (b) the law of the Qumran Community;
that is, the Book of Jubilees, dictated to Moses during his forty-day sojourn on
the Mount.46 Thus, only the “righteous plant” (Jub 1:16), the chosen people
(1:29), not the entire Israelite nation, holds fast to the terms of the second cove-
nant, and consequently only they will be worthy of the second creation.
6. The eschaton is again a mixture of the two ways of thinking. In the eschaton,
the souls of the righteous (ነፋስ) will become a holy spirit (መንፈስ):
After this they will return to Me in a fully upright manner and with all (their) minds and all
(their) souls. I will cut away the foreskins of their heart and the foreskins of their descendants’
heart. I will create a holy spirit for them and will purify them in order that they may not turn
away from Me from that time forever (1: 2347).
In the promise of turning the soul into spirit, Jubilees relies on Ezekiel: “And I will
provide you with a new heart and a new spirit I will place within you” (36:26).
Jubilees adjusts the biblical wording to its own apocalyptic mindset: the evil spirits
and Mastema will have no dominion over the holy spirits now embedded in the
chosen group.
We can say, then, that the Jubilean view of creation is that it is both good and
monistic. God created neither evil angels, the sons of darkness, nor sin. Adopting
Hellenistic ideas, the God of Jubilees created neutral people, consisting of bodies
46 Cana Werman, “The Torah and the Teudah Engraved on the Tablets,” Dead Sea Discoveries 9
(2002): 75–103, here 93–95.
47 James C. VanderKam, ed. and trans., The Book of Jubilees (Leuven: Peeters, 1989).
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and souls (or hearts). In Jubilees, sin is a result of human weakness. Evil spirits
strike the sinning person and they alone are evil, but they were neither created nor
ordained by creation. Jubilees offers a picture close to that of the ALD, in that man
can manage his life with no need of heavenly revelation to understand it. He can
have full control over his life by obeying the right law and by understanding his
own fragility. This is Jubilees’s contribution.
Conclusion
We began with Ecclesiastes’s scepticism. As I have attempted to show, over the
course of two centuries, the idea of scepticism was used as a tool for coping with
disastrous reality, both in wisdom literature and in apocalyptic literature. However,
in Judaism, scepticism is too risky; it can easily lead to the negation of God’s king-
ship and even to the negation of his existence. During the second century BCE,
scepticism gradually disappeared. The Qumranites made an effort to avoid it and
were able to do so with the aid of a new tool: philosophy. It was the destruction of
the Second Temple that brought about a return to apocalyptic scepticism. However,
that is a subject for another paper.
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Serge Ruzer
Reasonable Doubts of the “Other”: Jewish
Scepticism in Early Christian Sources
When early Christian sources describe polemical encounters with “unbelieving
Jews,” whether real or imaginary, and state that the Jews rejected Christian beliefs,
they are referring to a variety of points of contention. In such instances, the ques-
tion should be asked whether this picture faithfully represents a real external rival
or whether it serves as an attempt to overcome an internal problem in the Christian
outlook, conveniently disguised as a struggle with the Jewish religion: that eternal
Other. In other words, how much of this polemic is actually directed against the
Jewish Other and how much of it is implicitly aimed at intra-Christian disputes?
Alternatively, in some illuminating cases of explicitly intra-Christian polemics, the
Christian rivals are branded as Judaisers. One might wonder whether such accusa-
tions reflect views actually held by contemporaneous Jews or whether they are sim-
ply an exercise in expedient name-calling. There is a wide spectrum of attested
points of contention with the “unbelieving Jews,” some of which may be viewed as
reflecting a supposed Jewish scepticism. What is of interest is which of Jesus’s fol-
lowers’ beliefs are perceived as being under attack from scepticism and to what
extent this attack is presented as the result of Jewish spiritual corruption, or, alter-
natively, as a reasonable, “sceptical” reaction in light of the absence of sufficiently
convincing external signs of salvation. In the latter case, behind the scepticism of
the Other may loom the internal doubts of the Christians themselves, projected onto
their Jewish rivals.
By addressing some representative examples, I will correspondingly ask wheth-
er they really attest to existing Jewish “sceptical” views and positions or rather to
Christian uncertainties. In most cases, the question remains open—it goes without
saying that the true answer may be a combination of both—but merely positing it
helps us to better appreciate the complex dynamics of multi-religious milieux in
late antiquity.
1 The Nascent Christian Tradition
I will start from a few characteristic instances attested in the nascent Christian
tradition. At the end of the Gospel of Matthew, we find that the author has append-
ed an exclusively Matthean pericope to the Synoptic description of Jesus’s resur-
rection, culminating in Jesus’s appearance to the astounded disciples (Matt 28:11–
15):
Open Access. © 2021 Serge Ruzer, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
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While they [the disciples] were returning [from Jesus’s grave], behold, some of the guard went
into the city and told the chief priests all that had taken place. 12And when they had assembled
with the elders and taken counsel, they gave a sum of money to the soldiers 13and said, “Tell
people, ‘his disciples came by night and stole him away while we were asleep.’ 14And if this
comes to the governor’s ears, we will satisfy him and keep you out of trouble.” 15So they took
the money and did as they were directed; and this story has been spread among the Jews
(παρὰ Ἱουδαίος) to this day (μέχρι τῆς σὴμερον).
One may note the usage of Ioudaioi—unusual for Matthew, who, in contradistinction
to John, habitually refers to particular groups within Jewish society and not to the
Jews en masse. We are clearly dealing here with an editorial remark informed by an
awareness of polemical Jewish versions of Jesus’s post-mortem fate—something in
the vein of what would reappear much later in the anti-Christian Toledot Yeshu cir-
cle of stories. It is worth noting, however, that the disbelief in resurrection in gener-
al—and by association, that of Jesus—was part and parcel of broader contemporane-
ous Jewish scepticism. Moreover, if we are inclined to accept the evidence provided
by Flavius Josephus, this was a salient mark that distinguished all other “Jewish
philosophies” from the strange beliefs of the Pharisees.1 The same Gospel of Mat-
thew, following the common Synoptic tradition, confirms Josephus’s claim that be-
lief in resurrection was a “sectarian fancy” of the Pharisees, rejected and mocked
as unreasonable by Sadducees related to the members of the priestly elite (Matt
22:23–34):
The same day Sadducees came to him, who say that there is no resurrection; and they asked
him a question, 24saying, “Teacher, Moses said, ‘If a man dies, having no children, his brother
must marry the widow, and raise up children for his brother.’ 25Now there were seven brothers
among us; the first married, and died, and having no children left his wife to his brother. 26So
too the second and third, down to the seventh. 27After them all, the woman died. 28In the
resurrection, therefore, to which of the seven will she be wife? For they all had her.” 29But
Jesus answered them, “You are wrong, because you know neither the scriptures nor the power
of God. 30For in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like
angels in heaven. 31And as for the resurrection of the dead, have you not read what was said
to you by God, 32‘I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob’? He
is not God of the dead, but of the living.” 33And when the crowd heard it, they were astonished
at his teaching. 34But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the Sadducees, they came
together.
The whole passage in Matt 22:15–46 is tailored to position core points of Jesus’s
religious stance within the variety of contemporaneous Jewish outlooks: Matt 22:15–
21 against the Zealots among the Pharisees; Matt 22:22–33 with Pharisees against
Sadducees; Matt 22:34–38 with the Pharisees; Matt 22:41–46 in contradistinction to
the Pharisees. The Sadducees’ mockery in the pericope is thus not presented as
being directed against Jesus or his entourage, but against resurrection-centred Phar-
1 Josephus, J.W. 2.8; A.J. 18.
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isaic fancy in general (v. 34), and the Sadducees’ “realistic scepticism” is backed by
their reference to Scripture. In other words, Scripture, in its literary, “virtual” reality,
functions as the additional argument regarding what is reasonable and what is not.
Fittingly, Jesus’s counter-claim is also obliged to the same literary reality, offering
its own interpretation of the Torah that supposedly backs the idea of resurrection.2
It is telling that Matthew names the “chief priests” as those who began propaga-
ting the derogatory explanation for the empty tomb—the Pharisees are involved nei-
ther in this event nor in Jesus’s arrest and delivery to the Romans to be crucified.
Moreover, Matthew shows a clear awareness of the fact that the issue of Jesus’s
resurrection even constituted a stumbling block for some members of Jesus’s move-
ment (28:17): “And when they saw him, they knelt before him; but some doubted.”
Likewise, Luke and John’s attempts to emphasise the bodily (Pharisaic) nature of
Jesus’s resurrection bear important witness to this scepticism and to the need to
overcome it. Here is the Lukan attempt to counter the doubt (Luke 24:36–42):
As they were saying this, Jesus himself stood among them. 37But they were startled and fright-
ened, and supposed that they saw a spirit. 38And he said to them, “Why are you troubled, and
why do questionings rise in your hearts? 39See my hands and my feet, that it is I, myself;
handle me, and see; for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have.” […] 41And
while they still disbelieved for joy, and wondered, he said to them, “Have you anything here
to eat?” 42They gave him a piece of broiled fish.
John addresses the same conundrum—between the “reasonable,” post-mortem exis-
tence of one’s soul and the strange belief in bodily resurrection—in the famous
“Doubting Thomas” episode (John 20:24–29):
Now Thomas, one of the twelve, called the Twin, was not with them when Jesus came. 25So
the other disciples told him, “We have seen the Master.” But he said to them, “Unless I see in
his hands the print of the nails, and place my finger in the mark of the nails, and place my
hand in his side, I will not believe.” 26Eight days later, his disciples were again in the house,
and Thomas was with them. The doors were shut, but Jesus came and stood among them, and
said, “Peace be with you.” 27Then he said to Thomas, “Put your finger here, and see my hands;
and put out your hand, and place it in my side; do not be faithless, but believing.” 28Thomas
answered him, “My Lord/Master and my God (ὁ κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου)!” 29Jesus said to
him, “Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed are those who have not seen and
yet believe.”
The context—Thomas finally overcoming his doubt regarding Jesus’s return from
the dead—obliges us to interpret Thomas’s exclamation of “My Lord and my God”
2 Compare m. Sanh. 10:1, where those denying that the belief in resurrection is grounded in the
Torah are declared unfit for the world to come. On the possibly complicated editorial history of this
ruling, see Israel J. Yuval, “All Israel Has a Portion in the World to Come,” in Redefining First-
Century Jewish and Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed Parish Sanders, ed. Fabian E. Udoh
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 114–38.
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(ὁ κύριός μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου), or at least its second part, “my God” (ὁ θεός μου),
not as addressing Jesus, but rather as expressing astonishment about God’s great
wonder, the bodily resurrection of his anointed one—something like “Oh my God!”3
It seems, moreover, that the doubt about Jesus’s resurrection is part of a broader
doubt regarding his messianic calling—especially in light of the debacle of his
death. Luke rejects this sceptical view, but he obviously sees it as being present
among Jesus’s disciples themselves and as being founded on a traditional interpre-
tation of Scripture, and thus as “reasonable.” Luke’s solution is to argue for an
alternative interpretation of Scripture (Luke 24:13–27; 44–47):
That very day two of them were going to a village named Emmaus, about seven miles from
Jerusalem […]. 15While they were talking and discussing together, Jesus himself drew near and
went with them. […] 17And he said to them, “What is this conversation which you are holding
with each other as you walk?” And they stood still, looking sad. 18Then one of them, named
Cleopas, answered him, “Are you the only visitor to Jerusalem who does not know the things
that have happened there in these days?” 19And he said to them, “What things?” And they
said to him, “Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, who was a prophet mighty in deed and word
before God and all the people, 20and how our chief priests and rulers delivered him up to be
condemned to death, and crucified him. 21But we had hoped that he was the one to redeem
Israel. Yes, and besides all this, it is now the third day since this happened. […] 25And he said
to them, “O foolish men, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! 26Was
it not necessary that the Messiah should suffer these things and enter into his glory?” 27And
beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the
things concerning himself. […] 44Then he said to them, “These are my words which I spoke to
you, while I was still with you, that everything written about me in the Torah of Moses and
the prophets and the psalms must be fulfilled.” 45Then he opened their minds to understand
the scriptures, 46and said to them, “Thus it is written, that the Messiah should suffer and on
the third day rise from the dead, 47and that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be
preached in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem.
A different and more localised attempt to repel the scepticism backed by Scripture—
or more precisely, by its seemingly well-established interpretation—is attested in
Mark 9:11–13:4
And the disciples asked him, “Then why do the scribes say that first Elijah must come?” 11He
replied, “Elijah does come, and he is to restore all things; 12but I tell you that Elijah has already
3 This goes against a widespread understanding of the phrase as establishing Jesus’s divinity. The
appearance of ὁ θεός in this context may in principle be viewed as reflecting a broader process of
Jesus’s divinisation, attested, for example, in the letters of Ignatius (late first century) and thus
detached from the Johannine strategies. However, if we strive to comprehend it in a specifically
Johannine fashion, a problem arises: since it is the link to the logos that provides the Johannine
Jesus with a divine status—like Moses, but greater—what is the inner logic in calling “God” the
resurrected Jesus? In other words, how is Jesus’s resurrection connected to him being the bearer of
God’s logos? Was it in line with Philo’s suggestion that Moses, as one to whom God spoke face to
face, did not die? Though it is a suggestive possibility, I would argue that in order to indicate such
an interpretation, the Gospel ought to have provided some further elaboration.
4 Compare Matt 17:10–13.
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come, and they did not know him, but did to him whatever they pleased. So also the Son of
man will suffer at their hands.” 13Then the disciples understood that he was speaking to them
of John the Baptist.
This passage presupposes a collation between the understanding of Mal 3:23–24 as
presenting Elijah as an eschatological prophet and messianic expectations: a colla-
tion that results in the idea of Elijah as the Messiah’s precursor. This scheme, which
would become very popular in Christian thought, had, in fact, a much broader Jew-
ish appeal,5 and the Gospel passage, where it is characteristically ascribed to the
“scribes,” who clearly do not belong to Jesus’s entourage, may bear witness to its
circulation in the early first century CE. As such, it becomes the criterion of what is
“reasonable” and thus is the promoter of scepticism.
In other early traditions, the scepticism focused on what appears to be a fiasco
in Jesus’s life mission and/or on his resurrection would be directed towards another
essential part of a what appears to be a non-fulfilled promise—the promise of Jesus’s
return “in glory” to complete the task of messianic salvation. The Epistles of Paul
contain many examples; it is characteristic, however, that epistles, in accordance
with their genre, directly address their audience with entreaties and admonitions or
rebukes. In this situation, the author does not have to present scepticism as a “Jew-
ish thing,” but rather explicitly ascribes it to the members of Jesus’s movement. It
is they who are called to overcome their own doubts—doubts which seem “reason-
able” in light of the difficult times the movement is going through. Yet in his famous
statement in 1Cor 1:23, Paul notes the broader currency of this “reasonable doubt”:
“We preach Messiah/Christ crucified, a stumbling block (σκάνδαλον) to Jews and
folly (μωρίαν) to Gentiles.”
The post-Pauline Epistle to the Hebrews not only epitomises the predicament,
but also establishes the necessary link with the general Jewish lack of “redemption
certitude”—this time not among Jewish contemporaries, but among those who expe-
rienced the Exodus (Heb 3:14–4:2):
For we share in Messiah, if only we hold our first confidence [or faith] firm to the end, 15while
it is said, “Today, when you hear his voice, do not harden your hearts as in the rebellion.”
16Who were they that heard and yet were rebellious? Was it not all those who left Egypt under
the leadership of Moses? 17And with whom was he provoked forty years? Was it not with those
who sinned, whose bodies fell in the wilderness? 18And to whom did he swear that they should
never enter his rest, but to those who were disobedient? 19So we see that they were unable to
enter because of unbelief.
Therefore, while the promise of entering his rest remains, let us fear lest any of you be judged
to have failed to reach it. 2For good news came to us just as to them; but the message, which
they heard did not benefit them, because it did not meet with faith in the hearers [italics mine].
5 See, e.g., Chaim J. Milikowsky, “Trajectories of Return, Restoration and Redemption in Rabbinic
Judaism: Elijah, the Messiah, the War of Gog and the World to Come,” in Restoration: Old Testa-
ment, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives, ed. James M. Scott (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 265–80.
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Faith here, as in Paul, indicates the ability to overcome reasonable scepticism with
regard to the upcoming redemption in light of the troubled, “non-redeemed”
present. One wonders if the recurrent rabbinic formula אבדודןבןיא (“the son of
David will not come until …”) in b. Sanhedrin, with its emphasis on the (indefinite?)
postponement of the messianic salvation, represents a later echo of a broader scep-
tical sentiment. Thus, for example, “The Son of David will not come until two dynas-
ties in Israel come to an end: the one of the head of the [Babylonian] exile and that
of the nasi in the Land of Israel” (b. Sanh. 38a), or “The Son of David will not come
until the whole empire embraces heresy” (b. Sanh. 97a).6
One notes that with all the scepticism concerning Jesus’s messianic mission,
there is a conspicuous lack of any description of a sceptical Jewish reaction to the
miracles performed by Jesus as reported in the Gospel accounts. The polemical re-
sponse is presented as focusing on the possible source of Jesus’s miraculous pow-
ers, but no doubt is expressed with regard to the miracle itself (Matt 9:32–34):
As they were going away, behold, a dumb demoniac was brought to him. 33And when the
demon had been cast out, the dumb man spoke; and the crowds marvelled, saying, “Never
was anything like this been seen in Israel.” 34But the Pharisees said, “He casts out demons by
the prince of demons.”7
This accusation, devoid of what we may call reasonable scepticism, might have
been somehow linked to the dominant presence of demons in the miracle stories in
the Gospels—not only those of exorcisms, but also of healings proper. Likewise, in
rabbinic and later Jewish sources, Jesus is accused of being a magician (who, ac-
cording to some traditions, received his magic powers through the theft of the di-
vine Name).8 Of course, one man’s miracle is another’s magic, but, characteristical-
ly, the event itself is not being denied even in the sources expressing the polemical
stance of the Jewish Other.
6 Compare b. Yebam. 63b: “The Son of David will not come until the number of all the souls [des-
tined to dwell] in the body is filled.” See also discussion in Ephraim E. Urbach, “On Redemption”
in Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, 2nd enlarged ed., (Jerusalem: Magnes
Press, 1987), 1:649–90.
7 The appellation “prince of demons” for the commander in charge of the demonic forces also
appears in T. Sol. 3:6 [12] (of uncertain provenance). William D. Davies and Dale C. Allison (A Critical
and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, Volume II: Commentary on
Matthew VIII–XVIII [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991], 195–96) suggest that by the New Testament times,
he was considered to have once been the highest heavenly angel (T. Sol. 6:1–2) and had become
associated with Satan and Beelzebul. Other appellations were also in use, such as Asmodeus (see
Tob 3:8, but compare T. Sol. 5 [21], where a distinction is upheld between Beelzebul and Asmodeus),
Belial (Jub 1:20, compare “spirits/demons of Belial” in Damascus Document 11:3–2), and Mastema
(Jub 10:8; 11:5).
8 See, for instance, b. Sanh. 43a.
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2 Justin Martyr as a Polemical Witness
The writings of Justin Martyr from the mid-second century attest to a somewhat
different arrangement of the foci of the alleged Jewish scepticism. As the Gospel
narrative acquired its detailed form, it was now not Jesus’s resurrection—already a
firmly established belief among his followers—but additional details, such as the
story of Mary’s miraculous impregnation, that needed to be defended against scep-
tics. Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, a composition that would become
a blueprint for much of the later Christian anti-Jewish polemic,9 provides a telling
example here. Since we cannot be sure if Trypho was the author’s real-life interlocu-
tor or merely a fictitious figurehead,10 the question of what Trypho’s views as spelt
out in the composition actually stand for is even more appropriate. At the beginning
of chapter 67 of the Dialogue, Trypho is presented as confronting the Christian tradi-
tion of Jesus’s virgin birth, which was already gaining appeal:11
Moreover, in the fables of those who are called Greeks, it is written that Perseus was begotten
of Danae, who was a virgin; he who was called among them Zeus having descended on her in
9 On Justin Martyr’s polemical agenda and strategies, see Ben-Zion Bokser, “Justin Martyr and the
Jews,” Jewish Quarterly Review 64, no. 2 (1973): 97–122; no. 3 (1974): 204–11; Harold Remus, “Justin
Martyr’s Arguments with Judaism,” in Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, Volume 2: Separation and
Polemic (Waterloo, Ont.; Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 59–80; Marc Hirshman, “Polemic
Literary Units in the Classical Midrashim and Justin Martyr’s ‘Dialogue with Trypho,’” Jewish Quar-
terly Review 83, no. 3–4 (1993): 369–84; Michael Mach, “Justin Martyr’s ‘Dialogus cum Tryphone
Iudaeo’ and the Development of Christian Anti-Judaism,” in Contra Iudaeos: Ancient and Medieval
Polemics between Christians and Jews, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr,
1996), 27–47; Graham N. Stanton, “Justin Martyr’s ‘Dialogue with Trypho’: Group Boundaries, ‘Pros-
elytes’ and ‘God-Fearers,” in Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity, ed. Graham
N. Stanton and Guy G. Stroumsa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 263–78; Judith
Lieu, “Accusations of Jewish Persecution in Early Christian Sources, with Particular Reference to
Justin Martyr and the ‘Martyrdom of Polycarp,’” in Tolerance and Intolerance, 279–95; William Hor-
bury, “Jewish-Christian Relations in Barnabas and Justin Martyr,” in Jews and Christians: The Part-
ing of the Ways, A.D. 70 to 135, ed. James D. G. Dunn, repr. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999),
315–45; Daniel Boyarin, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” Church History 70, no. 3 (2001): 427–61;
Philippe Bobichon, “Autorités religieuses juives et ‘sectes’ juives dans l’oeuvre de Justin Martyr,”
Revue des études augustiniennes 48, no. 1 (2002): 3–22; Philippe Bobichon, “Persécutions, calom-
nies, ‘Birkat ha-Minim’ et émissaires juifs de propagande antichrétienne dans les écrits de Justin
Martyr,” Revue des études juives 162, no. 3–4 (2003): 403–19; Antti Laato, “Justin Martyr Encounters
Judaism,” in Encounters of the Children of Abraham from Ancient to Modern Times, ed. Antti Laato
and Pekka Lindqvist (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 97–123; Tessa Rajak, “Theological Polemic and Textual
Revision in Justin Martyr’s ‘Dialogue with Trypho the Jew,’” in Greek Scripture and the Rabbis, ed.
Timothy M. Law and Alison Salvesen (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 127–40; Terence L. Donaldson, “‘We
Gentiles’: Ethnicity and Identity in Justin Martyr,” Early Christianity 4, no. 2 (2013): 216–41.
10 See, for instance, Claudia Setzer, Jewish Responses to Early Christians: History and Polemics,
30–150 C.E. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 135, 215; Larry R. Helyer, Exploring Jewish Literature
of the Second Temple Period (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 493.
11 See also Rajak, “Theological Polemic and Textual Revision in Justin Martyr’s ‘Dialogue.’”
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the form of a golden shower. And you ought to feel ashamed when you make assertions similar
to theirs, and rather [should] say that this Jesus was born man of men. And if you prove from
the Scriptures that he is the Messiah (Christ), and that on account of having led a life con-
formed to the Torah (law), and perfect, he deserved the honor of being elected to be Messiah,
[it is well]; but do not venture to tell monstrous phenomena, lest you be convicted of talking
foolishly like the Greeks.12
Trypho is portrayed as one who is ready to accept Jesus’s messiahship in principle,
but who can do so only on what he views as a solid Jewish basis of the Messiah’s
faithfulness to the Torah—not that of mythological imagination. Justin might have
been aware of contemporaneous Jewish attacks on the story of the virgin birth. At
the very least, Celsus, that sceptical second-century Roman “conservative intellectu-
al,”13 was quoted by Origen in Contra Celsum (1.28) as claiming that he had heard
from a Jew that Mary had actually been impregnated by a soldier named Panthera—
a name that resurfaces in this context in a later Jewish source.14 Certain scholars
would suggest that Trypho’s rejection of the story represented the views of some
Jewish followers of Jesus.15 It is moreover possible that the Dialogue here reflects
disputations within Justin’s community itself, especially in view of the fact that the
texts of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, which contain the virgin birth motif,
had not yet become fully canonised: Justin himself seems to have used a harmony
composed from excerpts from different Gospels.16 It is telling that the need to con-
12 For the English translation of the Dialogue used here and below, see, Justin Martyr, Dialogue
with Trypho, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, Volume 1, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and
A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Marcus Dods and George Reith (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publish-
ing Co., 1885), revised and edited by Kevin Knight, https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0128.htm.
13 See Robert L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1984), 94.
14 See t. Ḥul. 2:22, Zuckermandel edition, 503.
15 See, for example, Oskar Skarsaune, “Jewish Christian Sources Used by Justin Martyr and Some
Other Greek and Latin Fathers,” in Jewish Believers in Jesus: The Early Centuries, ed. Oskar Skar-
saune and Reidar Hvalvik (Peabody, MA: Hendrikson Publishers, 2007), 379–416.
16 What Justin makes Trypho say also seems to point to a written Gospel harmony rather than to
separated Gospels of canonical status (Dialogue 10): “‘This is what we are amazed at,’ said Trypho,
‘but those things about which the multitude speak are not worthy of belief; for they are most repug-
nant to human nature. Moreover, I am aware that your precepts in the so-called Gospel are so
wonderful and so great, that I suspect no one can keep them; for I have carefully read them. But
this is what we are most at a loss about: that you, professing to be pious, and supposing yourselves
better than others, are not in any particular separated from them, and do not alter your mode of
living from the nations, in that you observe no festivals or sabbaths, and do not have the rite of
circumcision; and further, resting your hopes on a man that was crucified, you yet expect to obtain
some good thing from God, while you do not obey His commandments.’” Moreover, this is how
Justin himself refers to the Gospel account (Dialogue 105): “For I have already proved that he was
the only-begotten of the Father of all things, being begotten in a peculiar manner Word and Power
by Him, and having afterwards become man through the Virgin, as we have learned from the mem-
oirs.” The author of the Dialogue seems, therefore, to be aware of various “memoirs” (less than
canon) and harmonistically combines them—or others have combined them for him—into a single
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front the ridicule head-on only arises at this point: nothing of the kind is attested
in the Gospels. Does Jewish scepticism then also represent the internal debates and
the opposition of those who—like Trypho?—disliked the story of the virgin birth, the
story conspicuously absent from Mark, John, Paul, and so on?
The crux of Jewish scepticism, however, is presented in the Dialogue as a con-
tinuation of the motif already discerned in the New Testament—namely, a sceptical
response to the lack of redemption promised to and by Christians. Chapters 31 and
32 of the Dialogue are tailored to overcome this “reasonable objection.” In chap-
ter 32, Justin counters Trypho’s protestation that Jesus does not fit the scripturally
sanctioned and thus reasonable picture of final salvation, with the idea of two mes-
sianic advents—the first, already accomplished by Jesus (with reference to Zech
12:10: “They look on him whom they have pierced”), and the one to come (with
reference to the glorified Son of Man from Dan 7:13):
Trypho said, “These and such like Scriptures, sir, compel us to wait for him who, as Son of
man, receives from the Ancient of days the everlasting kingdom. But this so-called Christ of
yours was dishonorable and inglorious, so much so that the last curse contained in the Torah
of God fell on him, for he was crucified.”
Then I replied to him, “If, sirs, it were not said by the Scriptures which I have already quoted,
that his form was inglorious, and his generation not declared […] and if I had not explained
that there would be two advents of his,—one in which he was pierced by you; a second, when
you shall know him whom you have pierced. […] But now, by means of the contents of those
Scriptures esteemed holy and prophetic amongst you, I attempt to prove all [that I have ad-
duced] […] [by] other words also spoken by the blessed David, from which you will perceive
that the Lord is called the Christ by the Holy Spirit of prophecy; and that the Lord, the Father
of all, has brought him again from the earth, setting him at His own right hand, until He makes
his enemies his footstool.
Since there is no doubt that Justin’s coreligionists were very much aware of the
disappointing postponement of final redemption—which had not yet been safely
reinterpreted in a spiritualised fashion—the question lingers: Are we dealing here
mostly with Jewish scepticism, inner-Christian doubt, or both?
3 The Case of Theodore of Mopsuestia
I will now address a later case, that of Theodore of Mopsuestia (ca. 350–428), where
the Jewish rejection of basic tenets of the Christian outlook is not immediately de-
rived from what may be viewed as scepticism. This case is therefore introduced
narrative: “Word” comes from John, the virgin birth from Matthew. On the canonisation of the New
Testament, see, for instance, Guy G. Stroumsa, “The Body of Truth and Its Measures: New Testa-
ment Canonization in Context,” in Guy G. Stroumsa, Hidden Wisdom: Esoteric Traditions and the
Roots of Christian Mysticism (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 79–91.
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here mainly as a backdrop in order to supply a broader perspective for discussion.
Theodore was an important representative of the Antiochene tradition, a disciple of
Diodore of Tarsus, and, at one point in his life, a friend of John Chrysostom.17 Theo-
dore’s major theological treatise, On the Incarnation, having been lost,18 we are left
to reconstruct his outlook from the Commentary on John, which survives in its entire-
ty only in Syriac translation.19 The Commentary bears witness to a combination of
low Christology and a modicum of understanding with regard to the supposed Jew-
ish rejection of Christological ideas—especially illuminating, as the Fourth Gospel
itself is usually perceived as both vehemently anti-Jewish and as propagating a very
high Christology.20
The Commentary’s outstanding feature is the perception of a gradual develop-
ment in unfolding Christological truths.21 This concept of “progressive revelation”
is not limited to Jesus’s times, but functions as a guiding principle in Theodore’s
elaboration on the process of imparting divine knowledge throughout the history of
salvation.22 Thus, the Interpreter is of the opinion that it is only in the incarnation
 He would be celebrated in East Syrian tradition as the Interpreter (  ).
 For Theodore’s Christology, see, e.g., Francis A. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mop-
suestia (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University Press, 1956); Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tra-
dition. Volume 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), trans. John Bowden, 2nd rev. ed. (Lon-
don: Mowbray; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1975), 421–42; Frederick G. McLeod,
Theodore of Mopsuestia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 34–63. For the extant fragments
of On the Incarnation, see Till Jansen, Theodor von Mopsuestia: De incarnatione. Überlieferung und
Christologie der griechischen und lateinischen Fragmente einschließlich Textausgabe (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2009), 234–91.
 For the Syriac text, see Theodore of Mopsuestia, Commentarius in Evangelium Iohannis Apostoli,
ed. and Latin trans. Jacques M. Vosté (Paris: E Typographeo Reipublicae, 1940) (hereafter Comm.).
For an English translation, see Theodore of Mopsuestia, Commentary on John, trans. Marco Conti,
ed. Joel C. Elowsky (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010) (hereafter Eng.). See Felix Thome,
Studien zum Johanneskommentar des Theodore von Mopsuestia (Bonn: Borengas̈ser, 2008), and re-
cently, inter alia, Aryeh Kofsky and Serge Ruzer, “Shaping Christology in a Hermeneutical Context:
Theodore of Mopsuestia’s Endeavor in Face of Contemporaneous Challenges,” Adamantius 18
(2013): 256–75; Aryeh Kofsky and Serge Ruzer, “Hermeneutics of Progressive Development in Theo-
dore of Mopsuestia’s Commentary on John in Syriac,” Parole de l’Orient 40 (2015): 275–86.
 See, for example, Reginald H. Fuller, “Lower and Higher Christology in the Fourth Gospel,” in
The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn, ed. Robert T. Fortna
and Beverly R. Gaventa (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990): 357–65; Jörg Frey, “Licht aus den Höh-
len? Der ‘johanneische Dualismus’ und die Texte von Qumran,” in Kontexte des Johannesevange-
liums: Das vierte Evangelium in religions- und traditionsgeschichtlicher Perspektive, ed. Jörg Frey and
Udo Schnelle (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 117–203; Martin Hengel, “The Prologue of the Gospel
of John as the Gateway to Christological Truth,” in The Gospel of John and Christian Theology, ed.
Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 265–94.
 See discussion in Kofsky and Ruzer, “Hermeneutics of Progressive Development in Theodore of
Mopsuestia’s Commentary on John in Syriac.”
 This principle is also consistent with the method of rational/literal/historical and contextual
exegesis that Theodore inherited from his teacher Diodore of Tarsus, ingeniously elaborated and
bequeathed to his disciples of the so-called Antiochene school. See Sullivan, The Christology of
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that the logos was hypostatically revealed and seen, whereas earlier, God’s words
(  , logos) were conveyed through intermediaries (angels or prophets).23
This “supersessionist” attitude, however, does not annul Theodore’s positive
appraisal of biblical Israel as being cognisant of divine truths.24 The logos did con-
vey its messages to ancient Israel, albeit only indirectly. The deficient character of
the biblical Jews’ theological cognition is therefore derived not from their unsatis-
factory religious stance, but rather from the objectively veiled nature of the revela-
tion to which they were exposed, which prevented Israel from a true recognition of
its Lord.25
As may be expected, Theodore views the incarnation, outlined in John 1:14
(“And the Word [ὁ λόγος] became flesh and dwelt among us”), as a direct personal
revelation of the logos and the watershed in the unfolding history of salvation. How-
ever, with regard to the period after the incarnation, Theodore also develops a
model of the disciples’ gradual overcoming of their lack of comprehension, the final
phase of which comes only after Jesus’s resurrection. Even then, moreover, it does
not occur instantaneously, but is also distinguished by a gradual development.
This general framework of such a gradual development of cognition is finally
epitomised in Theodore’s bold and unusual concept of Jesus’s own personal devel-
opment—more precisely, concerning the changing mode of the union between the
human and the divine in the incarnation. Here, Theodore discerns two consecutive
potential and effective modes of the logos’s operation on Christ’s humanity. The
first mode, which is only latent, is applied to the period between Mary’s impregna-
tion and Jesus’s anointment with the Spirit at baptism. The second mode, which is
actually effective, is initiated by the Holy Spirit at Jesus’s baptism, when the addi-
tional grace is conferred, setting in motion Jesus’s public ministry, miraculous pow-
ers, and moral perfection, newly acquired by his enhanced humanity. Theodore thus
Theodore of Mopsuestia, 181–96; Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 352–60; Eduard Schweizer,
“Diodor als Exeget,” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 40 (1941): 33–75; Felix
Thome, Historia contra Mythos: Die Schriftauslegung Diodors von Tarsus und Theodors von Mopsues-
tia im Widerstreit zu Kaiser Julians und Salustius’ allegorischem Mythenverständnis (Bonn: Borengas̈-
ser, 2004).
 Comm.18–19; Eng. 9. Theodore characteristically claims that the notion of serial pre-incarnation
appearances of the logos—which he sees as a heretical, mostly Arian deviation—was also common
among John’s Jewish contemporaries: “In fact, there was a firm belief (  ) among them (Jews)
that he had indeed appeared to them many times in different guises ( ̈ܬܬܐܝ ).” What clearly
underlies Theodore’s polemical strategy here is his apprehension that such a position could poten-
tially impair the singularity of the divine manifestation in the Messiah. This is, of course, a classic
case of identifying heretical views with those of the Jews.
 Comm. 18.20–21; Eng. 9. Theodore retains the basic pre-incarnation perception of the logos as
omnipresent and as the voice proclaiming ( ܕܥܕ ) God’s will—in fact, as God’s intermediary in
His dealings with the world and humanity.
 ܐܥܕܘܗ , Comm. 32.14–15; Eng. 15.
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presupposes that Christ needed an additional influx of God’s grace in order to
achieve moral perfection:
Christ-in-the-flesh, when he was not yet in his nature—namely, conjoined with God the Word—
necessarily needed the mediation of the giving of the Spirit ( ܕܕܘܗ
ܘܪܕܗܬܗܕܬܬܐܐܐܕܘܗܐ ) […]. After receiving
every perfect grace ( ܬ ), which he received thanks to his anointing ( ܬ ),
he lived a life of great integrity ( ܬܘܬܘܕܕ ) in a way that is not possible for
human nature ( ܕܬܐܐܕܐ ).26
Theodore also seeks to conceptualise in Christological terms the events of the post-
resurrection stage, when Jesus’s enhanced human state is perceived as being de-
rived from a new and stronger mode of conjunction with the logos:
He (the assumed man) separated his person from other human beings […] by indicating that
he had received a more excellent grace ( ܕܫܘܨܕܢܘܩܬܬܪܕ )
through which he is [now] joined together with God the logos like a real son ( ܬܕܬ
ܕܐ ).27
It is in the context of this gradual development that the Interpreter portrays the
cognitive situation of Jesus’s Jewish environment. For Theodore, first-century Jewry
seems to stand for pre-incarnation stages of revelation delivered through the pro-
phets,28 and Jesus’s disciples shared this general Jewish matrix—especially regard-
ing messianic beliefs. Such recognition underlies Theodore’s perception of the ini-
tial post-incarnation cognitive difficulties shared by the two groups.
Commenting on John 7:34, Theodore explicitly states that Jews and disciples
during Jesus’s lifetime belong to the same epistemological category:
The Jews did not understand any of these words ( ̈ܕܘܕܗܐ ). And this
is not surprising, because even the disciples […] could not understand the words that were
said at that time ( ܗܝ̈ܘܗܕܘܘܗ̈]...[ܬܐܕܐ ). It was only at
the end that they learned these things from the facts.29
In a fascinating replay of his treatment of the pre-incarnation biblical stages of reve-
lation, he is ready to explain the lack of acceptance—on the part of Jesus’s Jewish
contemporaries in general, the disciples included—of the Christological truths re-
garding the Messiah’s union with the logos. The rejection of those truths is again
presented as being conditioned not by “Jewish weakness,” but rather by a still limit-
ed mode of revelation, and thus as the expression of a “reasonable doubt.” There-
 Comm. 296.29–297.2; Eng. 137.
 Comm. 350.19–22; Eng. 162.
 See also Theodore of Mopsuestia, Commentary on Galatians 3:23, in Commentary on the Minor
Pauline Epistles, ed. Rowan A. Greer (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 82–83.
 Comm. 161.1–5; Eng. 74.
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fore, Theodore’s interpretation—which the Interpreter explicitly presents as oppos-
ing the broad, and incorrect, understanding—of Thomas’s initial scepticism in John
20:24–28, the Gospel passage I already addressed above, is particularly significant.
Tellingly, Theodore views it not as a sign of weak faith, but rather as conduct that
was most realistic and adequate at this stage, since objectively, Thomas was not yet
able to discern the divine nature in Christ. Therefore, when Thomas, the “doubting
disciple,” exclaimed “My Lord and my God,” he was merely praising God for the
miracle of Jesus’s bodily resurrection.30
To conclude, I have highlighted a variety of points from early Christian dis-
course towards which “Jewish scepticism” was supposedly expressed. We have ob-
served a meaningful dynamic in its foci: from Jesus’s resurrection through claims
about his messianic mission and stories of his miraculous birth to the insistence—
in spite of the obvious delay in the Parousia—on his future triumph, all the way to
theological concepts. The extent to which those expressions of “Jewish scepticism”
reflected actual contemporaneous Jewish patterns of thought remains an open
question that warrants separate discussion on a case-by-case basis. What is clear,
however, is that in most instances, they might in fact have also reflected internal
Christian “reasonable doubts”; on some occasions, this is actually spelt out by our
sources.
In this sense, the background case of Theodore of Mopsuestia remains an out-
standing one, both because there is no indication that the Jews in Theodore’s reason-
ing are his contemporaries and because he explicitly presents “Jewish doubts” re-
garding new Christological schemes that were being propagated in that time as
reasonable and thus justified. He seems to be keenly aware of the highly complicated
character of those schemes, and in his opinion, the “lack of comprehension” corre-
sponds to the actual level of revelation to which Jesus’s entourage had been exposed.
Here especially, one may suppose that the Jewish “lack of comprehension” should,
in fact, be viewed as reflecting internal Christian doubts vis-à-vis elaborations intro-
duced into contemporary Christology. Unlike others, however, Theodore not only
tries to help his audience to overcome its uncertainties by branding them as “Jewish
doubts,” but also identifies with those doubts, demonstrating sympathy with the
predicament of the “unbelieving Jews” and thus that of his coreligionists themselves.
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Idolatry, God(s), and Demons among the Jews
of Sasanian Babylonia
Sasanian Babylonia was a region brimming with the supernatural. In this paper, I
shall discuss how the rabbis of this region responded to the pervasive polytheism
surrounding them, including the expansive world of demonology, and how they
sought to reconcile it with their religious worldview.
According to a number of Second Temple sources, Babylonian Jews, like Jews
throughout the ancient world, were staunchly monotheistic. For instance, we hear
from a source attributed to Hecataeus of Abdera how the Jews serving in the army
under Alexander of Macedon adamantly refused to participate in the reconstruction
of a temple to Bel in Babylon.1 Additional Second Temple works also give this im-
pression, such as the Book of Judith,2 and Bel and the Dragon—a work that seems
to polemicise against the worship of Bel. Other accounts are less emphatic. For in-
stance, the account of the robber kingdom of the two Jewish leaders Anilaeus and
Asinaeus, which is recorded by Josephus, thematises the pagan images worshipped
by Anilaeus’s Gentile wife and its disastrous impact on the Jews. Even though Jews
are not themselves implicated in idolatry, it might be alluding to, and warning
against, inner-Jewish dabbling in such pagan images.3
Rabbinic sources speak of Second Temple Jews and their late antique descend-
ants as having overcome what is described as the “inclination” ( ארצי ) or impulse
towards “alien worship.”4 On the basis of these sources, Ephraim Elimelech Urbach,
for example, would conclude that “the prevailing view of the Sages in the third
century was that the craving for idolatry had been uprooted and removed from Isra-
el already at the beginning of the Second Temple period.”5 The most explicit rabbin-
1 Josephus, C. Ap. 1.192. See Menahem Stern, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, vol. 1
(Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974), 38. For doubts regarding the accura-
cy of the attribution of this episode to Hecataeus, see generally Bezalel Bar-Kochva, Pseudo-Heca-
taeus, “On the Jews”: Legitimizing the Jewish Diaspora (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Universi-
ty of California Press, 1996).
2 Jdt 8:18. For the Persian era, see Rivka Raviv, “Hafsaqat ha-Elilut beYisrael bitqufah haParsit,”
Bekhol Derakhekha Daehu: Journal of Torah and Scholarship 25 (2011): 83–92, and further references.
3 Josephus, Ant. 18.345. On this episode and for further references, see Geoffrey Herman, “Iranian
Epic Motifs in Josephus’ Antiquities (XVIII, 314–370),” Journal of Jewish Studies 57, no. 2 (2006):
245–68. Here, idolatry is related to a forbidden sexual union. On this linkage, see further below.
4 For the rabbinic term, הרזהדובע , a literal translation would be ‘alien worship’ which I have
adopted in cases of ambiguity. The term ‘idolatry’, which is far more common, suggests the exis-
tence of a physical object, an idol, which is not always assumed in the rabbinic term.
5 Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1979), I, 22; Ephraim E. Urbach, “The Rabbinic Laws of Idola-
try in the Second and Third Centuries in the Light of Archaeological and Historical Facts, I–II,”
Open Access. © 2021 Geoffrey Herman, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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ic sources to make this claim appear in b. Yoma 69b, a Babylonian rabbinic source
which will be examined in detail below, and the Palestinian midrash Song of Songs
Rab. 7:8. Some rabbinic sources question the degree to which even those Israelites
depicted as sinning through the practice of idolatry in the Bible during earlier peri-
ods were in fact truly devoted to it. A tradition in the name of Rav, for instance,
defends the religious credentials of the Jews prior to the beginning of the Second
Temple era. It declares: “The Israelites knew that they were nonentities, and they
engaged in alien worship only in order to allow themselves forbidden sexual rela-
tions (b. Sanh. 63b).” Such an assertion, which reiterates the ancient tendency to
equate idolatry with sexual promiscuity,6 was reassuring to the talmudic sages in
its implication that the ancient Israelites, notwithstanding their sin of idolatry, com-
mitted “no cognitive error.”7
Saul Lieberman is of a similar view. While observing that the rabbis possessed
“a fair knowledge of the rites and practices of idol worshippers and of the various
regulations bearing on heathen divinities,”8 he asserted that “the Rabbis did not
deem it necessary to engage in theoretical discussions against” idolatry (italics
mine).9 In his view, they confined themselves to the legal sphere of permitted and
prohibited interaction and contact, albeit providing an extensive and detailed trac-
tate containing legal discussion on the subject. He also tended to minimise the direct
impact of pagan idolatry on rabbis and Jews in his close studies of “rabbinic polem-
ics against idolatry” and “heathen idolatrous rites in rabbinic literature,” even as he
provided and studied many examples of rabbinic familiarity with pagan practices.10
Such an assertion might seem difficult to substantiate. Furthermore, and more
generally, it does not clearly distinguish between the situations in Babylonia and
Palestine. I wish here to limit my examination to Babylonia. Indeed, studies of Jew-
ish attitudes towards idolatry, pagan deities, and demons in late antiquity, particu-
larly in the rabbinic period, have tended to focus on Palestine, with its rich offerings
of literary sources, material findings, and archaeological data alike.11 The Mishnah,
Israel Exploration Journal 9, no. 3/4 (1959): 149–65; 229–45, especially 154: “The consensus of opin-
ion amongst the Sages in the third century was that all idolatrous impulses had been eradicated
from amongst the people of Israel as early as the beginning of the Second Temple.”
6 For example, Exod 34:16; Lev 20:15; Ezek 6:9, and elsewhere.
7 For this phrase, see Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, trans. Naomi Goldblum
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 23.
8 Saul Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine: Studies in the Literary Transmission, Beliefs and
Manners of Palestine in the I Century B.C.E.–IV Century C.E. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary
of America, 1950), 115.
9 Lieberman, Hellenism, 128, italics mine.
10 Lieberman, Hellenism, 115–27; 128–38.
11 See, especially, Emmanuel Friedheim, Rabbinisme et paganisme en Palestine romaine (Leiden and
Boston: Brill, 2006), 25–67; 109–60; Friedheim, “Sol Invictus in the Severus Synagogue at Hammath
Tiberias, the Rabbis, and Jewish Society: A Different Approach,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 12
(2009): 89–128; Emmanuel Friedheim, “Sur l’existence de Juifs polythéistes en Palestine au temps de
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Tosefta, and Yerushalmi tractates of ‘Abodah Zarah naturally provide an immense
and highly focused collection of material on this topic.12 Recently, for instance, a
chapter on seeing idols in rabbinic sources in Rachel Neis’s book The Sense of Sight
in Rabbinic Culture is mainly concerned with Palestine and Palestinian rabbinic
sources, noting, in contrast, “the Bavli’s relative lack of engagement with the visual-
ity of idolatry.”13
The situation with regard to Babylonia does indeed differ from Palestine in
some respects, and it would appear to be more complicated.14 Richard Kalmin’s
study of the talmudic sources concerning “idolatry in late antique Babylonia,” for
instance, recognises the manifest presence of idols in public places, including cities
with a significant Jewish population, within the Roman milieu. This reality, he
notes, is often addressed in the Palestinian rabbinic sources and in sources about
Palestinian rabbis cited in the Babylonian Talmud. Against this, Kalmin registers
considerable discussion of idols and idolatry in the Babylonian Talmud, but an ab-
sence of explicit cases of actual idols affecting the lives of Babylonian rabbis in the
Babylonian Talmud. When the Babylonian Talmud provides examples, they invari-
ably feature Palestinian rabbis. He believes there to be a “paucity of idols in Babylo-
nia,” and hence that the “rabbinic anxiety” with regard to idols that he has uncov-
ered in his study points to a “puzzling disconnect between reality ‘on the ground’
in Sasanian Babylonia and the rabbis’ experience of the world.”15
Two examples where Babylonian rabbis do encounter idols that are provided in
the Babylonian Talmud are somewhat ambiguous and thus might not be seen to
altogether contradict this impression: the so-called andarta in the synagogue of Shaf
Veyatev, near Neharde‘a,16 and the idol in Bei Torta, a place of unknown location
la Mishna et du Talmud: Une nouvelle approche,” Les judaïsmes dans tous leur états aux Ier–IIIe siè-
cles: Les Judéens des synagogues, les chrétiens et les rabbins, ed. Claire Clivaz, Simon Claude Mi-
mouni, and Bernard Pouderon (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 73–116. In these studies, Friedheim has
argued for the existence of what he terms “polytheist Jews” in the rabbinic period. See, too, recent-
ly, Moshe Simon-Shoshan, “Did the Rabbis Believe in Agreus Pan? Rabbinic Relationships with
Roman Power, Culture, and Religion in Genesis Rabbah 63,” Harvard Theological Review 111, no. 3
(2018): 425–50.
12 In addition, one can mention a significant portion of Sanhedrin chapter 7.
13 Rachel Neis, The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 196.
14 See the discussion below on b. Ber. 57b and its assumptions about idol worship.
15 Richard Kalmin, “Idolatry in Late Antique Babylonia,” in Richard Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia be-
tween Persia and Roman Palestine: Decoding the Literary Record (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), 103–20, here 119–20. Compare Daniel Boyarin, A Traveling Homeland: The Babylonian Talmud
as Diaspora (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 69–72, who discusses Kalmin’s
article. Boyarin may, however, be blurring the boundaries between rabbinic Palestine and Babylo-
nia too much in asserting that “Jewish Bavel is doubly located in Iranian Āsōristan and in Palestine
at the same time” (71).
16 On this synagogue and its location, see Aharon Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic
Period (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983), 290–91.
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but probably within the vicinity of Pumbedita.17 Another case, which Kalmin does
not address, is the apparently real and perhaps regular possibility of seeing “Mercu-
ry,” for which a particular benediction was mandated (b. Ber. 57b). It would appear
that we are not actually dealing with Mercury here, but with the chief Babylonian
god. This is supported by the context of this statement. It features on a list of tradi-
tions concerning the city of Babylon and its biblical legacy. In addition, the tradent
is a rabbi from this region, Rav Hamnuna, and the tradition is further confirmed by
Rav Ashi, also from the region of Babylon in Southern Babylonia. Mercury was not
worshipped in Babylonia in this period, nor his Greek equivalent, Hermes, so “Mer-
cury” must merely be the term of reference carried over from the tannaitic sources.18
It is interesting, nevertheless, that Hermes was early on identified with Nabu, the
god traditionally associated with Borsippa, a city adjacent to Babylon, which may
mean that this is in fact referring to a specific situation. Either way, Kalmin’s data
can likely be accounted for without acknowledging a true disconnect. Michael Shen-
kar, for instance, is probably correct in suggesting that since
the majority of the population of Babylonia in this period seems to have been pagan, and there
is evidence that pagan temples and shrines, which undoubtedly contained idols, continued to
exist in the Babylonian countryside even into the Islamic period […] it is likely that the situa-
tion with idol-worship in Babylonia was different to the Roman Near East in that, in Babylonia,
idols were removed from the public sphere and kept in the temples, in accordance with millen-
nia old Mesopotamian practice. This, rather than a “Sasanian iconoclasm” […] could be the
main reason underlying the paucity of evidence for encounters with cult statues in the Bavli.19
The examination of rabbinic sources from Babylonia separately from Palestinian
sources is important and may help to avoid possible misconceptions. For instance,
we have a rabbinic statement, “Rav Naḥman said: All irreverence is forbidden apart
from irreverence towards alien worship” ( רבאריסאאתונציללכןמחנבררמא
אירשדהרזהדובעדאתונצילמ , b. Sanh. 63a–b; b. Meg. 25b), to which Lieberman
refers in his study of Palestinian rabbinic attitudes. However, in the Babylonian
Talmud, the expression itself only appears in the mouths of Babylonian amoraim,
and it may very well be reflective of the Babylonian rabbinic mindset alone rather
than a broader rabbinic one. The distinctive religious milieu of Roman Palestine
17 b. ‘Abod. Zar. 43b; b. Sanh. 64a. On its location, see the discussion in Oppenheimer, Babylonia
Judaica, 367.
18 On Mercury as the generic term for idolatry in rabbinic literature, see Saul Lieberman, Tosefta
Ki-fshuṭah: A Comprehensive Commentary on the Tosefta, Part I, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Jewish Theologi-
cal Seminary of America, 1992), 103.
19 Michael Shenkar, Intangible Spirits and Graven Images: The Iconography of Deities in the Pre-
Islamic World (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 31. The theory of Sasanian iconoclasm has its own
problems, but this is not pertinent here. In contrast, see the new study by Kevin T. van Bladel, From
Sasanian Mandaeans to Ṣābians of the Marshes (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017). This study proposes
that some of the Sasanian rulers were actively attempting to erase idolatry and its temples as part
of its argument for the emergence of minor religious cults in the course of the Sasanian era.
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against which the Palestinian rabbinic sources are examined needs, naturally, to be
matched with a parallel effort to probe and describe the particular religious milieu
of the Sasanian realm whence the Babylonian Jewish sources stem.
Pagan Deities in Sasanian Babylonia
Turning to Babylonia and its environs, we see that the proliferation and persever-
ance of diverse pagan worship throughout the Sasanian era is affirmed in multiple
ancient sources, including considerable Christian testimony. For the northern reach-
es of Mesopotamia or Adiabene, the Syriac Christian literary evidence is particularly
valuable. This generally well-informed body of evidence, while confirming enduring
pagan beliefs and practices, questions the extent or depth of the officially sanc-
tioned and occasionally aggressive process of Christianisation that this region expe-
rienced. The Doctrine of Addai (15b–16a), for instance, which dates from fourth- to
fifth-century Edessa, has the following declaration:
I see that this city is filled with paganism which is contrary to God. Who is this idol Nebo
which you worship, and Bel which you honor? Behold there are those among you who worship
Bath Nikal, like the inhabitants of Harran your neighbors, and Tar’atha like the inhabitants of
Mabug, and the Nishra like the Arabs, and the sun and the moon, like the rest of the inhabit-
ants of Harran who are like you.20
Likewise, Jacob of Sarug, from the late fifth or early sixth century, in his memra “On
the Fall of the Idols,” which is devoted precisely to the theme of pagan deities,
explicitly identifies Bel and Nabu as Edessan gods.21 The fall of Nisibis to the Per-
sians in the second half of the fourth century is judged by the contemporary Ephrem
to be a punishment for its tenacious paganism. Likewise, in the fifth century, Isaac
of Antioch details extensive and varied pagan beliefs in cities in northern Roman
Mesopotamia. One can hardly imagine that the regions of the non-Christian Sasa-
nian empire would have been less infused with pagan deities.
As we cross the border and enter the Sasanian empire, the Persian divine pan-
theon joins the non-Persian ancient Near Eastern religious scene. This finds expres-
sion in both Christian and Jewish (talmudic) sources, some of which will be men-
tioned below. It would appear, however, that the non-Persian pantheon retained its
prominence in the region where the Jews resided. Thus, of all the Gentile names in
b. Giṭ. 11a, which may be taken to be names with a theophoric element, only one is
recognisably Persian: Hormiz. Among the other names on the list, only Shabtai is
20 George Howard, trans., The Teaching of Addai (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 49. I have
slightly revised the translation.
21 For a detailed study of the pagan cults in Edessa, see H. J. W. Drijvers, Cults and Beliefs at
Edessa (Leiden: Brill, 1980). For studies of Jacob of Sarug’s list, see references cited in Drijvers,
Cults, 37 n. 70.
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Semitic, while the others are of uncertain origin. There is also little Christian impact
in the incantation texts: only one demon called Mešiḥa (= Messiah, Christ), a demon
in the church of Qrabul, according to BM 132947, is mentioned. Evidently, Christ is
treated like other deities and is demonised. Furthermore, an explicit reference to
pagan sanctuaries and practices found in b. ‘Abod. Zar. 11b would seem to support







Mar Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said [in the name of] Rav: There are five fixed sanctuaries of alien
worship: They are the temple of Bel in Babylonia; the Temple of Nabu in Borsippa; Tir‘ata
[= Astargatis] in Mabug [= Hieropolis]; Ṣerifa in Ashqelon, and Nishra in Arabia.
When Rav Dimi came [i.e., to Babylonia from Palestine] he said: They added to them the fair
in ‘Eyn Bekhi [= Heliopolis] and the brick in Acre—some say: the brick in ‘Eyn Bekhi.
Rav Dimi of Neharde‘a teaches the opposite order; the fair in Acre and the brick in ‘Eyn Bekhi.
Rav Naḥman the son of Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Ḥisda: What is the meaning of “fixed”? He said:
“So said the father of your mother: fixed means they worship there all year long.”22
This list, which interestingly lacks reference to any Zoroastrian sanctuary, can be
compared to the lists provided in the Syriac sources mentioned above. While those
sources focus on their neighbourhood of northern Mesopotamia, this list incorpo-
rates references to its own neighbourhood of Babylon and Borsippa. It also comple-
ments Mandaic sources which evoke Bel, Nabu, and Nishra together, the latter of
whom is associated with Kashkar, as Jonas Greenfield has shown.23 This list can
only be understood as a sample, not as a complete or even representative list of the
key deities in these places. The Syriac sources cited above demonstrate the associa-
tion of many of these deities with other locales. Astargatis and Nishra are prominent
in Hatra, for instance, and a Mandaic magic text speaks of Nanaya of Borsippa.24
Many of these deities, then, are found in a number of places.
22 B. ‘Abod. Zar. 11b. According to MS Paris 1337. One other reflection on Babylonian pagan reli-
gious culture is found in the Babylonian Talmud with reference to the Chaldeans ( יאדלכ ), who,
despite the vagueness of the sources, might be associated with religious experts in the mould of
ancient Babylonian stock. They are consistently depicted as astrologers whose predictions are accu-
rate and fulfilled, hence the length of Rav Joseph’s rule over the academy in b. Ber. 64a and Rav
Naḥman b. Isaac’s future as a thief in b. Šabb. 156b. See also b. Šabb. 119a; b. Sanh. 95a; b. Yebam.
21b. In the realm of astrology, this “science of the times,” the Chaldeans are reliable experts.
23 Jonas C. Greenfield, “A Mandaic Miscellany,” in ‘Al Kanfei Yonah: Collected Studies of Jonas C.
Greenfield on Semitic Philology, ed. Shalom M. Paul, Michael E. Stone, and Avital Pinnick (Leiden:
Brill, Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2001), 1:397–404.
24 Christa Müller-Kessler, “Interrelations between Mandaic Lead Scrolls and Incantation Bowls,”
in Mesopotamian Magic: Textual, Historical, and Interpretative Perspectives, ed. T. Abusch and
K. van der Toorn (Groningen: Styx, 1999): 197–210.
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Pagan Deities in Incantation Bowls
The perseverance of these and other pagan deities is also demonstrated from the
texts on Jewish, Christian, Mandean, and other incantation bowls, Mandean lead
rolls, and similar sources, testimony that is not mentioned in the studies that we
mentioned earlier.
Of particular interest here are a number of phenomena of both religious and
social significance. Firstly, within these magical artefacts there are extensive refer-
ences to many of the same deities described as active religious cults in the literary
sources, including those of Bel, Nabu, Bat Nikal, Shamash, and others.25 This would
suggest a certain correspondence between the religious pantheon reflected in the
bowls and the religious scene “on the ground.” This is also somewhat confirmed
with respect to the Zoroastrian deities evoked on the incantation bowls and in other
texts from this period.26 Hormiz b. Lilwatha/Lilitha in b. B. Bat. 73a, for example,
would seem to create a demonic caricature of the foremost Zoroastrian deity, as
Hormiz = Ahura Mazda.27 Hormiz is explicitly described as a dew in a polemical
Syriac text from the late Sasanian era.28 Moreover, one must wonder how, or indeed
whether one is to distinguish between the deity revered by their Zoroastrian neigh-
bours and his namesake evoked in the Talmud, who is comparable to other Zoroas-
trian deities mentioned on contemporary magical artefacts. Secondly, one may also
encounter deities known from much earlier Babylonian sources, such as Mulit and
Dalebat, that are not otherwise reflected in other contemporary sources.29 An addi-
25 For a Jewish text, see Dan Levene and Gideon Bohak, “A Babylonian Jewish Aramaic Incantation
Bowl with a List of Deities and Toponyms,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 19 (2012): 56–72, although the
readings offered there probably need further study.
26 See Geoffrey Herman, “Jewish Identity in Babylonia in the Period of the Incantation Bowls,” in
A Question of Identity: Social, Political, and Historical Aspects of Identity Dynamics in Jewish and
Other Contexts, ed. Dikla Rivlin Katz, Noah Hacham, Geoffrey Herman, and Lilach Sagiv (Olden-
bourg: De Gruyter, 2019), 131–52, especially 140–41.
27 See Reuven Kiperwasser and Dan D. Y. Shapira, “Encounters between Iranian Myth and Rabbin-
ic Mythmakers in the Babylonian Talmud,” in Encounters by the Rivers of Babylon, ed. Uri Gabbay
and Shai Secunda (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 285–304, here 292.
28 Mār Grigor, 7 (in Florence Jullien, ed., Histoire de Mār Abba, catholicos de l’orient. Martyres de
Mār Grigor, général en chef du roi Khusro Ier et de Mār Yazd-panāh, juge et gouverneur [Leuven:
Peeters, 2015], 50).
29 For the ancient Babylonian background of certain deities, see Wolfgang Fauth, “Lilits und As-
tarten in aramäischen, mandäischen und syrischen Zaubertexten,” Welt des Orients 17 (1986): 66–
94. For the Babylonian deities see especially Christa Mueller-Kessler and Karlheinz Kessler, “Spät-
babylonische Gottheiten in spätantiken mandäischen Texten,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vor-
derasiatische Archäologie 89 (1999): 65–87; Christa Müller-Kessler, “Dan(ḥ)iš – Gott und Dämon,”
in Assyriologica et Semitica: Festschrift für Joachim Oelsner anlässlich seines 65. Geburtstages am
18. Februar 1997, ed. Joachim Marzahn and Hans Neumann (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2000), 311–18.
Mulit features on a Jewish bowl published in James Nathan Ford and Alon Ten-Ami, “An Incanta-
tion Bowl for Rav Mešaršia Son of Qaqay” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 80 (2012), 219–30.
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tional point of interest is the considerable degree of borrowing and exchange be-
tween the incantation formulae written by the practitioners of diverse religious con-
fessions.30 Thus, Jewish formulae are found on bowls written in Syriac or Mandaic
script, and Mandaic and Christian formulae find their way onto bowls inscribed in
a clear and elegant Jewish Aramaic hand. Some Manichaean texts found in Turfan
also contain what would seem to be Jewish formulae and so reflect this religious
atmosphere.31 Examples include YBC 2393, a bowl with a Jewish Babylonian Arama-
ic inscription, that adjures “by Shamesh, and Sin, and Nabu, and Dalebat, and Bel,
and Nerig, and Kewan! Oh Great King, Warrior, and oh Mistress of Destruction”32 or
“Shamash, the king of the gods” ( יהלאדאכלמשימש ) in Moussaieff 163. Mulit ap-
pears on a Jewish bowl that mentions a certain rabbi, as well as in Mandean texts
and many others.33
If we limited ourselves to the Babylonian Talmud alone, we would not be aware
of the degree to which pagan deities were present in Babylonia, and more signifi-
cantly, of their presence in texts written by Jewish scribes. Needless to say, the testi-
mony of the incantation texts may be seen as just the tip of the iceberg, a chance
but rather consistent testimony of a rich ancient, but not stagnant, religious diversi-
ty. Much of the earlier scholarship on the Jews of Babylonia has tended to margina-
lise the Jewish sources that deal with incantations. Magic in general, including that
practised by rabbis, is sidelined in accounts and is regarded as “popular,” and the
magical artefacts are brushed aside as external to the study of Babylonian Jewry.34
These artefacts serve, however, as valuable comparative data for assessing the Bab-
ylonian Talmud’s discussions relating to idolatry.
Alien Worship in the Babylonian Talmud
The Jews were always a minority in Babylonia and would naturally have been under
the shadow of the local religious deities, and they were often forewarned of such,
30 See Tapani Harviainen, “Syncretistic and Confessional Features in Mesopotamian Incantation
Bowls,” Studia Orientalia 70 (1993): 29–37.
31 For their publication, see Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst, “The Apotropaic Magical Text M389
and M8430/I/ in Manichaean Middle Persian,” Aram 16 (2004): 141–60, and see Geoffrey Herman,
“The Talmud in Its Babylonian Context: Rava and Bar Sheshakh; Mani and Mihrshah” [Hebrew], in
Between Babylonia and the Land of Israel: Studies in Honor of Isaiah M. Gafni, ed. Geoffrey Herman,
Meir Ben Shahar, and Aharon Oppenheimer (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Centre, 2016), 79–96.
32 אננבורחדאתרמואנדפרקאבראכלמןויכוגירנוליבותבילדוובנוןיסושימשב . Julian Obermann,
“Two Magic Bowls: New Incantation Texts from Mesopotamia,” The American Journal of Semitic
Languages and Literatures 57 (1940): 1–31.
33 Ford and Ten-Ami, “An Incantation Bowl for Rav Mešaršia.”
34 Neusner’s five-volume History of the Jews in Babylonia devotes twenty-five pages of the fifth
volume to “other Jews, other magicians,” with the addition of a thirty-page appendix penned by
Baruch Levine on “The Language of the Magical Bowls,” which is mostly a textual study of earlier
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firstly by the prophets in the biblical sources, who also condemned the local gods,
Bel and Nabu, along with the kingdom of Babylon.35 Indeed, the Babylonian Tal-
mud itself shows an interest in local idolatry. While discussing the ridicule of alien
worship already mentioned, it evokes the names of deities such as those that appear
in local toponyms (b. Sanh. 63a–b = b. Meg 25b). In one place (b. ‘Abod. Zar. 53b),
there is a discussion of a pagan temple referred to as the “Temple of Nimrod” ( תיב
דורמנ ). Elsewhere (b. ‘Abod. Zar. 53b), the rabbis debate the status of a local dam-
aged pedestal on which one would stand an idol ( אמיגפאסמיב ). As the Talmud
discussion clarifies, however, this Temple of Nimrod is already in ruins, abandoned
forever by its worshippers. And yet, they encounter more in Babylonia than just
the ruins of temples and damaged pedestals! The contemporaneity of polytheism is
transparent in another source, b. ‘Abod. Zar. 55a, which discusses the question of
the reality of pagan deities and reveals the complexity of their relationship with
these pagan gods and metaphysical forces. Taking its cue from the Mishnah, which
relates a debate about pagan gods between the elders of Rome and the rabbis, the
Talmud continues to cite discussion between rabbis and Gentiles regarding the real-
ity of idolatry. Most of these sources are in Hebrew, cite tannaim, and would appear
to be of Palestinian and tannaitic provenance. The underlying tendency is to deny
any reality to the gods. Different assumptions seem to undergird what is related







I. Rava b. Isaac said to Rav Judah: There is (a case of) alien worship in our region. When
the world is dry and no rain comes they slaughter a man and rain comes.
II. He replied to him: Now, if I was dead I would not [have been able to] tell you this matter.
Thus said Rav: What is the meaning of the scriptural verse, “the Lord your God has appor-
tioned (ḥalaq) to all the nations” (Deut 4:19)? It teaches that he caused them to trip (hiḥliq)
with words, in order to remove them from the world.
III. This corresponds with that which R. Simeon b. Laqish said: What is the meaning of the
scriptural verse: “He mocks proud mockers but shows favour to the humble and op-
pressed” (Prov 3:34)? If one comes with the intent to become impure, he is enabled; if
one comes to become pure—he is aided.36
readings (Jacob Neusner, History of the Jews in Babylonia, vol. 5 [Leiden: Brill, 1970], 217–43; 343–
75). In his fourth volume, he had devoted only three pages to magic and the rabbis (Jacob Neusner,
History of the Jews in Babylonia, vol. 4 [Leiden: Brill, 1968], 347–50).
35 E.g., Isa 46:1.
36 B. ‘Abod. Zar. 55a, according to MS New York JTS Rab 15.
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The diverse responses found in this collection of conversations point away from the
previous scepticism regarding the potency of such deities and towards a clear anxie-
ty concerning the claims made by those of pagan religions that they were attaining
tangible results in their temples. The conversation between R. ‘Aqiba and a certain
Zonen, which immediately precedes the source we have cited, works on the premise
that “my heart and your heart know that alien worship has no essence” ( ךבלויבל
שממהבתילז"עשעדי ) and explains that any result it effects is pure coincidence.37
This, indeed, is the assumption of the sources cited earlier on in this sugya and in
the Mishnah debate with the elders of Rome. The recovery from malady which takes
effect at the moment when a person enters a pagan temple is explained by the
divine decree of healing just happening to coincide with the sick person’s visit to
the pagan temple. Sickness itself takes a vow, which it must honour.38 It falls under
God’s domain. The Babylonian Talmud’s choice to pursue the discussion further
suggests its lack of satisfaction with this answer. Rava b. Isaac’s remark to Rav
Judah points to the effective human sacrifice practised in “our region” in order to
bring about rain.39 The focus of devotion whose power is efficacious is local, “in
our region,” but the benefit it provides is also local—it serves for the welfare of the
entire local population, including the Jews. Rav Judah’s reply, prefaced with the
dramatic “now if I was dead,” etc., for rhetorical effect,40 is cited in the name of the
Babylonian amora, Rav. The Talmud compares this answer with a teaching by the
Palestinian amora, R. Simeon b. Laqish, which treats the distribution of pagan dei-
ties to the Gentiles as a divine device in order to justify their punishment. Punishing
the Gentiles is apparently the desired effect, but the pagan deities by which they
acquire their measure of iniquity, even if part of God’s design, are evidently quite
real. The Jewish interlocutor is advised to stay away from them not because they
are not efficacious, as the benefits are evident, but rather due to their side effects.
37 There has been some discussion as to whether this Zonen is Jewish or not. I take him to be a
pagan, thus providing the drama of the conversation. For discussion, see in particular and with
references to earlier scholarship Friedheim, Rabbinisme et paganisme en Palestine romaine, 49–52.
For an onomastic overview on this name in ancient Palestine, see Tal Ilan, Lexicon of Jewish Names
in Late Antiquity. Part 1: Palestine 330 BCE–200 CE., Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002, 281.
38 ןתעובשבןינמאנוןתוחילשבםיערםינמאנוםיערםיילחוןנחוי'ר'מאדוניהו . This can be compared
with the notion of sickness as something demonic that must be exorcised, as is common in the
incantation bowls. See, too, Dov Noy, “The Talmudic-Midrashic ‘Healing Stories’ as a Narrative
Genre,” Koroth 9 (1988): 124–46, especially 136. For a broad view on the phenomenon and anteced-
ents, see Markham J. Geller, “Akkadian Healing Therapies in the Babylonian Talmud,” Max-Planck-
Institut Für Wissenschaftsgeschichte Preprint 259 (2004): 1–57.
39 The only significant variant between the textual witnesses for our purposes here relates to the
addition of a phrase which relates that the deity appears to them in a dream and instructs them to
slaughter a victim. This addition appears in the Vilna and Pesaro print editions, MS Munich 95,
and Bazzano Archivio Storico Comunale Fr. ebr 11, but is lacking in the better MS Paris 1337 and
MS New York JTS Rab 15.
40 Cf. b. B. Meṣ. 73b; b. Šabb. 152b; b. Yebam. 46a.
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The Inclination towards Alien Worship
The rabbis, as mentioned, speak of the overwhelming attraction of idol worship in
the pre-exilic period and of having already been cured of this temptation in the
distant past. Of particular interest is the Babylonian rabbis’ remarkable rehabilita-
tion of the Judahite king, Manasseh. Notwithstanding his negative scriptural reputa-
tion and his mishnaic damnation, he is portrayed in the Talmud as capable of jug-
gling rabbinic-style expertise in the Torah and idolatry. When challenged about this
incongruity, he responds by pleading for our understanding: the temptation was
simply too great!41 This individual entreaty might, indeed, serve to account for the
challenge of idolatry that accompanies Israelite history throughout the First Temple
period. It is the determination to rid the Jews of their preoccupation with idolatry
that spurred the intriguing aggadic exposition of Scripture in b. Yoma 69b.42 It ap-
pears as an expanded re-telling of an episode from the fifth chapter of the Book of
Zechariah. This scene, which “is often seen as one of the most bizarre in Zechari-







5Then the angel who was speaking to me came forward and said to me, “Look up and see
what is appearing.” 6I asked, “What is it?” He replied, “It is a basket.” And he added, “This is
the iniquity of the people throughout the land.” 7Then the cover of lead was raised, and there
in the basket sat a woman! 8He said, “This is wickedness,” and he pushed her back into the
basket and pushed its lead cover down on it. 9Then I looked up—and there before me were
two women, with the wind in their wings! They had wings like those of a stork, and they lifted
up the basket between heaven and earth. 10“Where are they taking the basket?” I asked the
angel who was speaking to me. 11He replied, “To the country of Babylonia to build a house for
it. When the house is ready, the basket will be set there in its place.”
41 b. Sanh. 102b, according to MS Yad HaRav Herzog:
ארדאוההבתיוהיאהיל'מאיכהירמאדאכיאיסוכסכהותסכסיכהוה?ך?נשבז'עדארצילהיתיאיא
.תטהרו]ךדיב[רקשב]ךילוש[ךלופישתטקנהוה
“If the temptation of alien worship were in your years you would have constantly chewed it up”
(translation follows Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic
and Geonic Periods [Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press; Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2002], 592: “There are those who say he said to him: If you were in that generation
you would have taken hold of the folds in your hands and run [after them/me]). See Kalmin, Jewish
Babylonia, 178.
42 See also b. ‘Arak. 32b; b. Sanh. 64a. The Palestinian midrash also speaks of the removal of the
inclination to idolatry in Song of Songs Rab. 7:8, but its discussion is based on different biblical
sources and different rabbis.
43 Edgar W. Conrad, Zechariah (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 116.
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But it is written: “And Ezra the Scribe stood on the wooden tower which he had made to speak”
(Neh 8:4). Rav Gidal sad in the name of Rav: For he elevated Him with the Tetragrammaton.
That was in an emergency, as it is written: “And they cried in a loud voice to the Lord, their
God” (Neh 9:4). It is he who destroyed the temple and burned the sanctuary and exiled Israel
from their land, have you only given it to us so that we receive a reward? We desire neither it,
nor its reward do we want! They sat fasting for three days. A note fell from the skies on which
was written “truth”!
Rav Huna said: One learns from here that the seal of the Holy One, blessed be He is “truth.”
It emerged as a fiery young lion from the House of the Holy of Holies.
The prophet said to them: This is it. As they took hold of it a hair fell out from it. Its voice
travelled 400 parasangs. They said: How shall we act? We shall kill it. [Otherwise] it will raise
its voice and destroy the world. The prophet replied to them. You need to cast it into a pot and
cover it with lead that absorbs the sound. And they put fire beneath and roasted it, as it is
said: “And he said: This is the wickedness, and he cast it into the ephah and he cast the lead
stone over the mouth” (Zech 5:11).
The Talmud arrives at this juncture after a discussion concerning the use of the
Tetragrammaton outside the temple. A source is summoned that claims that Ezra
the Scribe made use of it outside the temple. This is treated as an exceptional cir-
cumstance and a story is then provided to describe that very situation. It depicts
the expulsion of the urge for idolatry, itself a midrash on the above-mentioned pas-
sage from Zechariah.
The mysterious ephah in the biblical narrative here, a measure of grain that is
usually understood as a basket that can contain such a measure, contains a woman.
The woman symbolises wickedness according to the Scriptural verses. Here, it has
44 b. Yoma 69b. Compare b. Sanh. 64b. Cited according to MS New York JTS Rab. 218 (EMC 270).
The significant difference between this version together with the earlier textual witnesses in com-
parison with the later MSS and printed editions is the description of placing the sealed pot over a
fire to be roasted before being sent off. See the discussion of this source in Meir Ben Shahar, “Bibli-
cal and Post-Biblical History in Rabbinic Literature: Between the First and Second Destruction”
(PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2011), 249–52, and his examination of the textual vari-
ants.
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been interpreted as representing the temptation of idolatry, again drawing on the
association between idolatry and fornication. Withstanding this temptation is meri-
torious, but it would be better to have neither the temptation nor the reward. The
temptation, personified in the form of a fiery lion, is secured and removed. The
Babylonian Talmud does not dwell on the fact that the scriptural verses send this
evil to the “Land of Shinar,” a synonym for Babylonia in rabbinic literature. While
the temptation of alien worship is sealed in this instance, elsewhere, the Babylonian
Talmud (b. Sanh. 24a) treats this verse as speaking of the unshackled descent of the
highly negative traits of hypocrisy and arrogance to Babylonia.45
The Babylonian provenance of this narrative is evident from its appearance in
the Babylonian Talmud and the absence of direct parallels in Palestinian rabbinic
sources. Its reference to having “exiled Israel from their land” is a nod to the Baby-
lonian exiles who are its audience. The focus on the urge towards idolatry in this
Babylonian source and the detailed description of the praxis of its expulsion, pre-
sumably based on contemporary local exorcism practices, suggests the relevance
and immediacy of the issue to be current rather than historical. The fact that the evil
ironically finds its way to Babylonia raises the uncanny deliberation as to whether
it had indeed been finally and entirely vanquished, not merely for the Jews in Pales-
tine, but particularly for those in Babylonia. It leaves open the discussion of the
extent to which idolatry and the drive towards it had indeed departed in the distant
past or whether it was in some way still quite present among them.
Babylonian Jews were very much a part of the complex religious world of Baby-
lonia, accepting many of the assumptions shared by their contemporaries regarding
the demonic and the divine. The frequent engagement with themes relating to the
supernatural and the divine in the Babylonian Talmud, when read alongside the
Jewish magical evidence from Babylonia and other contemporary sources, suggests
a degree of anxiety about the fact that the rabbis were grappling with the appeal of
a multiplicity of deities and forces present among the inhabitants of Sasanian Baby-
lonia and that they were actively seeking to clarify how their notions of the divine
differed from those of their neighbours.
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Facing Omnipotence and Shaping
the Sceptical Topos
In this paper, I would like to analyse the metamorphosis of narrative traditions.1
The core of my examination will be the transformation of a notion that is concealed
beneath the narrative. The story to be considered deals with a problem which is
usually a subject of contemplation for sceptical theists, a branch of philosophy
which accepts that God exists and that we can know general truths about Him, but
denies that we can know the reason for God’s decision to act in a particular way in
any given case. The argument to which sceptical theism primarily responds is the
ever-present problem of evil, whose argument against the existence of God runs as
follows: if God exists, then there should be no undeserved evil. However, it is well
known that cases of undeserved evil do exist. Therefore, a sceptic would or might
assert that an omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent God does not exist.
However, the sceptical theist would respond that based on our limited knowledge
of the reasons for God’s actions, we cannot know that the second premise is correct.2
In other words: “If, after thinking hard, we cannot think of any God-justifying
reason for permitting some horrific evil, then it is likely that there is no such rea-
son.”3 The sceptical theist will maintain his belief in God, but will deny God’s in-
volvement in the politics of evil. However, the rabbinic narrator’s approach is more
that of a sceptical pantheist, if such a term is possible. God is involved in the world;
He is aware of the existence of evil; however, despite being omniscient, omnibenev-
olent, and omnipotent, He has decided not to change anything in the world.4
In a manner of speaking, the rabbinic narrator accepts the teaching of the Book
of Job, with which the stories to be considered have an intertextual relationship,
1 A first draft of this paper was presented at the “Expressions of Sceptical Topoi in (Late) Ancient
Judaism” workshop held at the Maimonides Centre in Hamburg on 18 and 19 April 2016, and the
comments of the other participants were most helpful in the preparation of this paper. I began to
write it during my stay at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (DFG-Kolleg-Forschergruppe
FOR 2311) and completed it as an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation fellow at the Judaic Studies
Institute at the Free University of Berlin. I would like to express my gratitude to both these institu-
tions for their support.
2 See Trent Dougherty, “Skeptical Theism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/skeptical-
theism/. (19. 06. 2020)
3 Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea, “In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and
Oppy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 2 (2005): 241–51.
4 Regarding theological inquiries on this theme in rabbinic Judaism see, for example, David Stern,
Midrash and Theory: Ancient Jewish Exegesis and Contemporary Literary Studies (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1997), 73–93; Dov Weiss, Pious Irreverence: Confronting God in Rabbinic
Judaism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 150–60.
Open Access. © 2021 Reuven Kiperwasser, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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which states that God is very interested in earthly events and would even like to
intervene; however, since He is currently to be found in another dimension, inter-
vention is simply impossible, just as it is impossible for Job to play with Leviathan
or hunt Behemoth.5 These theological ideas, expressed through these metaphorical
images in the Book of Job, do not, as a rule, appear in rabbinic literature as theologi-
cal teachings; rather, they are embodied in narratives. A narrative is the best form
for the author to express theological doubts, as he can do so through his heroes’
thoughts without any need for apology. One narrative in the Babylonian Talmud
(b. Ta‘an. 25a) is, I believe, very illustrative of the narrator’s holding of such theo-
logical doubts. However, before allowing the Babylonian narrator to express his
sceptical pantheism, we should consider the Palestinian prototype of this story, al-
though it is less subversive, since a comparison with its Babylonian counterpart will
show us the conception of this theological idea.
The Prototype and Its Context
The pericope in which the Palestinian tradition appears consists of a parable and a
story, which are connected both to each other and to a verse from Genesis (25:8),
for which the text provides an interpretation. For a better understanding of the con-
text, we must read this parable tradition with some thoughts about the nature of
this literary form in rabbinic literature and its theological implications. The parable
considered here belongs to the particular genre known as “king parables.” These
have been widely discussed by scholars as a literary form that is characteristic of
rabbinic literature; however, the genesis and theological insights of this form still
await exploration.6 King parables are stories with a typical hero: a leader or head
of a Roman province, or even the emperor himself, who functions as the parable’s
signifier for the God of Israel.7 This analysis focuses on a specific subset of rabbinic
5 See Trent Dougherty, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism,” Faith &
Philosophy 25 (2008): 172–76.
6 The first study of royal parables in rabbinic literature was Ignaz Ziegler’s Die Königsgleichnisse
des Midrasch Beleuchtet durch die Römische Kaiserzeit (Breslau: S. Schottlaender, 1903). The topic
has also been discussed in more recent works: see Yona Fraenkel, Darkei ha-aggadah we-ha-midraš,
2 vols. (Giv‘atayim: Yad la-Talmud, 1991), I:323–93; David Stern, Parables in Midrash: Narrative
and Exegesis in Rabbinic Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 19–24. The
methodological problems with the mashal were discussed in reviews of this work: see the review
by Daniel Boyarin, “Review of Parables in Midrash: Narrative and Exegesis in Rabbinic Literature by
David Stern,” AJS Review 20 (1995): 123–38. See also, more recently, Alan Appelbaum, The Rabbis’
King-Parables: Midrash from the Third-Century Roman Empire (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2010).
7 See Stern, Parables, 16–19, and Fraenkel, Darkei ha-aggadah, I:370–72.
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king parables: namely, parables about a king who invites commoners to a banquet,
but whose invitation has strings attached, unbeknownst to the guest.8
In an earlier paper of mine, I made the argument that royal banquet parables
are in an ongoing inter-textual dialogue with the prophet Isaiah’s depiction of the
eschatological feast. The idea of the banquet at the End of Days first appears in the
biblical corpus in the future banquet scene famously described in Isa 25:6–7:
The Lord of Hosts will make on this mount ההתֹואל-םי,רהֶּז,
for all the people a banquet of rich viands, הםי,הםי:םי,
a banquet of choice wines— ם,םי,ֻזםי.
of rich viands seasoned withmarrow
of choice wines well refined.
The rabbinic parables relating to the royal banquet usually provide no explicit refer-
ence to the verses in Isaiah. The structure of these texts, however, points to Isaiah’s
eschatological banquet as an underlying foundation.9 The sumptuous eschatologi-
cal banquet Isaiah describes is an expression of divine triumph and victory. I believe
that this motif, which makes its first appearance in the prophet’s words, proliferates
and expands in the later phase of the Second Temple period,10 becoming wide-
spread in rabbinic literature.11 However, in rabbinic literature, it is seldom a story
of celebrating the victory of a glorious king. There, rather, it is typically a scene of
embarrassment, making the story more of a trial. The royal banquet parables in-
clude additional motifs such as the invitation to the banquet, dismissal from the
banquet, refusal to participate, and guests arriving in inappropriate dress. The hon-
our of the banquet’s host is represented as something that could either increase or
diminish, while the composition of the guest list receives additional weight. How-
ever, in the parable that I want to discuss here, the scenario of the royal feast will
include some details that are difficult to explain. We will address the question of
what they indicate regarding the relationship between the host and the guests.
8 I have devoted a paper to this type of parable: see Reuven Kiperwasser, “A Bizarre Invitation
to the King’s Banquet: The Metamorphosis of a Parable Tradition and the Transformation of an
Eschatological Idea,” Prooftexts 33, no. 2 (2014): 147–81. However, if in my previous study I wanted
to show that sometimes some of a parable’s details are accidental rather than intentional, here I
wish to show that sometimes these details are expressions of theological doubts, illustrating the
narrator’s inability to concentrate on the problem at hand.
9 See Bernard Brandon Scott, Hear Then the Parable: A Commentary on the Parables of Jesus (Min-
neapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 172–73.
10 4Ezra 6:52, En 60:24.
11 Lev. Rab. 22:10; b. B. Bat. 74b. For the significance of the image of the eschatological feast in
rabbinic literature, see also Geoffrey Herman, “Table Etiquette and Persian Culture in the Babyloni-
an Talmud” [Hebrew], Zion 77 (2012): 149–88, here 171–75.
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The typical mashal (parable) has a schematic plot, including a number of artifi-
cial elements which are left nearly entirely unexplained. The nimshal—that is, the
meaning of the parable—is an exegetical explanation which forms part of the ma-
shal’s composition, thus compensating for the missing narrative. If the mashal is
the narrative frame, then the nimshal is the exegetical context, which at the same
time also functions as a partly independent narrative. The typical rabbinic mashal
is preserved within exegetical contexts which, in the form in which they are con-
veyed to us by the literary midrash anthologies, are usually taken by scholars to be
their original settings.12 In this paper, I will propose an alternative hermeneutical
model for understanding the mashal by focusing on the details of a parable of a
royal banquet which differ from the typical version of this royal banquet parable. I
believe that these details stem from a general theological context within which the
parables were traditionally embedded rather than from the local literary context in
which we find them preserved. In my other paper, I argued that we need to attribute
the abundance of plot detail neither to the storyteller’s creativity nor to his desire
to adorn the story; rather, these details of the mashal preserve meanings that had
once been available in earlier historical contexts and are now hidden within the
new literary contexts.13 Here, too, I wish to reconstruct their context, which is much
wider than the immediate exegetical context of the parable.
The Mashal in Context
The mashal I want to discuss appears in a fifth-century midrashic anthology of Pal-
estinian provenance, Genesis Rabbah, which is a key source for rabbinic theology
and exegesis.
Gen. Rab. 62:214
It is written: “Strength and splendour are םוילקחשתוהשובלרדהוזוע":'תכ
her clothing, and she laughed on the last ןרכשןתמלכ.)הכאלילשמ("ןורחא
day” (Prov 31:25). The entire reward of ,אובלדיתעלםהלןקותמםיקידצלש
the righteous is kept ready for them for ןהשדעאוהךורבשודקהןהלהארמו
the Hereafter, and the Holy One, blessed דיתעאוהשהמןרכשןתמהזהםלועב
12 See Kiperwasser, “A Bizarre Invitation,” 149, and the literature cited there.
13 Appelbaum proposed explaining the discordance between the nimshal and the mashal as a
result of a process of transmission by different tradents; see Appelbaum, The Rabbis’ King-Parables,
86–87 n. 53.
14 Theodor and Albeck edition, 2:671–72. For the parallel tradition of the parable, see y. ‘Abod. Zar.
3:1 (42c). I intend to analyse this parallel elsewhere. For the parallel of the story of R. Abbahu in
Palestinian rabbinic literature, see the very distant version in Deut. Rab. ‘Eqev (Lieberman edition,
77).
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be He, shows them all that He will give העיבשםשפנו,אובלדיתעלםהלןתיל
them in the Hereafter and then their souls .םינישיןהו
are sated and they fall asleep.
R. Lazar said: A parable about a king who הדועסהשעשךלמללשמ:רזעל'ררמא
made a banquet and invited guests and ןהשהמןהלהארהוםיחרואהתאןמיזו
showed them what they would eat and .םהלונשיוםשפנהעבשוןיתושוןילכוא
drink, and their souls were sated, and םיקידצלםהלהארמאוהךורבשודקהךכ
they fell asleep. Thus, God shows the אוהשןרכשןתמהזהםלועבןהשדע
righteous while they are yet in this world םשפנואובלדיתעלםהלןתילדיתע
the reward which will be given to them in התעיכ"?םעטהמ.םינישיםהוהעיבש
the Hereafter and then their soul is sated ,יווה)גיגבויא("'וגוטוקשאויתבכש
and they fall asleep. What is the [scriptur- ךורבשודקהםיקידצלשןקוליסתעשב
al] proof? “For now, should I have lain .ןרכשןתמןהלהארמאוה
still and been quiet; [I should have slept;
then had I been at rest]” (Job 3:13, JPS).
Thus, when the righteous are about to
pass away the Holy One, blessed be He,
shows them their reward in the Hereafter.
When R. Abbahu was dying, he was ןירהנג"יהילווח,והבא'רךמדדכ
shown thirteen streams of balsam. He 'מא?ןמדןיליא?ןוהלרמא.ןומסרפא
said to them: “For whom are these?” They ינאו"והבאדןיליא:ןוהלרמא.ךדיד:היל
told him: “They are yours.” He said: “This יתילכיחכלבהווהתליתעגיקירליתרמא
for Abbahu?! ‘But I said: I have laboured "יהלאתאיתלעפוי"יתאיטפשמןכא
in vain, I have spent my strength for .)דטמהיעשי(
naught and vanity; yet surely my right is
with the Lord, and my recompense with
my God’ (Isa 49:4, JPS).
This midrashic passage is connected to the verse from Gen 25:8: “And Abraham
expired, and died in a ripe old age, an old man, and full of years; and was gathered
to his people.” The connection is as follows: the verse from Genesis uses the word
עבשו , which literally means “was sated.” The redactor of Genesis Rabbah made the
link with the Genesis verse with the help of a verse from Prov 31:25: השובלרדהוזוע
ןורחאםוילקחשתו . This verse now plays the role of the “distant verse” of a petiḥta,15
in which the juxtaposition of the verse from the chapter in Genesis and the “distant
verse” must shed additional light on the Genesis verse and create a new meaning.
The midrashist accentuates the literary meaning of Abraham having died “sated”
15 Concerning the term petiḥta or petiḥah (the proem) and its content, see recently Paul Mandel,
“On Pataḥ and on the Petiḥah—A New Study” [Hebrew], in Higayon L’Yona: New Aspects in the
Study of Midrash, Aggadah and Piyut, in Honor of Professor Yona Fraenkel, ed. Yaakov Elbaum, Galit
Hasan-Rokem, and Joshua Levinson (Jerusalem: Magnes 2007), 49–82.
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and, with the help of the mashal and the short story that follows it, proposes a new
exegetical-theological meaning. The Palestinian editor is thinking about the reward
of the righteous in this world, and he concludes that it is impossible. However,
letting the poor but pious die without any awareness that a reward has been prom-
ised and only providing the opportunity to discover it in the Hereafter seems unfair.
Therefore, he decides that God shows people their reward before they die and that
the righteous, fully content with this knowledge, pass away without complaint and
probably even without telling those who are still alive what they will receive in the
Hereafter. The exegetical basis for this story is a verse from Job, in which a pause,
some interval of time, seemingly occurs between “sleep” and “rest.” The first is a
dream in which God shows a person his future reward, while the second is his final
rest; namely, death. The parable expresses this idea very boldly. A king invites
guests and instead of serving them food and fragrant wines, as is customary in
Roman banquets and prescribed by the above-mentioned verses from Isaiah, he
leaves them with no food to eat at all. Instead, he only shows them the food and
drink. Does this imply that the guests literally only feast their eyes? The parable
might feasibly be explained in this way. Contemporary theories of how vision was
perceived in antiquity, both by the rabbis and within the broader Greco-Roman
world, maintain that vision was understood as something that directly touched the
mind and soul. Thus, to gaze upon an object was to have it physically enter one-
self.16 Seeing something catastrophic or pestilent would cause the body to react
physically, since the sight of it would be like a disease entering the body. Seeing
something ideal and perfect would teach the soul to resemble it and would provide
it with an uplifting experience.17 In this parable, the guests’ souls are fed. However,
I would like to propose, with particular emphasis on the nimshal, that “shown” here
means that the host not only pointed out all the ingredients of the banquet menu,
but also lectured his guests about the food and drink. While it is customary for the
symposiarch to ask questions about the meal during a symposium and to make it a
topic of discussion, this is clearly no substitute for the long-awaited meal. The ma-
shal therefore seems somewhat comical, because here we see that the guests, tired
of the king’s oratory, fall asleep without consuming anything. However, considering
the nimshal, it turns out that the situation is not ridiculous, but rather highly moti-
16 An excellent summary of the topic can be found in Mark D. Stansbury-O’Donnell, “Desirability
and the Body,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities, ed. Thomas K. Hubbard (Malden,
MA, Oxford, and Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 31–51. See also the analysis of visual theories
in Rachel Neis, The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 142.
17 One literary tradition including something very close to the rabbis’ metaphorical physiology is
related in Plato’s Timaeus (45b–d), in which the author articulates a theory of visual fire. According
to this theory, a ray emanates from the viewer’s eye which touches an object and brings an impres-
sion of it back to the psyche. This theory also explains how a person might react to being stared at
by someone else, since their visual fire reaches out and touches him or her as well.
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vated by a particular spiritual code. The royal banquet is an eschatological banquet,
and the king is God Himself.18 While the meal is served in the Hereafter, it is an-
nounced in the present. The guests, then, have no choice but to fall asleep—that is,
to interrupt their connection to the present—and die. We can see from the parable
that a person who already knows what his reward will be no longer desires a life
that is full of suffering. The reward in the Hereafter is an entirely material and sub-
stantial reward, because the future world is not spiritual, but a physical world with
the same material needs as this one.19
We now come to the main task of this paper. We see that this obscure story
with its inexplicable details reflects obscure theological paradigms regarding quite
impenetrable features of the divine order of the world. Behind the plot lies a pro-
found meditation about God’s omnipotence. The midrashist does not dare to inti-
mate that God cannot ameliorate the suffering of the righteous or even reward the
pious in this world in some way. Instead, he proposes a pious and somewhat apolo-
getic explanation whereby despite his lack of involvement in the affairs of the
present, God is ready with a reward in the Hereafter. This explanation, however,
only appears in the nimshal. The mashal provides us with a picture of a royal host
who invites his guests and prepares a sumptuous meal with fragrant wine, but dur-
ing the preparation of the feast, all the guests fall asleep (and notice the symbolic
proximity between dream and death!), and a little amusingly, the host is left alone
in the palace, which is full of food and wine. This situation is paralleled in the tragic
theological paradigm of the world, which God has created for the righteous despite
the fact that they leave it without consuming its bounty. However, why has the God
of Israel left the reward for the righteous to the Hereafter and kept this world in its
odd condition? The Palestinian editor prefers not to answer. The answer to this
question is the issue raised by its distant narrative offspring in the Babylonian Tal-
mud, although, the courage of giving such an answer will lead the author to avoid
using the form of a parable. A parable is a form which is used when it seems impos-
sible to give a bold answer.
The narrator seemingly wants to express some doubt about the value of the
eschatological meal. For the guests, the sight of the meal is quite enough to feed
their living souls. It seems that it is more important, on the level of the nimshal, to
accept the invitation to the banquet and to be there on time than it is to consume
the meal. Behind this strange situation of a royal host who fails to feed his guests
in an appropriate manner lies the familiar theological question of God’s involve-
ment in the present affairs of His creation and (or) the reward that He presumably
provides for His subjects.
18 See Kiperwasser, “A Bizarre Invitation,” 147–81.
19 See Chaim Milikowsky, “Which Gehenna? Retribution and Eschatology in the Synoptic Gospels
and in Early Jewish Texts,” New Testament Studies 34, no. 2 (1988): 238–49.
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The Story in its Palestinian Context
The Palestinian prototype (Gen. Rab. 62:2) of the Babylonian story is very short and
sketchy, but it is much more understandable than its Babylonian counterpart. The
story is even a little elliptical. However, in the light of the preceding exegetical
theological discussion, the message seems relatively clear. The Palestinian redactor
in the above source addresses the notion of the righteous receiving a reward in this
world, and through the parable, he alludes that this is not possible. This source is
ultimately an evaluation of the preceding topic. Rabbi Abbahu, here portrayed as
poor,20 learns of his reward though a vision of thirteen streams of balsam oil.21 The
streams are the products of awell-established industry that produces fragrant oils. This
implies that there is also a sizeable plantation of balsam trees elsewhere, making the
owner an immensely rich man. Rabbi Abbahu, bewildered, asks to whom this wealth
belongs and discovers that all of it is his. To this, he exclaims, citing a verse: “I have
laboured in vain, I have spentmy strength for naught and vanity; yet surelymy right is
with the Lord, and my recompense with my God.” By this, he means that he has la-
boured in vain throughout his life, but now, when he is close to dying, he is aware that
God has rewarded him. However, the imperfect world that this guest must now leave
will remain imperfect, and God will not change his practice regarding the distribution
of wealth; the situation will be corrected only in the world to come. Why? Is God not
omnipotent, or is this His will? The answer to this question will be themain focus of its
distant narrative offspring. Let us allow the Babylonian narrator to explain why:
The Story in the Babylonian Talmud
b. Ta‘an. 25a
Rabbi Ele‘azar ben Pedat was in אבוטאתלימהילאקיחדתדפןברזעלאיבר
great need.22 He had nothing to eat. ,םעטמלידימהילהוהאל)ואתלמדבע(
20 The Babylonian Talmud, which is very distant from our hero both geographically and chrono-
logically, describes him as possessing wealth. It is my view, however, that this story, as well as
another in y. Šabb. 8:1 (11a), where the students explain Rabbi Abbahu’s unusually happy expres-
sion by the fact that he found some treasure, is better understood on the assumption that he en-
joyed a more modest income.
21 See Joseph Patrich and Benny Arubas, “A Juglet Containing Balsam Oil (?) from a Cave Near
Qumran,” Israel Exploration Journal 39, no. 1–2 (1989): 43–59. See also, more recently, Yohar Amar
and David Iluz, “Balsam: The Most Expensive Perfume Plant in the Ancient World,” in The Paths of
Daniel: Studies in Judaism and Jewish Culture in Honor of Rabbi Professor Daniel Sperber, ed. Adam
S. Ferziger and David Sperber (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2017), 15–27 (English section).
22 There are interesting variants among the textual witnesses at this point in the story. The majori-
ty of the textual witnesses propose אבוטאתלימהילאקיחד or אתלימהילאקיחד , which could mean
that he was in (great) need. The word אתלימ has various meanings—see Michael Sokoloff, A Diction-
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He carried out a deed (‘abad :]אתלמדבע[
milt’a).23
He took a [something] of garlic (bar’a הימופבהיידשוה)י(מותדארבלקש
de-tumah) and cast it into his mouth.
His heart weakened, and he fell םינוהיבלשלח
asleep.24
The rabbis went to inquire [after his היבילוישלןנברלוזא
health].
They saw him crying and laughing ארונדאתיצוצקפנוךייחויכבאקדהויזח
and a fiery branch came out from his היתופאמ
forehead.
When he awoke, they asked him: תכייחותייכבאמעטיאמהילורמארעתאיכ
“Whywere you crying and laughing?”
He said to them: “Because the Holy אוהךורבשודקהימעביתיהוהדוהל'מא
One, blessed be He, was sitting with
me
and I said to Him: ‘How longwill I suf- אמלעיאהברעטצאיתמדעהילירמאו
fer in this world?’
And He said to me: Ele‘azar, my son, אמלעלהיכפאדךלאחינינברזעלאילרמאו
ary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic Periods (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan Universi-
ty Press; Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 668–69—and sometimes it
means “monetary matters.” However, some textual versions (Vatican 134, Göttingen 3) have אקיחד
אבוטאמלעהיל , which means that he was ill (see Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Arama-
ic, 867 n. 4). According to one version (Oxford 366), his problem was his ill fortune in an astrologi-
cal sense, אבוטאתעשהילאקיחד , which is probably a scribal correction influenced by the continua-
tion of the plot where this term is employed. See further n. 25. It is interesting that all this is lacking
in the Jerusalem manuscript.
23 The word אתלימ (Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 668–69) is traditionally un-
derstood as being bled, which is quite possible. For this meaning of אתלמדבע , see also b. Šabb. 129a
and b. Pesaḥ. 59b. Bloodletting was a common procedure. On bloodletting, see Julius Preuss, Biblical
and Talmudic Medicine, trans. Fred Rosner, new ed. (Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1993), 33–34. For
bloodletting being mentioned more often in the Babylonian Talmud than in Palestinian sources, see
Markham J. Geller, “Bloodletting in Babylonia,” in Magic and Rationality in Ancient Near Eastern and
Graeco-Roman Medicine, ed. H. F. J. Horstmanshoff andM. Stol (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 305–24. However,
bloodletting is a common cure for illness or for some instances of physical distress, which is seemingly
not the case here, at least according to most of the textual witnesses, although see the previous note.
I would therefore suggest that the above-mentioned word refers to a deed or act and that it has some
magical undertones: see Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 669 n. 4. Assuming that
the “deed” is magical, I am compelled to change the sequence of events and place the phrase ‘abad
miltʾa before the depiction of taking the mysterious drug. See further below.
24 The phrase “and he slept” only appears in the printed versions, albeit as early as the old Span-
ish edition. MS Oxford Opp. Add. Fol. 23 adds that he went home after feeling weak; however,
according to MS Göttingen 3, he went to the study house, where he fell down.
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do you want me to return the world to ]תדליתמד[)דילתמד(רשפאאשירמ
its beginning, so that perhaps you ינוזמדאתעשב
may be born25 in an hour of plenty?”
I said to Him: “All this and [then only] רשפאויאהילוכהימקלירמא
perhaps?”
I said to Him: “Is [the time] I have אנייחדואיפטייחדהילירמא
livedmore than [the time] I shall
live?”
He said to me: “That which you have תייחדיל'מא
lived.”
I said to Him: “In that case, I do not אניעבאלןכםאהימקלירמא
want it.”
[I said to Him: “What would You give [ ילתבהייאמיתאדאמלעלהימקירמא ]
me in the world to come?”]26
He said to me: “As a reward for saying אנביהיאניעבאלתרמאדארגאיאהבילרמא
‘I do not want it’27 I shall give you in תרפכאתוורהנירסילתיתאדאמלעלךל
the world to come thirteen streams of והבתגנעמדאיכדאמסרפאוהבילפשדתלגידו
pure balsam oil28 like the Euphrates
and the Tigris, in which to indulge
yourself.”
I said to Him: “That and nomore?” אלותויאההימקלירמא
He answeredme: “Andwhat would I אנביהייאמךרבחלויל'מא
[then] give to your colleague?”
I retorted: “Have I asked this from one אניעב]אק[הילתילדארבגמאנאוהילירמא
who has nothing?” 29
25 I have corrected the scribal error of the Pesaro print with the help of the Jerusalem manuscript,
which provides a more logical reading. However, according to MSS Vatican 134, Vatican 487.9, and
Munich 140, the version is ינוזמדאתעשבתלפנד ; namely, “you will fall (out of your mother’s womb?)
in an hour of plenty.” The version in Munich 95, תלפכד , is probably a scribal error from the previous
one. MS Oxford Opp. Add. Fol. 23 reads ינוזמדאתעשבתירבימד , that is, “you will be created in an
hour of plenty,” which also seems to make good sense. According to Göttingen 3, the version is
אתעשךלימרתמד , which simply means “an hour of plenty will be established for you.”
26 This sentence is lacking in the Pesaro edition, but not in other textual witnesses, except for MS
Jerusalem, and I think that its presence here is justified.
27 This sentence only appears in the Pesaro print and in MS Jerusalem, which suggests an addi-
tion, with the apologetic intent of justifying Rabbi Ele‘azar’s daring behaviour.
28 Although the entire story is Babylonian, this theme, like the reward of the righteous in the
world to come, originates in Palestine: see y. ‘Abod. Zar. 3:1 (42c); Gen. Rab. 62:2.
29 The text is taken from the early Pesaro print (1516). For the critical edition of this text, see Henry
Malter, ed., The Treatise Ta‘anit of the Babylonian Talmud (New York: American Academy for Jewish
Research, 1930), 113. For an English translation, see Henry Malter, trans., The Treatise Ta‘anit of the
Babylonian Talmud, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1967), 113. For com-
mentaries on this story, see Tal Ilan, Massekhet Ta‘anit: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 269–70, and Shulamit Valler, Sorrow and Distress in the Talmud, trans. Sharon
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He hit me onmy forehead with his fin- ילרמאויאתופא]ארונד[אלטוקסאב23ןייחמ
ger bone [of fire]30 and said: “Ele‘azar יריגךבורג]יא[ירברזעלא
my son, let the arrows be shot at
you!”31
The poor and suffering Rabbi Ele‘azar ben Pedat33 did not have any suitable food to
eat on account of his poverty,34 and he therefore ate something inappropriate. The
expression המות/אמותדארב , bara’ de-tuma’/de-tumah, is relatively rare and not easy
to translate.35 This is the one and only locus in which someone is depicted eating a
bara’ de-tumah. Simply eating garlic is referred to as akhlah tuma’ ( אמותהלכא )
(b. Yebam. 106b). A single (piece of) garlic is usually designated as אידיחיאמות ,
tuma’ iḥidaya’, or אמותדאתפוש , šufta’ de-tuma’ (b. Giṭ. 69a). Even though the literal
translation of barʾa de-tumah would be “something external to the garlic,” here I
translate it as “something belonging to garlic,” according to the usage of this ex-
pression in b. Šabb. 139b, where it means something that is large enough to absorb
leaking liquid. It was translated by the medieval commentator Rabbenu Ḥananel as
roš šum, meaning the whole head of garlic. Another translation, from gaonic writ-
ings, is the Arabic ḥabb al-ṯum, meaning “a clove of garlic,” which might also be
the meaning of the expression in b. Šabb. 139b.36 Both meanings are difficult to sup-
port here since one might wonder why a person would eat either a clove or a whole
head of garlic. This translation could only make sense if this was the one and only
edible substance he could find. The results of this, however, go well beyond his
Blass (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2011), 172–75. See also Julia Watts Belser, “Between the
Human and the Holy: The Construction of Talmudic Theology in Massekhet Ta‘anit” (PhD diss.,
University of California, Berkeley, 2008). See also, more recently, Yaakov Elman, “Dualistic El-
ements in Babylonian Aggada,” in The Aggada of the Bavli and Its Cultural World, ed. Geoffrey
Herman and Jeffrey L. Rubenstein (Providence, RI: Brown Judaic Studies, 2018), 273–312, here 296–
99.
30 This detail is absent in the Pesaro print. I have added it on the basis of MSS Munich 95 and
Vatican 487.9, and probably also MS Jerusalem.
31 The correction from ורג to ורגיא is based on the readings inMSSMunich 95,Munich 140,OxfordOpp.
Add. Fol. 23, London British Library Harl. 5508 (400), Vatican 134, and Vatican 487.9. This version is
preferable since it is actually the ליעפתא form, whichmeans an imperative in the plural form: ורג)ת(א .
32 The better version is probably קרט as in MSS Vatican 134, Munich 140, and Göttingen 3. How-
ever, it does not change the translation: יאתופאבאלוטקסאבילקרט .
33 R. Ele‘azar (b. Pedat) was a third-generation amora who studied with R. Yoḥanan (y. Sanh. 1:2
[18c]; y. Ber. 2:1 [4b]). Another story that portrays R. Ele‘azar as weeping, poor, and suffering ap-
pears in b. Ber. 5b. See my discussion in “Narrative Bricolage and Cultural Hybrids in Rabbinic
Babylonia: On the Narratives of Seduction and the Topos of Light,” in The Aggada of the Bavli and
Its Cultural World, 23–45, especially 36–40.
34 See above notes 22 and 33.
35 This reads הימותדארב in some versions of the text, which is most likely a scribal error induced
by analogy with הימופ in the same line.
36 According to Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, 240.
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expectations. Our hero falls into an incubation sleep in which he encounters God
Himself. The external features of this encounter are his unusual emotional expres-
sions: he laughs and cries simultaneously, while fire comes out of his head. A hero
who both laughs and cries is a narrative topos in rabbinic literature,37 as well as in
Syriac patristic writings,38 and its goal is to draw the attention of the secondary
heroes, who then ask for an explanation. It turns out that laughter, crying, and even
the emission of fire are all features of the conversation that our hero has had with
God.39 He asks how long he will continue to suffer in this world; namely, he wants
to know whether poverty will be his lot until the end of his life. Seemingly, he has
understood that his poverty was directly determined by God. Accordingly, while
most Babylonian traditions indicate that poverty is a consequence of misconduct
and sin, there is also an opinion that one’s socio-economic status is determined
before birth or according to one’s astrological lot at birth.40 If so, the story we have
analysed here does not share the belief that poverty is a consequence of miscon-
duct. Our hero is sure that he has never sinned, and he wants to know whether the
divine plan is for him to suffer from poverty throughout his entire life. Seemingly,
this narrator believes that poverty is divinely predestined, and he shares the presup-
position of numerous rabbis, such as, for example, the pericope from b. Niddah,
which conveys the idea that poverty and wealth are prenatally determined by God:
b. Nid. 16b41
As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Papa expounds: ׳נוממהךאלמותוא׳פפרב׳נינח׳רשירדד
The angel who governs over conception ׳דימעמו׳פיטלטונוומשהלילןוירההלע
is named Laylah (night). And it takes a המוז׳פיטע״ש׳וברוינפל׳ואוב״קהינפל
drop and places it before the Holy One, ינע׳כחואשפטשלחוארובגהילע׳הת
blessed be He, and says before Him: ׳נינח׳רדכאל׳ידצועשרלבארישעוא
Master of the Universe, what will be- ׳ארימץוח׳ימשידיבלכה׳נינחר״אד
come of this drop? [Will the person born לאושךיהלא׳ייהמ׳רשיהתעו׳נשםימש
from it be] strong or weak, foolish or וגו׳ארילםאיכךמעמ
37 See t. Yoma 2:7 (par. y. Yoma 3:9 [41a], b. Yoma 38a); b. ‘Abod. Zar. 20a; Sifre Deut. 43 (b. Sanh. 101a).
38 See Protevangelium Jacobi 17:2, in Montague R. James, trans., The Apocryphal New Testament:
Being the Apocryphal Gospels, Acts, Epistles, and Apocalypses, with Other Narratives and Fragments,
reprint corrected ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 46.
39 In her commentary on this story, Tal Ilan preferred the manuscript version, in which the hero
has a conversation with a feminine representation of the Divine Presence (Shekhinah) (Massekhet
Ta‘anit, 270). However, since the verb attached to the feminine character is in the masculine form,
I would suggest that the scribes were perplexed by the circumstances of such a direct exchange
with God and changed “The Holy One” to the more neutral Shekhinah. Therefore, the printed edi-
tion’s version is preferable here.
40 See Yael Wilfand, Poverty, Charity and the Image of the Poor in Rabbinic Texts from the Land of
Israel (Sheffield: Phoenix Press, 2014), 78–79.
41 The text is discussed in great detail in Wilfand, Poverty, 79–80.
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wise, poor or rich? But [the angel does
not ask whether it will be] wicked or
righteous, and it is in accordance with
the view of Rabbi Ḥanina. For Rabbi
Ḥanina said: everything is in the hands
of Heaven, except for the fear of Heav-
en; for it is stated [in Scripture]: “And
now, O Israel, what does the Lord your
God ask of you but to revere the [Lord
your God, to walk only in His paths, to
love Him, and to serve the Lord your
God with all your heart and soul]”
(Deut 10:12, JPS).
According to this text, people can only control their own morality, whether to be
evil or righteous. Everything else, including poverty and wealth, is beyond human
control. Whether a person is poor or wealthy, according to this tradition, is decided
by the Creator before their birth.42 Therefore, it seems that the narrator of our story
shares this idea with the abovementioned tradition and sends his hero to God to
demand an explanation. Another Babylonian tradition which could be viewed as
complementary to the previous story is as follows:
b. Šabb. 146a
It was written on R. Joshua b. Levi’s יאה:יולןבעשוהייברדהיסקניפאביתכ
wax tablet: He who [is born] on the first .היבאדחאלורבגיהי−אבשבדחבדןאמ
day of the week] shall be a man without דחאלואמיליא?]היבאדחאלו[יאמ
one [thing] in him. אבשבדחבאנא:ישאבררמאהו−וביטל
What does “without one [thing] in him” בררמאהו,ושיבלאדחואל−אלא!יאוה
mean? דחבןייווהאתזוקקרבימידואנא:ישא
Shall we say, without one virtue? Surely שירהוה−אוהו,ךלמ−אנא,אבשב
R. Ashi said: I was born on the first day .ושיבלילוכיא,וביטלילוכיא:אלא!יבנג
of the week! ).ךשוחורואהיבורביאד−אמעטיאמ(
Hence it must surely mean one vice. But
surely R. Ashi said: Dimi b. Qaquzta and
I were born on the first day of the week:
42 This is in line with the assertion made in Zoroastrian literature from the Sasanian period that
property-related matters (i.e., whether one is rich or poor) are not subject to one’s own control, but
rather to what is called brēh or baxt; i.e., the decree of fate, in which heaven plays no part. See
Ādurbād ī Ēmēdān, The Wisdom of the Sasanian Sages (Dēnkard VI), trans. Shaul Shaked (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1979), 174–75 (section D1a); see also the commentary on 297–300.
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I am a king43 and he is the head of
thieves!—Rather it means either com-
pletely virtuous or completely wicked.
[What is the reason? Because light and
darkness were created on that day.]
In this tradition, one’s socio-economic status is determined either by the day of the
week when one’s birth occurs or according to an astrological sign. Not all rabbis
accepted celestial influence as a determining factor of one’s lot. Some doubt regard-
ing astrological influence can be seen later on, where we hear how a Jew can escape
his astrological fate by giving alms.44 However, Ta‘anit’s narrator is certain the ce-
lestial order has a strong power over the distribution of wealth.
In a pointedly formulated dialogue between them, God actually admits that he
cannot change the poor scholar’s financial situation without causing the far-reach-
ing destruction of all creation and its reconstruction in order that this time, our hero
will perhaps successfully be born into improved circumstances.45 After all, as it
turns out, his welfare is dictated by the position of the stars on the day of his birth;
namely, “the hour of plenty,” which is celestially determined.
Seemingly, our text in Ta‘anit is characterised by a more comprehensive ap-
proach to the problem than the above-mentioned texts from b. Niddah and b. Šab-
bat. It features the concept of the “hour of plenty” (ša‘ita’ de-mezenei, the meaning
of which is that the hour of one’s birth determines whether one will be rich or
poor.46 The existence of such an hour is predetermined by the Creator Himself. How-
43 This means that he was the head of a rabbinic school or study house: see Geoffrey Herman,
“Insurrection in the Academy: The Babylonian Talmud and the Paikuli Inscription” [Hebrew],
Zion 79 (2014): 378–407, here 378–84.
44 See Wilfand, Poverty, 80.
45 This motive is rather rare in the Babylonian Talmud; however, in a Middle Persian composition,
the author tells another story about suffering men and God’s inability to change their fate as a
typically Jewish story that expresses typical rabbinic theology. See Samuel Frank Thrope, “Contra-
dictions and Vile Utterances: The Zoroastrian Critique of Judaism in the Škand Gumānīg Wizār”
(PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 100–101, who also rightly observed the similar-
ities between this story and our story from b. Ta‘anit (102). See also Jason Mokhtarian, “Clusters of
Iranian Loanwords in Talmudic Folklore: The Chapter of the Pious (b. Ta‘anit 18b–26a),” in The
Aggada of the Bavli and Its Cultural World, 125–48, who assumes that the Persian author “clearly
knew this talmudic folklore” (141).
46 The latter is probably the ša‘ita’ de-‘aniyuta’. This expression, however, does not appear in our
story. It would nevertheless be correlative with the opposition between the representations of pover-
ty and plenty, or the opposition between the genius of plenty and the genius of poverty which
appears elsewhere in the Bavli, in b. Ḥul. 105b–106a (a tradition that has been discussed by Wil-
fand, Poverty, 78–79), and reads as follows: “There was a certain man who was followed by the
demon (or angel) of poverty [ אדש in the printed edition, although MS Hamburg 169, MS Vatican
121, and MS Vatican 122 have ארש instead, suggesting an angel in charge of poverty. However,
taking into consideration the existence of the angelic patron of poverty mentioned elsewhere in the
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ever, having created the conditions of the “game,” he allows the participants a cer-
tain freedom, and he can no longer change the rules.47
Naturally, this is disappointing to our hero, who now, I would suppose ironical-
ly, bemoans his lot in life and inquires whether what remains of it is shorter or
longer than what he has lived until now. It appears that the Omnipotent and Omnis-
cient is not only aware of the limits of his own capabilities, but also of the duration
of mortal life. The life of Rabbi Ele‘azar will be hard, but short. It is bitterly ironic.
It is common to find the traditional interpretation that the lack of divine inter-
vention in “this world” is compensated for the righteous in the “world to come.”
Thus, Rabbi Ele‘azar, accepting the absence of a reward in this world, asks about
his reward in the Hereafter. God considers it necessary to tell him that in the future,
he will indeed receive quite significant financial compensation—sources of fragrant
oils that will make him immensely rich. The hero now mocks the extent of the com-
pensation, implying that it would not hurt God to add to it even more. When the
Creator, who does not recognise the mocking tone, justifies His decision to give
“only” thirteen rivers of fragrant oil by the need to distribute the wealth equally
among all the rabbis, He is challenged in that being omnipotent, He cannot have
difficulty distributing the wealth! The relationship between this world and the fu-
ture one is seemingly being ridiculed. If the Hereafter is little more than a better
managed imitation of this world and even there, God has His limits, why does it
deserve such acclaim, and how can it be expected to compensate for this imperfect
world?
The Creator rebukes our hero and, somewhat surprisingly, flicks him on the
forehead, which was the cause of the fiery branch observed by the rabbis,48 and
Bavli, one might prefer the version found in the manuscripts], but the demon (or angel) of poverty
was unable to prevail against him because the man was very careful about disposing of crumbs at
the end of a meal. One day, the man was eating his bread over cynodons [a species of grass]. [The
demon] said: Now he will fall into my hands! After he ate, the man took a spade and uprooted all
the cynodons. He then heard [the demon] exclaiming: ‘Alas, he has driven me out of his house.’”
Here, poverty is portrayed as a form of demonic possession, caused by a demon who is specially
designated for that purpose. There is another Babylonian tradition according to which poverty and
sustenance is maintained not by demons, but by a certain benevolent creature named Isra, which
is usually translated as an “angel” or “genius” (see Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian
Aramaic, 122–23): “The name of the Angel of sustenance is Naqid and the name of the Angel of
poverty is Nabil” (b. Pes. 111b). Comparing this tradition with that of b. Niddah, one might suppose
that it was held that isra’ de-mezenei governed over the hours when rich people were born and isra’
de-‘aniyuta’ governed over the hours when poor people were born.
47 Alternatively, if one is to read it in the light of the tradition discussed in the previous note, after
giving power to the angels of poverty and sustenance, he can no longer interfere with the order of
their mutual replacements and so protect Ele‘azar in order to enable him to be born in an hour of
plenty.
48 The fire branch is referred to as אתיצוצ . This term has been the subject of considerable discus-
sion. For a summary of earlier scholarship and a suggested solution to the lexicographic problem,
see Daniel Boyarin, “Towards the Talmudic Lexicon” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 50 (1981): 164–91. Boyarin
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reassures him through the use of an Aramaic expression: יריגךבוריגא ! “Let the
arrows be shot at you!” In this blissful moment, the story comes to an end, leaving
the reader in a state of mild bewilderment. Clearly, it is a form of apology on the
Creator’s part, who constituted this world in such a manner that poor pious scholars
endure a life of suffering. But how does it work exactly?
This very interesting and highly enigmatic story49 evokes many questions. Why
did this strange incubatory dream happen? How was this vision actually induced
by the consumption of a bara’ de-tumah, such an innocent agent? Did our hero take
it by accident, or was it, as it seems, deliberate—was he seeking an encounter with
God? For what reason did our hero want to meet God? What is the meaning of the
strange reward of the flowing balsam oil? Why is God actually unable to resolve the
pious scholar’s financial problems? And what does the strange phrase at the end of
the story mean? The story clearly has a strong theological message, albeit a rather
obscure one.
The Palestinian story is clearly the prototype for the Babylonian one; however,
a few elements of Palestinian realia have become hyperbolised in the Babylonian
version. Streams of balsam have become powerful rivers. An inability to reward the
righteous in the present and the reward of immense wealth appear in both stories.
However, a few motives are unique to the Babylonian version: the preparations for
the incubation dream; the behaviour of the hero during his dream; and the dialogue
between God and Rabbi Ele‘azar.
The story’s exposition bears a broad resemblance to the beginning of the Middle
Persian story of the pious Ardā-Wīrāz. The latter was chosen from the entire commu-
nity assembled at the fire temple of Ādur-Farnbag on account of his virtue50 and
was ordered to drink the narcotic mang.51 His seven sisters, who were also his wives
(according to the pious practice of consanguineous marriage, xwēdōdah) strongly
objected to his being subjected to this ordeal, but eventually assented to it. Ardā-
writes that this word relates to part of a stalk of wheat. In a figurative sense, this is a strand of hair
growing from the head or even fringes sticking out of cloth (Boyarin, “Talmudic Lexicon,” 169–70).
49 The context in which the story appears is not very helpful for understanding it. The story is
directly connected to the Ḥanina ben Dosa tradition (b. Ta‘an. 24b–25a) and is only very remotely
linked to the general theme of this chapter (which is rainmaking). Like Ḥanina ben Dosa, Rabbi
Ele‘azar ben Pedat is very poor; like Ḥanina ben Dosa, he has a special relationship with his creator;
and like Ḥanina ben Dosa, he will be entitled to the greatest possible pleasure in the world to come,
if he will only endure hardship in this one. The Babylonian editor decided that a fitting location to
insert this story was just after the Ḥanina story cycle. On Ḥanina ben Dosa, see Eliezer Diamond,
Holy Men and Hunger Artists: Fasting and Asceticism in Rabbinic Culture (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 68–69. See also Ilan, Massekhet Ta‘anit, 269.
50 See Phillipe Gignoux, “Notes sur la rédaction de l’Ardāy Virāz Nāmag,” Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Supplementa 1 (1969): 998–1004; Walther Hinz, “Dantes persische
Vorläufer,” Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran, n.f., 4 (1971): 117–26.
51 See V. Dinshaw, “A Note on the Pahlavi Word “mang” in the Arda Viraf Nameh,” Journal of the
Cama Oriental Institute 23 (1932): 107–8.
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Wīrāz was unconscious for seven days and nights and during this time, his sisters
and others watched over him, praying and reciting from the Avesta and the Zand.
When Wīrāz’s soul returned to his body, he narrated his experience. We will leave
his experiences untold, but will draw attention to Ardā-Wiraz’s journey to the next
world, a journey undertaken in order to affirm the truth of the Zoroastrian beliefs.
This is set after a period when Iran had been troubled by the presence of a confusing
alien religion; namely, Islam. Seemingly, we have here a similar motive—a pious
man, after consuming some unusual food, ascends to the other world and converses
with a divine partner. This is apparently the way to find out what his god wants.
Iranists have observed that the story of Ardā-Wīrāz is not unique.52 Parallels are
found in more precisely dated sources—the legend of Zoroaster recorded in Dēn-
kard 7 and the monumental inscriptions of the third-century Zoroastrian high priest
Kirdīr (q.v.).53 In the Dēnkard, King Wištāsp is depicted as hesitating before embrac-
ing the new religion. After drinking mang (and thereby undertaking an extra-terres-
trial journey), his doubts are resolved.54
The theme of doubt is also Kirdīr’s case, a vision of heaven and hell is again
presented during a soul journey. He explains in the Naqš-e Raǰab inscription that
he was seeking assurance that the religion to whose development he had contribut-
ed was efficacious. Again, the theme of doubt is implied in a visionary literary work.
I will not discuss the sources relating to Ardā-Wīrāz Nāmaq, but I would like to
show that the Babylonian and Persian narrators share this and the ritual involves
this Pahlavi parallel, it seems that the ingestion of garlic, even in a sizeable quanti-
ty, is not enough to allow a visionary to see the divine. It might be suggested that
the bara’ de-tumah of our story is a transformation or corruption of the Zoroastrian
Middle Persian term barsom (Avestan barǝsman). Barsom serves as a cultic item
used by the Magi, presumably consisting of branches of dates, pomegranates, and
tamarisk, holding the barsom and repeating prayers to praise the Creator for the
support accorded by nature.55 Barsom was used alongside the consummation of
the narcotic haoma, both of which were important items in the Zoroastrian cult.56
52 See Philippe Gignoux, “La signification du voyage extra-terrestre dans l’eschatologie maz-
déenne,” in Mélanges d’histoire des religions offerts à Henri-Charles Puech (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1974), 63–69, and Philippe Gignoux, “Une ordalie par les lances en Iran,” Revue
de l’histoire des religions 200 (1983): 155–61.
53 See Prod O. Skjærvø, “Kirdir’s Vision: Translation and Analysis,” Archäologische Mitteilungen
aus Iran, n.f., 16 (1983 [1985]): 269–306.
54 See Dēnkard 7.4.83–86, in Marijan Molé, ed. and trans., La légende de Zoroastre selon les textes
pehlevis (Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck, 1967).
55 See M. F. Kanga, “Barsom,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, Volume 3, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London:
Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1988), 825–27, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/barsom-av (19. 06.
2020).
56 See David Stophlet Flattery and Martin Schwartz, Haoma and Harmaline: The Botanical Identity
of the Indo-Iranian Sacred Hallucinogen “Soma” and Its Legacy in Religion, Language, and Middle
Eastern Folklore (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Kasim Abdulaev, The Cult of Haoma
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According to some scholars, the barsom’s bundle of twigs may originally have
been a bundle of haoma stalks. The Haoma divinity is identified with priesthood,
while the barsom stalks “cut for the bundles bound by women” (Yasna 10.17) are
a symbol and instrument of the Zoroastrian priesthood. Phonetically, the Aramaic
bar(a de)θōm sounds similar to the Middle Persian barsom. While there is no evi-
dence that anyone ever swallowed barsom leaves,57 I would merely like to suggest
that the Babylonian narrator had come across an unfamiliar motif and that the
alterity of this motif was emphasised by the somewhat erroneous use of a foreign
term. This usage was not completely clear to later editors, and the foreign barsoma
may have become the enigmatic bara’ de-tumah. Another explanation was sug-
gested to me by Shaul Shaked in a personal communication. He proposed under-
standing the words bara’ de-tumah literally, meaning “that which is outside of
garlic.”58 This is the name of a late Persian custom, sīr u sedāw, meaning the
consumption of garlic along with the plant Peganum harmala. However, the pur-
pose of this custom is unclear, and we have no proof that it was practised in Sasa-
nian times.59
Let us now turn to other additions made by the Babylonian narrator. The jet of
fire is already known to us from b. B. Bat. 73a, where a similar feat is described as
being routinely performed by Jewish sailors themselves rather than by heavenly
creatures:
Raba b. Bar Ḥana said: Seafarers told me: The top of the wave which comes to sink the ship
is shaped like a fringe of pale fire. We strike it with tree-branches with “I am who I am the
Yah Lord of Hosts, Amen, Amen, Selah” engraved on them.60
in Ancient Central Asia [Russian] (Samarkand: International Institute of Central Asian Research,
2009).
57 See the extensive discussion of this term in Flattery and Schwartz, Haoma and Harmaline
(80 onwards). The sense of the term remains uncertain.
58 This is as follows: the word bara’ may be a borrowed Persian word, as there is a Middle Persian
word bar which means “fruit.” The phrase bara’ de-tumah can thus be interpreted as “fruit of gar-
lic,” meaning one grain of garlic.
59 See Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Bīrūnī, The Chronology of Ancient Nations: An English Version of the
Arabic Text of the Athar̂-ul-Bak̂iya of Albîrûnî, or, Vestiges of the Past, Collected and Reduced to
Writing by the Author in A.H. 390–1, A.D. 1000, ed. and trans. Edward C. Sachau (London: Oriental
Translation Fund of Great Britain, 1879), 212, on the use of garlic as a weapon against demons. I
owe this note to Shervin Farridnejad.
60 Here, a paraphrase of Exod 3:14 seems to be being used as a magical formula establishing
the dominion of the God of Israel over the powers of nature. See, for example, its usage in
MS 1911/1 (fifth to seventh centuries CE), an incantation bowl in the Schøyen collection: see
http://www.schoyencollection.com/palaeography-collection-introduction/aramaic-hebrew-syriac/
4-6-3-jewish-aramaic/ms-1911-1 (19. 06. 2020), and see also Christa Müller-Kessler, “The Use of Bibli-
cal Quotations in Jewish Aramaic Incantation Bowls,” in Studies on Magic and Divination in the
Biblical World, ed. Helen R. Jacobus, Anne Katrine de Hemmer Gudme, and Philippe Guillaume
(Piscataway NJ: Gorgias, 2013), 227–45, especially 243–44.
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It could be suggested that the fiery light of the menacing waves, which is an em-
bodiment of divine anger, must be overcome by the light of God’s countenance,
which is equivalent to the light of the Torah. However, in our story, the fire is pro-
duced from the head of our sleeping hero,61 because at the same time, far away
from our trivial world, where rabbis are looking in bewilderment at the body of R.
Ele‘azar, God is flicking the scholar’s forehead, and this contact in the distant divine
world causes the appearance of the fire in the mundane one.62 God is a foreigner
who cannot appear in this world; however, His deeds are echoed in it in strange
and inexplicable ways. God’s last words to the suffering scholar deserve some expla-
nation. R. Ele‘azar’s boldness must be punished. This is evidenced by God saying
that he ought to punish his daring with fiery arrows. However, instead of arrows,
He gently flicks the daring mortal’s forehead, and even this light touch generates
fire, which, however, does not cause him any harm.
Let us turn now to the theological nucleus of the story expressed in the brief
dialogue between the rabbi and God. As it turns out, God is not able to help the
poor suffering rabbi. He is omnipotent, but His tools are too strong and powerful to
change the already created world. Now that the world has come into existence, it is
governed by principles established by its Creator. To change anything in the created
world now would require a return to the very beginning, to the initial conditions of
the divine experiment, a rewinding, so to speak, implying the destruction of every-
thing that has been created and starting all over again. However, even with such a
drastic scenario, the creation may still have its own dynamics and place the newly
born Ele‘azar in a poor family once again. The principles I describe here are con-
nected to the concept of mazala in the Babylonian rabbinic thought; namely, fate,
determined by the position of the stars.63
61 A sage’s production of fire as a consequence of his immersion in Torah study is another known
rabbinic topos. Here, one could also mention the story in b. Ḥul. 137b, where Rabbi Yoḥanan recalls
that when he was a student, he witnessed the scholarly debates between his two prominent mas-
ters, which are described as the emanation of רונדןיקוקיז , “fiery sparks,” from the master’s mouth
to the student’s and vice versa. I thank Geoffrey Herman for reminding me of this tradition. See
also the story of Rabbi Abin in y. Ber. 5:1 (9a), in which assassins seeking to murder the sage are
frightened by sparks of fire ( רונדןיקוקיז ) coming out of his neck. Other examples could also be
provided.
62 A single ray of light emanating from the hero’s head or from some other miraculous object is
an image that is quite rare and unknown to me outside of the texts under discussion. In this connec-
tion, it may be appropriate to mention the mysterious image on the wall found in the Mithraeum
discovered at Hawarti in Syria in 1996/97. See Michal Gawlikowski, “The Mithraeum at Hawarte
and Its Paintings,” Journal of Roman Archaeology 20 (2007): 337–61, especially 355. There is a still-
unexplained mythic scene that depicts seven heads without bodies, each of which is emitting a ray
of light. Some have suggested that these bodies belong to demonic creatures. I would like to express
my appreciation to Michael Shenkar for this reference.
63 See Giuseppe Veltri, Magie und Halakha: Ansätze zu einem empirischen Wissenschaftsbegriff im
spätantiken und frühmittelalterlichen Judentum (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1997), 210–11.
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We can see, then, that the narrator in b. Ta‘anit is preoccupied with questions
about divine intervention in mundane existence. Like the narrator of Job before him,
he wants to emphasise the alterity of God, which probably could be defined as His
transcendence and which is the reason for His inability to interfere in events on
Earth. However, the talmudic narrator wants to explain this inability more precisely.
He describes God as being so obedient to the rules of His own game that He cannot
change its rules, but only start a new one.64 As a sceptical theist, therefore, our
narrator keeps his belief in God, but denies His involvement in the politics of evil.
However, he is not willing to say that there is no God-justifying reason for permit-
ting evil, because there is a reason—God planted the seeds of evil in this world and
now He is obliged to let them grow, not without some sadness and bitter irony:
“Ele‘azar my son, let the arrows be shot at you!” While the Babylonian narrator has
succeeded in keeping his god far away from the imperfect world, at the same time,
he has shown Him to be involved in what is happening there and empathetic to the
problems of the suffering pious man.65
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Tali Artman Partock
“If a Man Would Tell You”
The Bible, the only treasure which escaped the fire of Jerusalem, was in the greatest possible
danger. The doctrine of God, as taught and believed in synagogues and the houses of the Jews,
was at stake.1
To speak of scepticism as a philosophy that is embedded in rabbinic literature car-
ries the risk of using an unsuitable, external category to decipher the codes of an
epistemic, theological, and social system which is very remote from both “Athens”
and us. When interpreting phenomena occurring in a culture other than one’s own,
it is necessary to be careful not to impose external theoretical frameworks (analyti-
cal categories) on the subject of study. One should rather learn how the studied
culture understands and categorises its discursive (and other) practices. Dan Ben
Amos called these practices “ethnic genres.”2 Ethnic genres, he argued, could be
identified either by members of the studied group or by the one studying them. The
subject of this study, the rabbinic circles of late antiquity, functions as a somewhat
imagined “ethnos.” This trans-generational and spatial group was often well aware
of its own rules of creativity, as Galit Hasan-Rokem has shown.3 As Ben Amos ar-
gues, reading with ethnic genres in mind rather than analytical categories does not
entail losing the benefits that these categories may hold or disregarding them;
rather, it is a call to proceed with caution. Scepticism itself is a rather diverse and
somewhat unstable sign.4 Rather than superficially dwelling on the differences be-
tween philosophical, religious, and scientific scepticism, for this discussion of what
I see as a rabbinic form of engagement with scepticism, I would like to borrow the
four main axes around which sceptical theories revolve: the existence of truth; the
proper means of the production of knowledge; their relationship to authority; and
the concept of doubt. In order to do so, I would suggest studying a group of texts
which thematises the process of examining the ways in which rabbinic knowledge
is produced. This group, fortunately, has a very clear stylistic feature, or discursive
marker, which allows us to connect its members. I am referring, of course, to the
1 Arthur Marmorstein, “The Background of the Haggadah,” in Studies in Jewish Theology, ed. Myer
S. Lew and Joseph Rabbinowitz (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), 4.
2 Dan Ben-Amos, “Analytical Categories and Ethnic Genres,” Genre 2, no. 3 (1969): 275–301.
3 Galit Hasan-Rokem, “Did the Rabbis Recognize the Category of Folk Narrative?”, European Jour-
nal of Jewish Studies 3, no. 1 (2009): 19–55.
4 Richard H. Popkin, “Skepticism,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/top-
ic/skepticism, accessed 20 April 2018; Richard H. Popkin, “Skepticism,” in The Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy, vol. 7, ed. Paul Edwards (London: Collier Macmillan, 1967), 449–61. Both contain a
bibliography on the subject.
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group of texts which open with the words “if a man would tell you” and their close
variants. There has only been one study of these texts as a distinctive group.5 At
the very least, the members of this group share the first instinct that is essential to
scepticism: doubt.
My objective in this paper will be to attempt to formulate the relationship be-
tween truth, epistemology, and authority within this group of texts. I shall argue
that the expression “if a man would tell you” functions as a discursive marker which
rabbinic literature utilises in order to suggest an engagement with what we have
learnt to call “scepticism”: doubting epistemology as well as authority. The phrase
“[and] if a man would tell you” is found more than one hundred times in rabbinic
literature, up to the period of the Tanḥuma genre. The overwhelming majority of
the corpus where this phrase occurs is Palestinian, whereas it appears only fourteen
times in the Babylonian Talmud. A noteworthy study of these texts was published
by Arthur Marmorstein in 1950,6 but since then, they have not been further studied
as a group and their rhetorical and discursive function and attributes have remained
unexplored. While Marmorstein made a significant contribution, his study was not
without its problems.
Marmorstein justifiably identified the “if a man would tell you” texts as part of
the rabbinic tradition of the diatribe, a form that he considered to be rooted in the
Cynic and Stoic philosophical traditions. He made three main claims. Firstly, he
proposed that the expression “if a man would tell you” is used by homilists to intro-
duce hypothetical counter-arguments, whether alleged or real, to their biblical in-
terpretation. Secondly, he suggested that they should be grouped together with five
other groups of texts that he saw as similar, if not identical: “Anyone who says …,”
“So that they would not say …,” “An answer to those who say …,” “So that they may
not say …,” and “If they would say …” ( ימלהבושת,ורמאיאלש,רמואשימלכ
ורמאיםא,הפןוחתפןתילאלש,םירמואש ). Finally, he claimed that all these groups
are polemical in function and that the hypothetical or real speakers in all of the
groups are hostile to rabbinic teaching; that is, all apart from a small group of texts
that start with the phrase “do not wonder if …” ( המתתלא ). He believed that this
group represented an inner-rabbinic voice, although in my view, this group is irrele-
vant to the discussion. The support for Marmorstein’s assertions is often wanting,
either because he believed it to be self-evident, or because it was part of his more
fundamental claim that there was a dispute between rabbinic Judaism and the Mar-
cionites that was pivotal to rabbinic self-definition.
It is difficult to agree with Marmorstein on many of his points, all of which
either lead towards or are the building blocks of his broader argument that all of
these aggadic passages are polemical in nature and that Marcion was the single
5 Marmorstein, “The Background of the Haggadah,” 57–71.
6 Marmorstein, 57–71. Marmorstein consistently dates the sources on the basis of the names of the
tradents and not based on the composition in which they appear.
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greatest threat to rabbinic theology. His argument might have been stronger if only
biblical verses were indeed the focus of all the diatribes mentioned, as the Bible
stood at the heart of interreligious dispute in late antiquity, but this is not always
the case. For example, almost none of the sources in the “if a man would tell you”
group in tannaitic literature7 and in the Babylonian Talmud8 are anchored on the
interpretation of a verse. Furthermore, not all the speakers are hostile to rabbinic
teaching, nor are they outsiders to rabbinic circles. Indeed, looking closer at the
identity of the speakers reveals that the groups that Marmorstein categorised togeth-
er do not, in fact, belong together.
The group that starts with “so that they would not say” ( ורמאיאלש ), for example,
is an enormous group with over 200 sources as early as the second and as late as the
seventh century. These sources concern things that are done not for their truth value
or necessity, but rather in order that it may not seem to anyone, irrespective of wheth-
er they are an Israelite or not, that the Law is being transgressed ( ןיעתיארמ ). These
have an entirely different relationship to truth from the “if a man would tell you”
group, which at least attempts to appear to be searching for truth and reasserting
truth as a value.
The group starting with “so that they may not say” ( הפןוחתפןתילאלש ), how-
ever, has the specific function of rejecting the hypothetical or actual claims of non-
Jews (the “nations of the world”) or heretical Jews, as they are directly mentioned.
It includes, for example, the much-discussed polemic regarding the notion of “two
powers in heaven.”9 It is mostly tannaitic10 and has very little continuation in classi-
7 m. Ed. 1:6; t. Menaḥ. 13:1; t. Nid. 6:4; t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:3; Midrash Tannaim on Deut. 17:10 (Hoffmann
edition, 103).
8 b. Ber. 10a; b. Ḥag. 16a; b. Meg. 6a–b, 31b; b. Nid. 52b; b. Sanh. 80a; b. ‘Abod. Zar. 9b; b. Ned.
40a.
9 See Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosti-
cism, reprint ed. (Boston, MA: Brill, 2002); Adiel Schremer, “Midrash, Theology, and History: Two
Powers in Heaven Revisited,” Journal for the Study of Judaism 39 (2008): 230–54; Stephen Waers,
“Monarchianism and Two Powers: Jewish and Christian Monotheism at the Beginning of the Third
Century,” Vigiliae Christianae 70 (2016): 401–29; Menahem Kister, “The Manifestations of God in the
Midrashic Literature in Light of Christian Texts” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 81 (2012): 103–42; Menahem Kis-
ter, “Metatron, God, and the ‘Two Powers’: The Dynamics of Tradition, Exegesis, and Polemic”
[Hebrew], Tarbiz 82 (2013): 43–88; Daniel Boyarin, “Two Powers in Heaven; or, The Making of a
Heresy,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation: Essays in Honor of James L. Kugel, ed. Hindy Najman
and Judith H. Newman (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 331–70; Alon Goshen-Gottstein, “Jewish-
Christian Relations and Rabbinic Literature—Shifting Scholarly and Relational Paradigms: The Case
of Two Powers,” in Interaction between Judaism and Christianity in History, Religion, Art and Litera-
ture, ed. Marcel Poorthuis, Joshua Schwartz, and Joseph Turner (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 15–43; Daniel
Boyarin, “Once Again: ‘Two Dominions in Heaven’ in the Mekhilta” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 81 (2012): 87–
101.
10 Mek. of Rabbi Ishmael, Shira 4 (Horovitz and Rabin edition, Mechilta d’Rabbi Ismael, 129–30);
BaHodesh 5–6 (Horovitz and Rabin edition, 219–21, 223); Mek. of Rabbi Shimeon, Beshalah 15:3
(Epstein and Melamed edition, 81); Sifra, Dibura deNedava 2:5 (Finkelstein edition, 2:22 and varia
in 4:63), Sifre Num. 119 (Kahana edition, appendix 1, ב"ל ); Sifre Num. 143 (Kahana edition, appen-
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cal midrash.11 This group is focused on authority rather than on epistemology or
truth. In fact, it categorises only utterances from “proper” sources of authority, such
as from (“orthodox”12) rabbinic Jews, as true. The “anyone who says” ( ימלכ
רמואש ) group is focused on the punishment or reward for uttering certain things
and has nothing to do with doubt.13 The phrase “an answer to those who say”
( םירמואשימלהבושת ) appears only once and in a rather late source (Pesiq. Rab. 47),
and “if they would say” ( ורמאיםא ) is merely a plural version of “if a man would
tell you” and should therefore be classified with it.14 I am arguing here, through a
detailed taxonomy, that the group that has “if a man would tell you” as a discursive
marker is unique, as it preserves a moment of hesitation in the rabbinic discourse.
As opposed to the complete negation of the false opinions and theologies of others
as reflected in the “so that they would not say” ( הפןוחתפןתילאלש ) and the “any-
one who says” ( רמואשלכ ) groups, the doubts raised by the sources in this group
are seriously considered, at least in part, and at times cause a change of heart.
What Marmorstein may have been reacting to when he created his taxonomy is
the fact that a statement which begins with the marker “if a man would tell you”
( םדאךלרמאיםא ) is often rejected by the speaker/writer/redactor of the diatribe. I
assume that it was this, in addition to the somewhat provocative content of some
of the texts in the “if a man would tell you” group, that led him to believe that all
the hypothetical speakers in this group are hostile to rabbinic teaching. I propose
here to take a more historical and methodical approach to examining the data in
order to understand the function of this discursive marker in classical rabbinic lit-
erature and to group the texts that use it. In order to classify the sources, I will use
the focal points that scepticism offers us, examining epistemology, authority, truth,
and doubt. I believe that we must ask the following questions: What is the identity
of the people who are posing the challenges? Is there a difference between those
who ask their interlocutor questions and those who offer simple propositions? Are
they “right” or “wrong?” Are they indeed refuted? And finally, why are their claims
rejected?
In order to classify the appearances of the expression “if a man would tell you,”
I would suggest initially organising them into five groups, corresponding to three
dix, ט"ס ); Sifre Deut. 42 (Finkelstein edition, 89); 43 (Finkelstein edition, 96–97); 308 (Finkelstein
edition, 347), Midrash Tannaim on Deut. 5:7; 11:14; 19:1 (Hoffmann edition, 20, 35, 113).
11 It appears only in Pes. Rab. Kah. 26 (Mandelbaum edition, 394); Lev. Rab. 21:8 (Margulies edi-
tion, 462); Gen. Rab. 1:10 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 9). In Lev. Rab., it is directed not against
the Gentiles, but against Satan. Tanḥ. Jethro 16 (Buber edition, Ex 79) recycles the material we
already know.
12 I use “orthodox” in the sense that Boyarin offers in his argument for the creation of orthodoxy
and heresy in rabbinic Judaism in the second century: see Boyarin, “Two Powers,” 364–70.
13 Gen. Rab. 67:4 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 757–58); Song. Rab. 1:1; Tanḥ. Zav 7; and Sifre
Num. 105 (Kahana edition, 260), which is the most relevant to the discussion and to which I shall
return later.
14 This is what I have done here.
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major variables: the identity of the speakers, the response, and the type of utterance
they use. In the first group (G1), anonymous speakers make an argument which is
rejected;15 in the second group (G2), unidentified people ask a question and receive
a (positive) answer;16 in the third group (G3), an argument made by an identified
speaker is accepted;17 in the fourth group (G4), an argument made by an identified
speaker is rejected;18 and in the final group (G5), an argument made by an unidenti-
fied person is accepted.19 Analysing each group separately and the corpus as a
whole will reveal the relationship between authority, truth, and the discourse
therein.
A full and detailed taxonomy of the cases will not only undermine the validity
of many of Marmorstein’s assumptions, but will also enable us to understand the
historical function of the formula “if a man would tell you.” I shall now analyse
each group separately in order to clarify both my own choices relating to the classifi-
cations and the function of the groups. I will then offer my own taxonomy.
15 m. Ed. 1:6; b. Meg. 6a; b. Meg. 6b, b. ‘Abod. Zar. 9b; y. Ber. 4:3 (32b), four times; y. Sanh. 10:1
(50b); y. Šeb. 1:1 (4a) twice; y. Ta‘an, 2:1 (9a) thrice; y. Ta‘an. 2:2 (9b) four times; y. Ter. 11:12 (56a);
Gen. Rab. 12:1 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 97–99); 17:6 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 157); 44:19
(Theodor and Albeck edition, 441–2); 50:10 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 527); 69:4 (Theodor and
Albeck edition, 793) twice; 94:9 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 1181); Lev. Rab. 23:2 (Margulies edi-
tion, 629, line 1 in the apparatus); Pesiq. Rab. Kah. 3:5 (Mandelbaum edition, 43); 4:2 (Mandelbaum
edition, 59); 5:1 (Mandelbaum edition, 100); Deut. Rab. Nitsavim 5 (Liebermann edition, 117); Song.
Rab. 1:14 (3); Song. Rab. 2:2 (2); Lam. Rab. (Vilnius) 2:13; 4:1; Eccl. Rab. 2:11–12 (Hirshman edition,
140–42); Tanḥ. Noah 17 (Buber edition, Gen 44); Ḥukot 19 (Buber edition, Num 104); Ki Tetse 9
(Buber edition, Deut 39); Tanḥ. Vayera 1 (Warsaw, Gen 46); Ha’azinu 3 (Warsaw, Deut 245), Yelam-
denu according to the citation in Talmud Torah Bereshit 131 (Jacob Mann, The Bible as Read and
Preached in the Old Synagogue, vol. 1 [Penna: Jewish Publication Society, 1940]. 317).
16 b. Ber. 10a; y. Ta‘an. 1:1 (3a); Gen. Rab. 55:15 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 585); Lev. Rab. 27:4
(Margulies edition, 627–31, four times); Pesiq. Rab. Kah. 9:4 (four times; Mandelbaum edition, 152);
Deut. Rab. Ekev (Liebermann edition, 74, four times); Eccl. Rab. 12,10 (Vilnius edition) and 3,15
(Hirshman edition, 210–212) (three times); Tanḥ. Emor 12 (Buber edition, Lev 90–91) three times;
Tanḥ. Nasah 31 (Buber edition, Num 41–42, four times).
17 t. Menaḥ. 13:1; t. Nidd. 6:4; t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:3; Midrash Tannaim Deut. 17:10 (Hoffmann edition,
103); ’Abot R. Nat. B 37 (Schechter edition, 98); b. Nid. 52b; b. Sanh. 4a; b. Meg. 31b; b. Ned. 4a; y.
Mo’ed Qat. 3:1 (10a); y. Hor. 1:1 (2b); Gen. Rab. 78:2 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 919). In theory, y.
Šeb. 4:2 (10a) could be included here too, but as it is not an opening of a dispute or discourse, I
have decided to leave it out.
18 t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:9; b. Ḥag. 16a; b. Sanh. 4a; b. Meg. 31b; b. Ned. 40b; y. Hor. 1:3 (5b); Tanḥ.
Baha’alotkha 16 (Buber edition, Num 52); Beshallah 24 (Buber edition, Ex 67), Nasa 30 (Buber edi-
tion, Num 31, three times); Tanḥ. Ki Tisa 24 (Warsaw edition, Ex. 244); Shoftim 12 (Warsaw edition,
Deut 225).
19 b. Meg. 6a; b. Meg. 6b; Deut. Rab. Nitzavim (Liebermann edition, 117, twice); Lam. Rab. 2:13.
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1 Five Different Groups within the Genre
1.1 Group 1, or, Are the Speakers Telling the Truth?
I shall start with the unidentified speakers who make claims, as they are the largest
group. This group consists mainly of examples found in the early Palestinian amora-
ic literature (32/42), with only one tannaitic example (m. Ed. 1:6). All but one of its
seven examples in the Tanḥuma genre20 are repetitions of earlier sources, and the
Bavli contributes three more. As we shall see, this group presents us with a phenom-
enon in which empirically just claims or claims that could be, or indeed are, accept-
ed elsewhere in rabbinic literature as true are deemed to be false.
This happens in ten out of the sixteen cases taken from the Yerushalmi in this
group. Eight of them revolve around the numbers of blessings in the ‘amidah, one
is about the interpretation of a mishnaic passage, and one is about a tradition con-
cerning the Sabbatical year. As the majority of the cases in the group refer to the
correct number of blessings, we will examine this text more closely.
In y. Ber. 4:3 (33b), there is a lengthy unit devoted to various attempts to explain
why there are eighteen blessings in the ‘amidah. Five explanations are given: the
number of psalms which appear before the psalmist is answered; the eighteen spi-
nal vertebrae;21 the eighteen invocations of God in Psalm 29; the eighteen times the
three patriarchs are mentioned together in the Bible, and finally, eighteen different
commandments relating to the construction of the Tabernacle. I will not analyse or
quote here those explanations for the phenomenon which do not directly respond
to a claim starting with the marker “if a man would tell you,” and I will consider
only the first, third and fourth explanations just listed:22
Why eighteen? R. Joshua ben Levi said: Because there are eighteen psalms from the start of
the Book of Psalms to the verse: “and the Lord answers you in your day of trouble” (Ps 20:2).
If a man would tell you: there are nineteen, tell him: “Why are the nations in an uproar” (Ps 2:1)
is not included […]
20 I have separated the Tanḥuma group from the classical midrash sources because of its generally
different poetics, its anthological nature, and its possible influences from the Bavli. This is a group
of Palestinian midrashim on the Torah dated from the sixth to the ninth centuries. Some of them
have been preserved in the collections we now call Tanḥuma, but others “travelled independently”
as midrashim to a specific book (for example, the second part of Exodus Rabbah). On the basic
characteristics of the group, see, for example, Moshe David Herr, “Tanḥuma Yelammedenu,” in
Encyclopaedia Judaica, Volume 15, ed. Cecil Roth (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971): 794–96; Ronit Nikolsky,
“From Palestine to Babylonia and Back: The Place of the Bavli and the Tanhuma on the Rabbinic
Cultural Continuum,” in Rabbinic Traditions between Palestine and Babylonia, ed. Tal Ilan and Ronit
Nikolsky (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 284–305; Marc Bregman, The Tanhuma-Yelammedenu Literature: Stud-
ies in the Evolution of the Versions (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003).
21 Based on m. ’Ohal. 1:8.
22 The parallel sugya in b. Ber. 28b adds another explanation: the eighteen times God is mentioned
in the Shema‘.
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R. Levi said, [The eighteen blessings] correspond to the eighteen invocations [in Psalm 29].
[But what of] “Ascribe to the Lord?” (Ps 29:1) R. Huna said, if a man would tell you that there
are nineteen [blessings], tell him that the rabbis at Yavneh established a [nineteenth blessing]
concerning the heretics.
R. Eleazar b. R. Yose objected before R. Yose: It is written, “The God (El) of glory thunders”
(Ps 29:3)—they should have established another blessing on its account. He said to him, “It
was taught, they insert the references to the heretics and the sinners in the blessing concerning
the slanderers [the twelfth], and the references to the elders and the proselytes in the blessing
concerning the righteous [the thirteenth], and the reference to David in the blessing concern-
ing the rebuilding of Jerusalem [the fourteenth]. We have enough invocations [in the chapter]
for each and every one of these subjects.
R. Ḥaninah in the name of R. Pinḥas: [The 18 blessings] correspond to the eighteen times that
the [names of the] patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are mentioned together in the Torah.
And if a man would tell you that there are nineteen [instances], tell him that we do not count
this one: “And behold the Lord stood beside him and said, “I am the Lord, the God of Abraham
your father and the God of Isaac” (Gen 28:13); and if a man would tell you that there are only
seventeen [instances], tell him that we do count this one: “And in them let my name [Jacob]
be perpetuated, and the name of my father Abraham and Isaac” (Gen 48:16).23
All the unidentified speakers challenging assumptions in this passage from the
Yerushalmi are, in fact, right. The first speaker is correct in that there are indeed
nineteen psalms, not eighteen, up to the moment that God answers the psalmist on
his day of trouble in Ps 20:2. The second speaker, introduced to the discussion by
R. Huna, is also right, as God is mentioned by name more than eighteen times in
Psalm 29. His opinion is accepted to the degree that R. Huna agrees that there are
indeed nineteen blessings in the ‘amidah, as birkat ha-minim was added.24 R. Ele‘-
azar, however, claims that if we count the times God appears with the name El, there
are indeed twenty invocations in Psalm 29, and according to the logic presented by
R. Huna, we should add another blessing to the ‘amidah. The answer given by R.
Yose reflects the difference between the Palestinians and the Babylonians (represen-
ted here by R. Huna) about the number of blessings in the ‘amidah.25 R. Yose ends
23 The translation here is a (slight) adaptation of Tzvee Zahavy’s translation, published in Jacob
Neusner, ed., The Talmud of the Land of Israel, Volume 1: Berakhot (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990), 170–71.
24 On birkat ha-minim and the different forms (and numbers) of the benedictions in the ‘amidah,
see, for example, David Instone-Brewer, “The Eighteen Benedictions and the Minim before 70 CE,”
Journal of Theological Studies 54, no. 1 (2003): 25–44; Uri Ehrlich, The Weekday Amidah in Cairo
Genizah Prayer Books: Roots and Transmission (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America,
2013); Günter Stemberger, “Birkat ha-minim and the Separation of Christians and Jews,” in Judaea-
Palaestina, Babylon and Rome: Jews in Antiquity, ed. Benjamin Isaac and Yuval Shahar (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 75–88; Yechezkel Luger, The Weekday ʻAmida in the Cairo Genizah [Hebrew]
(Jerusalem: Orḥot, 2001); Ruth Langer, Cursing the Christians? A History of the Birkat Haminim (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
25 On the Babylonians’ difficulty with not counting birkat ha-minim as an additional blessing, see
Ezra Fleischer, “On the Beginnings of Obligatory Jewish Prayer” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 59 (1990): 435–38.
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the counting game by showing that we can add more text to the existing blessings
without changing their numbers and keep the traditional eighteen, corresponding
to the eighteen invocations of the ineffable name. He does so by adding the minim
to the curse of the informers, the elders and the proselytes to the blessing of the
righteous, and David to the blessing of Jerusalem. A different variant on the theme
of the number of blessings appears in t. Ber. 3:25, which nevertheless counts eigh-
teen.26 He thus rejects both the doubt raised by the unidentified speakers and
R. Huna’s opinion. In the next section, R. Ḥaninah attempts another explanation
for the number eighteen, this time based on mentioning all the patriarchs in one
verse. His discursive opponents justly claim that this is not the case.27 Once again,
the argument is about the details: Can we consider the verse in which Jacob speaks
of his forefathers to be mentioning all three forefathers together? The point I wish
to make here is that it is difficult to think of those who know how to count as
Marcionite, as non-rabbinic, or to see their arguments as completely false, or “po-
lemical,” as Marmorstein suggested. The “unidentified speakers” seem to fulfil dif-
ferent discursive functions: personifying hypothetical counter-arguments, pointing
out places where the claims are weak and should be further supported, or facilitat-
ing or explaining change (as in the case of R. Huna). The speakers do not seem to
have a hidden agenda, and often they reflect opinions that are not foreign to rabbin-
ic thought itself. The number of the blessings, at any rate, is an entirely inner-
rabbinic dispute.28
We find the same phenomenon of rejecting perfectly viable claims in six out of
the seven cases of G1 in Genesis Rabbah, for example, in Gen. Rab. 17:6,29 commenting
on Gen 2:21, which has “and he slept; then he took one of his ribs and closed up its
place with flesh” ( הנתחתרשברגסיו ). In Genesis Rabbah, Rabbi Ḥaninah attempts a
drašat ’otiyot (a midrash of single letters in the Bible) regarding the end of the verse:
“Rabbi Ḥaninah son of R. Adda said: from the beginning of the book to this passage
the letter samek is not written. But when the woman was created, Satan was created
with her. And if a man would tell you ‘that is it which encompasses’ (Gen 2:11), tell
him that verse speaks only of rivers.”
The letter samek undoubtedly appears in the Book of Genesis before the crea-
tion of woman, in Gen 2:11, which deals with the River Pishon, which encompasses
(sovev בבוס ) Kush. However, R. Ḥaninah has the last word. A different midrash that
26 Fleischer, “On the Beginnings,” 435–438; Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah: A Comprehensive
Commentary on the Tosefta, Volume 1: Seder zera‘im ’alef (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary
of America, 1987), 53.
27 The simplest way to count would be seventeen, including Gen 25; 28; 31; 32 (twice); 35; 49; Ex 2;
3 (three times); 6; Lev 26; 2Kgs 13; 1Chr 1 (twice); 2Chr 32; to this, one might add a second occur-
rence in both Gen 28 and Gen 32, making it nineteen.
28 Ezra Fleischer, “The Shemone Esre, Its Character, Internal Order, Content, and Goals” [Hebrew],
Tarbiz 62 (1993): 179–223, here 182–83.
29 Theodor and Albeck edition, 157.
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appears in Genesis Rabbah (with parallels in Lamentations Rabbah, Pesiqta deRab
Kahana, and Songs of Songs Rabbah) has the following:
“I will Judge” ( יכנאןד ) (Gen 15:14). R. Eliezer in the name of Rabbi Jose, in those two letters
the Holy One, blessed be He, promised our father to redeem his sons, and if they will repent
from their bad deeds he will redeem them by 72 letters. R. Judan said, from “has a god tried
to go to take for himself a nation from within another nation” to “by great terrors” (Deut 4:34)
we find 72 letters. And if a man would tell you there are 75, take out (three letters that make)
the second mentioning of “a nation ( יוג ).”30
It is difficult to prove that the argument of there being seventy-five letters here is
wrong, as indeed seventy-five letters appear in the Bible. The rejection of the claim
is no more convincing than that of R. Ḥaninah regarding the letter samek.
Working out of the specific examples given here and the other members of the
group, a unified cause for the rejection of the arguments of the unidentified speak-
ers does not seem to be possible, since it appears that the grounds for rejecting the
claims of the speakers in G1 are too varied. They stretch from inconsistencies be-
tween verses to reading a different part of the verse, using a different counting
technique, the observed natural world, a different system of categorisation, or a
ruling of a beit din. To put it differently, the claims are not rejected on the basis of
any coherent epistemology. They are also not being rejected because of the identity
of the speakers, as most of the claims are not presented to the rabbinic collective
by a member of an out-group.
There are two texts that may seem to be exceptions to this rule, which could be
treated as polemical. One appears in Gen. Rab. 12:2 and in a parallel text in Eccl.
Rab. 2:12, and the other appears in y. Ta‘an. 2:1 (9a).31 The first has to do with a man
who claims that he understands the cosmic order. While his interlocutor, R. Huna,
rejects his claim as impossible, the subsequent opinions quoted are quite different
and suggest that human beings can indeed understand some if not all of the natural
world and the cosmic order.32 This is consistent both with the trend of rejecting
acceptable claims that we saw earlier and with the speakers being people who do
not necessarily come from outside of the rabbinic collective. This brings us to the
famous passage from y. Ta‘an. 2:1 (9a):
If a man would tell you: I am a god, he is a liar; I am (the) Son of Man, he will regret it; I go
up to the heavens—he has said so, but he shall not do it.
30 Gen. Rab. 17:6 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 157).
31 Gen. Rab. 12:2 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 97–99), and in a parallel text in Eccl. Rab. 2:12
(Hirshman edition, 140).
32 See Reuven Kiperwasser, “‘The Natural Order’—The Perception of the Nature in Rabbinic
Thought” [Hebrew], Akdamot, the Journal for Jewish Thought 5 (1998): 35–52.
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While Peter Schäfer sees anti-Christian polemic here,33 and others even inner-
Christian polemic,34 I wish to probe the identity of the speaker and the nature of
R. Abbahu’s answer. Schaf̈er justly argues that Jesus is a better fit as the object of
the question than Ḥiram, who claims to be a god in Ezek 18:2, or Nebuchadnezzar,
who claims he will ascend to heaven (Isa 14:13), because only with the inclusion of
Jesus is the whole sequence coherent. He is the only one about whom it was claimed
that he was God, the Son of Man, and that he ascended to heaven. Schaf̈er also
noted that the first two claims are refuted by an appeal to the same verse in Ba-
laam’s oracle (Num 23:19), “God is not a human being, that he should lie, or a
mortal, that he should change his mind. Has he promised, and will he not do it? Has
he spoken, and will he not fulfil it?” The third claim about ascending to heaven,
however, is not rejected on the basis of a verse (even if Isaiah could be utilised
here). It is simply rejected outright.
However, Schaf̈er disregards the problems created by the narrative structure: Is
Jesus talking to R. Abbahu and we are witnessing his second coming, or is there
another man who thinks he is a god, who went up to heaven to sit with God and
keeps appearing to the sages? Is this a dramatisation of rabbinic dogma, or just
R. Abbahu’s view concerning a third-century Christian controversy?
The logic of this midrash is of particular interest. As with some other cases in
this group, it is not without blemish. Let us follow the three claims and their an-
swers again. The refutation of the first argument is based on a verse that says “God
is not a man,” read as proof that man is not God. There are two fallacies here.
Firstly, the argument is circular in claiming that if God does not lie and men do,
then God cannot be a man, so if someone claims that he is God, he is lying and is
not God. If the man is indeed God, he is not lying, and therefore he is a god. The
second is that there is a difference between being a god and being God. This is a
difference that Christianity and many types of dualist heresies have noted. I also do
not recall anyone regretting saying that he was the son of man,35 or any rabbinic
doctrinal teaching against sinless men who go to heaven without dying. In fact, the
opposite appears as an answer to one of the questions asked by unidentified speak-
33 See Peter Schaf̈er, Jesus in the Talmud (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 107–11;
Samuel Tobias Lachs, “R. Abbahu and the Minim,” Jewish Quarterly Review 60, no. 3 (1970): 197–
212, here 198–99; Robert Travers Herford, Christianity in the Talmud and Midrash (London: Wil-
liams & Norgate, 1903), 62–63; Jacob Z. Lauterbach, “Jesus in the Talmud,” in Jacob Z. Lauterbach,
Rabbinical Essays (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1951), 545 ff., and also Ephraim E. Ur-
bach, “Homilies of the Rabbis on the Prophets of the Nations and the Balaam Stories” [Hebrew],
Tarbiz 25 (1956): 272–89, here 277–78. Urbach sees this as an imagined dialogue between Balaam
and a Christian.
34 Oded Irshai, “R. Abbahu Said: ‘If a Man Should Say to You “I am God”—He Is a Liar’” [Hebrew],
Zion 47 (1982): 173–77, points out that even within the church, the divinity of Christ was contested
by some. See the literature mentioned there.
35 On the Son of Man in the context of “two powers,” see Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, 202–15.
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ers in G2. To put it differently, the answers offered here by R. Abbahu are more
negations, threats, and promises than real refutations. As with some other cases
within this group, the point is not how valid the claims are, but their rejection, and
we shall return to this point later.
1.2 Group 2: Those Who Ask Questions
Group 2, the group of questions asked by unidentified personae, includes fourteen
early amoraic cases, one example from the Babylonian Talmud, and eleven exam-
ples from the Tanḥuma genre, of which only three are not original and four are
repeated.
The early amoraic group consists of variants on the same questions: six ask
about the possibility of something, and two ask “where” (is your God, y. Ta‘an. 1:1
[3a]) and “when” (will God redeem Israel, Eccl. Rab. 12:10).36 All the questions are
answered by a verse or an allusion to a biblical story. All of those who ask questions
may be part of the rabbinic group, borderline rabbinic Jews, or members of an out-
group, but only in one case (y. Ta‘an. 1:1 [3a]) is it clearly someone who is identified
as a non-member of the Jewish collective. In the Tanḥuma group (4) and in the
Bavli (1), another five are added about the possibility or impossibility of an event.
The group as a whole poses a hermeneutical challenge. All but the two “where”
and “when” questions are answered by a straightforward affirmation. Seven of them
ask about God: Can God make the poor rich?37 Can God resurrect the dead?38 Could
Adam be alive today had he not sinned?39 Could God create water upon water?40
Turn water into dry land?41 To this list, Deut. Rab.42 adds another three questions:
Does God accept those who repent? Does God open the wombs of barren women?
And can God save from fire? These questions focus on the relationship between God
and men, which we encounter also in the Bavli with the man who asks: “Does a
slave rebel against his master?” (b. Ber. 10a). All the answers are supported by vers-
es. The hermeneutical challenges are, however, how to interpret the nature of the
questions; that is to say, are they meant to challenge what they may think of as
rabbinic “dogma,” or are they honest questions, seeking answers in the face of dif-
ferent theological and textual difficulties?
36 Hirshman edition, 140.
37 Gen. Rab. 55:15 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 585).
38 Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31); Pesiq. Rab. Kah. 9:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 152–53);
Eccl. Rab. 3:15 (Hirshman edition, 210); Deut. Rab. ‘Eqev (Liebermann edition, 74).
39 Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 9:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 152–53);
Eccl. Rab. 3:15 (Hirshman edition, 210); Deut. Rab. ‘Eqev (Liebermann edition, 74).
40 Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 9:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 152–53).
41 Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 9:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 152–53);
Eccl. Rab. 3:15 (Hirshman edition, 210).
42 Deut. Rab. ‘Eqev (Liebermann edition, 74).
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The oldest member of the group, found in Gen. Rab. 55:15, interprets the trials
of Abraham as the Torah’s way of teaching us about reward. Abraham wins great
favour because of his loyalty to God. When someone asks, “Can God make rich
whoever he pleases, and make poor whoever he pleases, and make whomever he
wants king?”, the affirmative answer takes the omnipotence of God as a given and
focuses on God’s ethical standard. God may do so, and His decisions are not arbitra-
ry.43 The man who may be understood as complaining that God does not favour him
is therefore asked to measure himself against the scale of Abraham. I see no reason
to think of the question asked as external to the rabbis, since the desire to under-
stand God’s actions is at its heart and graver questions about God’s decisions in the
face of the destruction of the temple are often raised. If, however, a person tells you
that this question is polemical by nature, suggesting that God is not just, then tell
him/her that we will address this question shortly.
A most interesting and much-repeated tradition is the one that appears as an
opening of an obviously popular proem, which has survived in multiple versions.44
I shall quote its beginning here as it appears in MS Munich of Leviticus Rabbah, as
this is most likely its first documentation.45
“That which is now, already has been; that which is to be, already is; and God seeks out what
is pursued” (Eccl 3:15).46 R. Judah and Rabbi Nehemiah. Rabbi Judah said: If a man would tell
you that had the first man not eaten from that tree he would be alive and well forever, tell him
this is “that which is now”: Elijah is alive and well forever. “That which is to be, already is”:
R. Nehemiah: If a man would tell you, how is it possible that in the beginning the whole world
was water upon water! tell him “[it] already is,” as Okeanos is full of water. Shall he say, will
the Holy One, blessed be he, dry it? Say to him “it has already happened”—“the Israelites
walked through the sea on dry land” (Ex 15:19). “That which is to be, already is”—shall you
say, is it possible that the Holy One, blessed be he, will resurrect the dead? Tell him this: “[it]
already is,” he has already resurrected the dead by the hands of Elijah and Elisha, and Ezekiel
in the valley of Dura.47
This is the first part of a very long proem which connects Eccl 3:15, “That which is
now, already has been; that which is to be, already is; and God seeks out what is
pursued,” and Lev 22:27: “When an ox or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall remain
seven days with its mother, and from the eighth day on it shall be acceptable as
43 This stance is also taken in a conversation between Matrona and Rabbi Jose repeated in Gen.
Rab. 68:4 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 771); Lev. Rab. 8:1 (Margulies edition, 164–68); Pesiq. Rab
Kah. 2:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 18–20).
44 In Pesiq. Rab Kah. 9:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 152); Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31);
Eccl. Rab. 3:15 (Hirshman edition, 210–12); Tanḥ. Emor 12 (Buber edition, Lev 90–91).
45 Here, I have not chosen the version that Margulies reconstructed from many manuscripts, but
rather that of MS Munich. On the problems presented by textual criticism, see Margulies’s com-
ments on pages 727–28 of his edition.
46 Hirshman edition, 210–12.
47 Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31).
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the Lord’s offering by fire.” The whole proem functions as consolation to a nation
which is based on interpreting the biblical lexeme nirdaf ( ףדרנ ) in the Ecclesiastes
verse as “persecuted” rather than “chased” and as the sacrificial herbivores offered
to God in the Leviticus verse. The first part of the proem is dedicated to fostering
hopes for the future based on God’s actions in the past. The Ecclesiastes verse is
foremost read as a promise: God will stand by his people and redeem them. The
proem follows a chronological order, from creation to salvation, and links biblical
stories to the “rabbinic present” in which, as it is said, “Israel are pursued by the
nations of the world” in the hope that “God will seek the pursued.”
The proem is a long list of examples of situations that seem irreversible or catas-
trophic, but turn out to be merely temporary phases. This midrashic tradition (in its
five variations48) is the only instance where this verse from Ecclesiastes is ever quot-
ed in rabbinic literature.49
Marmorstein read the opening of the proem as a polemic answering an imag-
ined “gnostic” allegation against the Bible, the nature of which is not entirely clear
from his writings. We can assume that he saw it as a problem as it might point to
inconsistencies in the Bible, or as reflecting inconsistencies within the nature of
God Himself; that is, suggesting that he is either bad, or—perhaps even worse—that
he is but the demiurge who created the earth for the higher God.
The four questions the speaker asks could be split into two dyads, one concern-
ing life and death, the other concerning creation and the eschaton. We can read the
first question of the first dyad as making two conflicting claims. The first is that if
all men are mortal now but Adam was initially immortal, then “what is now” and
“what has been” is not one and Ecclesiastes was wrong. The way the midrash re-
futes the claim is ironically not by mentioning the death of Adam and his mortality,
but the possibility of immortality after Adam. The idea that Adam was created im-
48 In Pesiq. Rab Kah. 9:4 (Mandelbaum edition, 152); Lev. Rab. 27:4 (Margulies edition, 627–31);
Eccl. Rab. 3:15 (Hirshman edition, 210–12); Tanḥ. Emor 12 (Buber edition, Lev 90–91).
49 This verse was in fact highly unpopular even among the contemporary Christians and other
“heretics.” It is translated but not elaborated on in the Peshitta; it is not referenced by any of the
ante-Nicene Fathers, and is mentioned only thrice afterwards, in traditions that did not gain much
popularity: Peter Chrysologus, Evagrius Ponticus, and Jerome. Chrysologus, an influential Jerusa-
lemite theologian, reads the verse about all the persecuted who have insight into the knowledge of
created things in his sermon 70 (see Peter Chrysologus, Selected Sermons, in Saint Peter Chrysolo-
gus, Selected Sermons, and Saint Valerian, Homilies, trans. George E. Ganss, paperback ed. [Wash-
ington: Catholic University Press, 2004], 119–23), while Evagrius Ponticus reads “have already
been” as referring to John the Baptist still in his mother’s womb, while no Christological reading is
to be found (see Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia on Ecclesiastes 3.15, in Evagrius Ponticus, ed. and trans.
Augustine Casiday [London and New York: Routledge, 2006], 135–36). Jerome, in his Commentarius
in Ecclesiasten, reads the second part of the verse as referring to martyrs, whom God will avenge
(see Jerome, Commentarius in Ecclesiasten, in Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi, opera omnia, vol. 23 of
Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina, ed. Jacques Paul Migne [Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1845],
1040B).
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mortal is not only manifested in Genesis, but also restated and reasserted in mid-
rash, especially regarding Eve’s part in bringing death to the world.50 There is no
heresy in claiming that Adam was initially immortal, and I cannot see why a tradi-
tion that is so well attested within rabbinic circles should be seen as some kind of
Marcionite challenge to them.51 The challenge, then, is in the difference between
every man and the first man: Is there indeed a fundamental difference between
Adam and every man born of him? Was Adam unique, a case of what has been and
now is not? In order to refute the argument that the ways of the world have
changed, the text is willing to go to an extreme. R. Judah’s answer focuses on mak-
ing Adam’s death (and perhaps accordingly everyone’s death) a result of his person-
al sins and avoidable, inasmuch as sin is avoidable. A man without sin may live
forever, and we have Elijah to prove it.
Theologically, the argument about the possibility of immortality for every per-
son without sin may be far more dangerous to the rabbis than yet another contradic-
tion in the Bible.52 It may validate Jesus as a sinless man, one who transcended the
fate of Adam and did not die. It may also call for finding fault in each and every
patriarch and prophet in the Bible. Moreover, Elijah has a part in the messianic
future, as we can find in Mal 3:23–24,53 a fact which may support a reading of Ma-
lachi 3 as referring to Jesus, a reading with which Marcion himself surprisingly
agreed. The final refutation of the function of this question as Marcionite polemic
lies exactly in Marcion’s view of Malachi 3 as one of only three places in the Old
Testament that refers to Jesus.54 In other words, claiming that it is Marcionite propa-
ganda in disguise is more likely to describe the answer given than the question
asked by the “unidentified speaker.”
In any case, while making Jesus’s life story plausible, R. Judah insists that it
was not unique. The second part of the dyad again finds a very close alliance be-
tween rabbinic Judaism and orthodox Christianity. The resurrection of the dead
stood at the heart of a well-known inner-Jewish dispute from the Second Temple
period,55 as well as at the heart of a dispute with the pagan world and between
50 See, for example, Gen. Rab. 17:7 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 158); y. Šabb. 2:6 (20a); ’Abot. R.
Nat. B 9 (Schechter edition, 24–25); Tanḥ. Noah 1 (Buber edition, Gen 27–28). I thank Shoshana
Cohen for helping me to make this connection.
51 An argument even Marmorstein himself struggled to make: see Marmorstein, Studies in Jewish
Theology, 58.
52 The Babylonian Talmud even speaks of contradictions within Ecclesiastes itself (b. Šabb. 30b).
53 5:4 in NRSV.
54 Edwin Cyril Blackman, Marcion and His Influence (London: S.P.C.K, 1948), 117–18.
55 This is described, for example, by Flavius Josephus in Ant. 18.1; J.W. 2.8. On the importance of
the doctrine of resurrection, see also Albert L. Baumgarten, “Josephus and the Jewish Sects,” in A
Companion to Josephus, ed. Honora Howell Chapman and Zuleika Rodgers (Chichester, UK: John
Wiley & Sons, 2015), 261–72 (and see Cana Werman’s contribution to this volume).
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different followers of Jesus.56 While Marcion’s followers rejected it, it was essential
to orthodox Christianity and even Arian Christianity, as Epiphanius shows.57 As po-
lemical questions, in other words, these put rabbinic Jews and the majority of Chris-
tians on the same side of the divide, a risk which I believe was greater in the Chris-
tian empire where the rabbis producing the texts lived than in the Marcionite sect.
As far as polemics go, this is hardly a strong strategy.
The questions regarding water do not, to my knowledge, threaten rabbinic the-
ology or specifically support the Marcionite theology of creation in any way. The
question of where all the water that once covered the earth went after Gen 1:9 trou-
bled some rabbis regardless of any foreign intervention. The answer—namely, into
the (river) Okeanos58—is given in Gen. Rab. 5:1 and again in Lev. Rab. 10:9, where
the gathering of the water is mentioned as an example of how an apparently small
vessel can hold a great amount. But why should God create too much water to begin
with? Is He not omniscient? The answer to this is also given in Gen. Rab. 5:1, as
there the water is kept as a sort of whip, always ready to flood the earth in case
humankind turns evil. Since not even Marcion doubted the power of the creator God
to form the world as He pleases, I cannot see why this would be the best representa-
tion of his “heresy.”59 We can read R. Naḥman’s main question as being about chaos
and order and God’s ability to separate the two. When R. Naḥman affirms it, it is
more of a refutation of pagan beliefs about the weak defeated God of Israel than of
any heretical claim. Everything God wills, including the redemption of Israel, is
possible, a fact that we learn from the (biblical) past. The affirmation of the omni-
potence of God is so common in rabbinic literature60 that I find it difficult to believe
that in this instance alone it is an argument made against gnostic sects.
So how are we to understand these questions? I believe that they are indeed
there to affirm some basic rabbinic theological conventions: God’s omniscience,
56 See recently Yifat Monnickendam, “‘I Bring Death and Give Life, I Wound and Heal” (Deut.
32:39): Two Versions of the Polemic on the Resurrection of the Dead,” Henoch 35 (2013): 90–118,
and the literature mentioned there on the relationship between Judaism, Christianity and closely
related “others” regarding the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.
57 Epiphanius of Salamis, The Panarion, Book I (Sects 1–46), trans. Frank Williams (Leiden: Brill,
1987), 228, 295, 297.
58 On its importance and mythical function in Greek culture, see James S. Romm, The Edges of the
Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994), 20–25; Arent Jan Wensinck, The Ocean in the Literature of the Western Semites (Amster-
dam: Johannes Müller, 1918), and see also Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil:
The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988); Dina Stein, Textual
Mirrors: Reflexivity, Midrash, and the Rabbinic Self (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2012), 70.
59 Marcion, however, would argue that the creator god is not God; see Adolf von Harnack, Mar-
cion: The Gospel of an Alien God (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1990), 13.
60 Marmorstein himself highlights this as essential in Jewish theology in The Old Rabbinic Doctrine
of God (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 1, 160–79.
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omnipotence, and ongoing commitment to Israel. While those questions may have
been raised by Others, they could have been, and indeed were, raised by good rab-
binic Jews, or at least by what Boyarin calls “synagogue Jews” as opposed to “study
house Jews.”61 The amount of dogmatic freedom embedded in the answers, the way
they ignore theological hazards which might be created by them, and the fact that
the questions indeed do not correspond to any one specific known heresy, added to
the overall structure and meaning of the proem, lead me to believe that the ques-
tions are not polemical by nature. This does not entail that they do not engage with
defining rabbinic dogma, or that they do not have “others” in mind, but more likely
that these texts are there to show that every question which may be brought in from
the outside had already been solved in an inner discussion. The fifth-century texts,
that is, if they take any interest at all in an alleged second-century interreligious
dispute, do so as part of their own inner-religious legacy, not as part of a continuous
engagement with a prominent threat.
This line of thought can be further stretched into the other questions in the
group about the whereabouts of God and the date of the eschaton. Those are also
inner-rabbinic questions, which are dealt with in many other places. The question
which I find most telling is the one that asks about the whereabouts of God in
y. Ta‘an. 1:1 (3a), which has: “Rabbi Joshua b. Levi said: If a man would tell you,
where is your God? Tell him, in the big city of Rome. Why? One is calling to me
from Seir (Isa 21:11).” This is a very playful answer, and it is based on an assumption
that the omnipresence of God is already established. It plays with the conventions
of what polemic questions may look like or imply. At first glance, it may appear as
if R. Joshua is admitting defeat: the Romans, who captured Jerusalem, presumably
also captured its local god. This answer is more radical than the question, even if
the epistemology is quite ordinary (learning from a verse). The exiled here is not
the Shekhinah, but God Himself, and He is held captive in Rome. This may sound
more like a Roman narrative than a rabbinic one, until the verse from Isaiah is
quoted and the pun becomes clear. Since “Seir” is identified with Rome and “Du-
mah” is interpreted to mean Rome a little earlier on the page62 in the Talmud, Rome
is the new dwelling place of God. But if we read the whole chapter in Isaiah, espe-
cially the parts of it not quoted here, the hidden transcript will become clear and
the members of the rabbinic inner circle may burst out laughing, as intended by the
midrash. If God is indeed in Rome, then redemption is near, as too is the fall of
Rome. Rome is just another kingdom to be overthrown, and God’s presence there is
the starting point of redemption. This question is a masterful play between public
and hidden transcripts.63 While on the public level, it pleases an imagined Roman,
61 Boyarin, “Two Powers,” 335.
62 Based on the graphic similarity between אמוד and אמור .
63 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (London and New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
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on the hidden level, it completely usurps Rome. Here, just like in the four questions
above, it appears that what the members of the community believe is far more im-
portant than what the “Others” might think. Let the Romans believe what they
please, R. Joshua says; we know what they do not.
A pattern is starting to emerge. While all questions are answered by citing proof
texts, the supposed refutations of hostile claims turn out to be more threatening
theologically than the questions asked. The flexibility about certain “truths” that
are expressed in the answers, as well as their sometimes radical (unintended?) con-
sequences imply, I believe, that the answer given and those who quote them were
not threatened by the questions themselves, but rather used them in order to reaf-
firm and creatively explore their own conventions.
1.3 Groups 3 and 4: Identified Speakers and Their Fate
Groups 3 and 4, which contain the sayings of identified speakers, are perhaps the
only groups to exhibit a clear epistemology. Unfortunately, this epistemology is
hardly revolutionary, and it can be boiled down to ad hominem arguments. The
claims brought forth by members of the inner rabbinic circle are accepted. Such is
the opinion of Rabbi ‘Aqiba (regarding bringing a ram as an offering in t. Menaḥ.
13:1 and the age from which a girl cannot refuse marriage and must get a proper
divorce bill in t. Nid. 6:4 and b. Nid. 52b). The same holds true for the “elders”
whose opinion is accepted in t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:3, b. Meg. 31b, b. Ned. 40a, and a beit
din in Midrash Tannaim on Deuteronomy 17:10. Arguments coming from the mouths
of members of the extended rabbinic circle or borderline characters are rejected (a
prophet in b. Sanh. 80a and y. Hor. 1:3 [5b]; children in t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:3, b. Meg.
31b., and b. Ned. 40a; yetzer hara’ in b. Ḥag. 16a). In this context, it is interesting to
note that none of the speakers are identified as not being members of rabbinic socie-
ty. In fact, tannaitic literature has a different formula for introducing hypothetic
heretical or false arguments from the mouths of people who are directly marked as
strangers (’ummot ha- ‘olam) or who are wrong: “So that they would not say” ( אלש
הפןוחתפןתיל ). This is the formula that introduces the familiar discussion of the
questions of the two powers in heaven, the names of God, the appearance of “other
gods” in the Bible, and so on.64 To put it differently, tannaitic literature uses both
64 Mek. of Rabbi Ishmael, Shira 4 (Horovitz and Rabin edition, 129–30); BaHodesh 5–6 (Horovitz
and Rabin edition, 219–21, 223); Mek. of Rabbi Shimeon, Beshalah 15:3 (Epstein and Melamed edi-
tion, 81); Sifra Leviticus Vayikra D’nedava 2:5 Sifre Num. Korah, 119 (Kahana, Appendix 1, ב"ל );
Pinhas 137, 143 (Kahana edition, appendix, - טס,דס ); Sifre Deut. ‘Ekev 42 (Finkelstein edition, 89);
43 (Finkelstein edition, 96–97); Ha’azinu 308 (Finkelstein edition, 347), Midrash Tannaim on Deut.
(Mekhilta) 12:28; 31:4; 31:6 (Hoffmann edition, 60, 61, 62); Midrash Tannaim on Deut. 5:7; 11:14; 19:1
(Hoffmann edition, 20, 35, 113). In the amoraic period, this formula is not as dominant: it appears
twice in Lev. Rab. (20:8; 21:10, Margulies edition, 462, 490), twice in Pesiq. Rab Kah. (12:20; 26:8;
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“if a man would tell you” and “so that they would not say” to introduce arguments
made by (collectively) identified rather than unidentified speakers. While the latter
are mostly non-Jews, the former are always members of the rabbinic group.
In the amoraic period, things are not quite as clear, as “so that they may not
say” ( הפןוחתפןתילאלש ) loses popularity and “if a man would tell you” grows
in popularity. In classical amoraic midrash, the “so that they may not say” group
occasionally refers to heretics, while at other times it refers to Satan or to all the
inhabitants of this world; that is, the division of labour between the two discursive
markers ceases to exist.
1.4 The Key: Group 5
The last group, group 5, consists of only three examples: b. Meg. 6a–6b and Lam.
Rab. 2:13. However, these may hold the key to understanding the rhetorical function
of all the groups. Lam. Rab. turns on its head the contextual meaning of one of the
gravest verses in the Bible (Lam 2:8): “Her (Jerusalem’s) gates have sunk into the
ground; he has ruined and broken her bars; her king and princes are among the
nations; there is no Torah; and her prophets find no vision from the Lord.” From
this verse, the sages learn the following:
“Her king and princes are among the nations there is no Torah” (Lam 2:8). If a man would tell
you there is wisdom among the nations, believe him, as it is written, “I will destroy the
wise men from Edom, and understanding from the mountains of Esau” (Obad 1:8) [There is]
Torah among the nations—do not believe him, as it is written, “Her king and princes are[,]
among the nations there is no Torah,” her prophets are false prophets, and even if these pro-
phets are true prophets, “they find no vision from the Lord” (Lam 2:8).65
The frightful words about Jerusalem and her people are turned against the nations
by changing the location of an imagined comma. Instead of reading “her king and
princes are among the nations, there is no Torah,” one should read “her king and
princes are, among the nations there is no Torah.” It is only the nations who do not
have Torah, not us, and prophecy is lost to all. From this, we are to learn that the
nations, here obviously non-Jews, cannot have Torah; that is, they cannot be verus
Israel. But let us go back to the nature of the anonymous speaker’s arguments.
The ad hominem argument that decided the fate of the utterances in groups 3
and 4 is no longer relevant, as the same speaker makes both an argument which is
accepted (there is wisdom among the nations) and one which is rejected (there is
Torah among the nations). The proof text for the acceptance of the first argument
Mandelbaum edition, 218, 394), and twice in Gen. Rab. (1:10; 8:8; Theodor and Albeck edition,
61,91).
65 Lam. Rab. 2:13.
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is far more straightforward and convincing than that for the refutation of the second
argument.
B. Megillah gives us two further examples in which the unidentified speakers
who make claims are clearly a rhetorical tool rather than actual people. The first,
in b. Meg. 6a, draws special attention to questions of epistemology:
Caesarea and Jerusalem. If a man would tell you that both are destroyed, do not believe him;
if he says that both are flourishing, do not believe him; if he says that Caesarea is wasted and
Jerusalem is flourishing, or that Jerusalem is wasted and Caesarea is flourishing, you may
believe him, as it says, “I shall be replenished, now that it is wasted” (Ezek 26:2). If this one
is replenished, that one is wasted, and if that one is replenished, this one is wasted.
Hypothetically, we could have learned from this, again, that an utterance may be
deemed true or false on the basis of its agreement with scripture. However, the verse
may have only an ornamental value, as in fact the verse which is the basis of this
midrash unfortunately does not refer to Caesarea and Jerusalem, but to Jerusalem
and Tyre. The once mortal enemy becomes nothing but a metaphor, and the powers
of history reveal the ideological bias in the interpretation of the verse. The rabbis
who want to claim that the animosity between Caesarea and Jerusalem is eternal,
not political or circumstantial, ironically point to the negation of such assumptions
made in the biblical past. Tyre is no threat in their days.
Tractate Megillah 6b in the Babylonian Talmud gives us an even more interest-
ing unidentified hypothetical speaker, or rather, even less stable grounds for refut-
ing him:
R. Isaac also said: If a man says to you, I have laboured and not found, do not believe him. If
he says, I have not laboured but still have found, do not believe him. If he says, I have la-
boured and found, you may believe him. This is true in respect of words of Torah, but in
respect of business, all depends on the assistance of heaven. And even for words of Torah this
is true only of penetrating to the meaning, but for remembering what one has learnt, all de-
pends on the assistance of heaven.
R. Isaac introduces the principles known in contemporary culture as no pain no gain
as the basis for the objection to a man who says the opposite. However, the sugya
qualifies R. Isaac’s total rejection of the man’s arguments and slowly begins to agree
with his argument in some cases. The sugya is willing to compromise with R. Isaac’s
initial position on issues that do not immediately reflect on the professional guild
of the rabbis. Merchants may be fortunate, some people have a better memory than
others, but the unique skills the rabbis hold are not divine gifts, but the result of
human effort. Why is this so? We are not told. We just have to accept it.
The axiomatic status of the claims here is paralleled by the decisive tone used
in the two other members of this group. We are to accept that there is no Torah
among the nations and that the opposition between Rome and Jerusalem is eternal,
even if the proof texts are highly manipulated and without any proof in the case of
understanding the meaning of Torah without years of study. In this group, we draw
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closer and closer to a rabbinic “credo” of transcendental truths that cannot be de-
nied: Rome is an eternal enemy, Gentiles (whether Christians or others) cannot have
a true knowledge of Torah, and nor do others who study it outside the rabbinic
schools or by way of revelation. Since the unidentified speakers in all instances here
give one argument which is accepted and one which is rejected, it is difficult to
interpret their function as threatening rabbinic orthodoxy. Rather, they are used in
order to allow a manifestation of those things which should be considered pillars
of rabbinic faith. To put it differently, the fifth group might point us to the function
of the “speakers” not as markers of boundaries between the rabbis and their Others,
but as enablers of the manifestation of rabbinic dogma. Therefore, it is not the qual-
ity of the arguments nor the identity of the people expressing them that is important
here. The claimants are but rhetorical instruments, used to emphasise the power
and authority of rabbinic teaching and to transform simple utterances into dogmatic
statements.
Going back to the challenge posed by Marmorstein, we must ask ourselves
again, after closely reading many of the sources which open with the formula “if a
man would tell you,” whether those “who would tell you” indeed have only a po-
lemical function, intended to overcome Marcionites, and what relationship between
knowledge and power is manifested in them. A taxonomy of all the occurrences of
the formula “if a man would tell you” may give us the answer.
2 General Taxonomy
The earlier Palestinian texts group (not including Tanḥuma, Deut. Rab., ’Abot. R.
Nat. (B), and the Bavli)66 have fifty-seven members.67 Of these, the biggest group
(G1) is the group of unidentified speakers who make an argument which is rejected
(about 56%, 32/57). The second-largest group, about 26% (G2), includes the ques-
tions from unidentified speakers (15/57). The third-largest group (12.5%) includes
the cases in which an identified person, generally belonging to the rabbinic circle,
makes a claim which is accepted (seven, of which four are tannaitic sources, two-
thirds of the tannaitic texts studied here). The fourth group (G4) consists of the
identified “tellers” whose claims are rejected (2/57, about 3.5%, one of which is
tannaitic). The fifth group (G5) is made up of unidentified speakers who argue for
something whose argument is accepted (1/57, about 1.7%).
In classical rabbinic literature, then, between 14% and 49% of the arguments
made by such hypothetical speakers are accepted (G3 + G5 + parts of G2). This alone
66 The Babylonian sources do not seem to know any of the Palestinian amoraic traditions, nor are
they familiar with the Tanḥuma, ’Abot R. Nat, or Deut. Rab.
67 For the full statistical distribution, see the table at the end of this section.
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sets them apart from the groups of text Marmorstein considered close or identical
in (polemic) function.
In the later midrash sources (Tanḥuma, Deuteronomy Rabbah),68 the questions
group is the largest (G2, 40%, 11/27), followed by the anonymous claims (G1, 27%,
7/27), G4 (identified speakers with rejected claims; 27%, 7/27), and G5 (anonymous
accepted claims; 4%, 2/27). Group 3, identified claims which are accepted, is ab-
sent. This is significant, as it seems that the Tanḥuma group understood the marker
“if a man would tell you” as more polemical: all the claims made by the people
“who would tell you” are rejected.
In the Bavli and ’Abot de Rabbi Natan, G3 is the biggest group (33.3%, 5/15).
G4 comes second with four (27%), G1 is third with three (20%), G5 has two (13.3%),
and G1 comes last with one (6%). To put it differently, almost half the claims are
accepted, and most of them (60%) are identified, a rather different distribution from
that found in both the early and late strictly Palestinian groups.
The Babylonian Talmud seems to hold a unique and specific link to the tannait-
ic group, and it differs from the Palestinian amoraic sources in that much like in
the tannaitic group, the people “who would tell you” never ask questions. More-
over, the identity of the speaker seems to be an influential factor on the acceptance
or rejection of their claims. Some known rabbis’ opinions are accepted (b. Nid. 2b;
see t. Nid. 6:6); others, identified as “elders” or “youngsters” (b. Meg. 31b; b. Ned.
40a), are accepted or rejected ad hominem.
Tanai- PT Gen LevR PsRK Son- LamR EccR Sum BT AdRN Tanḥ. DeuR Total
tic R nR
Sum 6 19 9 5 7 2 3 6 57 14 1 20 7 99
G1 1 15 7 1 3 2 2 1 32 3 6 1 42
G2 1 1 4 4 5 15 1 7 4 27
G3 4 2 1 7 4 1 12
G4 1 1 2 4 7 13
G5 1 1 2 2 5
68 I have separated the Tanḥuma group from the classical midrash sources, for reasons I have ex-
plained in an earlier note. See also Marc Bregman, “Early Sources and Traditions in the Tanḥuma-
Yelammedenu Midrashim” [Hebrew], Tarbiz 60 (1991): 269–74; Bregman, The Tanhuma-Yelammedenu
Literature. Jacob Elbaum, “On the Character of the Late Midrashic Literature” [Hebrew], Proceedings
of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, division C: Jewish Thought and Literature (1986): 57–
62; Ofra Meir, “The Hermeneutic Story in Early and Late Midrash” [Hebrew], Sinai 86 (1980): 146–
66; Gila Vachman, “On the Uniqueness of the Redaction in ‘Midrash Ḥadash’ on the Torah” [He-
brew], Iggud 1 (2008): 253–63.
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2.1 Ad Hominem? Exploring the Identity of the Speakers Who
Ask Questions or Make Claims
For thirty-seven of the fifty-seven speakers who make claims or ask questions in the
earlier sources, there is no reason to assume they do not belong to the rabbinic
circle.69 Another two are marginal characters in it (children, an angel),70 seventeen
are borderline characters, which should also be counted as part of the in-group,71
and only one is clearly a non-rabbinic speaker. This is the person in y. Ta‘an. 1:1
(3a) who asks: “Where is your God?”
In the later midrash group, something new and surprising happens. A fifth (6/
27) of the speakers are marked as foreign and hostile to the rabbis;72 for about 40%
(12/27), there is no reason to assume they are not part of the inner rabbinic circle,73
and another third (9/27) are speakers whose identity as rabbinic Jews needs further
examination (those who pose questions).74 In the Babylonian Talmud group,75 two
thirds (10/15) are clearly rabbinic and a third (5) belong to an extended rabbinic
circle (child, prophet, and the evil inclination winning each soul).76
Tan. PT GenR LevR PdRK Son- LamR EccR Sum BT AdRN Tanh DeuR Toyal
nR
Sum 6 19 9 5 7 2 3 6 57 14 1 20 7 99
In-
5 14 8 1 3 3 1 37 9 1 8 3 58
group
69 m. Ed. 1:6; t. Menaḥ. 13:2; t. Nid. 6:4; Midrash Tannaim Deut. 17:10 (Hoffmann edition, 103);
t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:3; y. Ber. 4:3 (33b) (four times); y. Mo‘ed Qat. 3:1 (10a); y. Sanh. 10:1 (50b), y. Šeb. 1:1
(4a) (twice); y. Ta‘an. 2:2 (9a–9b) (four times); y. Ter. 11:2 (2b), y. Hor. 1:1 (2b); Gen. Rab. 12:1; 17:6;
44:19; 50:10; 55:15; 69:4; 94:9 (twice) (Theodor and Albeck edition, 157, 441–42, 527, 585, 919, 1181);
Lev. Rab. 23:2 (Margulies edition, 528); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 3:5; 4:2; 5:11 (Mandelbaum edition, 43, 59,
100), Eccl. Rab. 2:11 (Hirshman edition, 140).
70 t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:9; Gen. Rab. 78:2 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 919).
71 These include two people who make arguments, in y. Ta‘an. 2:1 (9a) and y. Hor. 1:3 (5b). The
rest are people asking questions, whose identity is not clear. They could be members of the rabbinic
circle, or “heretics.”
72 Tanḥ. B’haalotkha 16 (Buber edition, Num 52); Beshalach 24 (Buber edition, Ex 67); Emor 3
(Buber edition, Lev 81); Nasa 30 (Buber edition, Num 41); Tanḥ. Ki Tisa (Warsaw edition, Ex 244);
Shoftim 12 (Warsaw edition, Deu 225).
73 Tanḥ. Noah 17 (Buber edition, Gen 44); Emor 12 (Buber edition, Lev 90–91) (thrice); Ḥukot 9
(Num 104); Ki Teze 9 (Buber edition, Deut 9); Vayera 1 (Warsaw edition, Gen 46); Ha’azinu 3 (War-
saw edition, Num 245); Yelamdenu according to the citation in Talmud Torah Bereshit Genesis 131
(Mann, The Bible as Read, 317); Deut. Rab. Nitzavim (Liebermann edition, 117, three times).
74 Tanḥ. Nasa 30 (Buber edition, Num 41); Nasa 31 (Buber edition, Num 41–42, four times); Deut.
Rab. ‘Eqev (Liebermann edition, 74, four times).
75 Supported by the single example from ’Abot R. Natan B 9 (Schechter edition, 24–25).
76 b. Ḥag. 16a; b. Sanh. 90a (twice); b. Meg. 31b; b. Ned. 40a.
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(continued)
Tan. PT GenR LevR PdRK Son- LamR EccR Sum BT AdRN Tanh DeuR Toyal
nR
Ext. In-
1 1 2 5 1 8
group
Border-
4 4 4 5 17 5 4 26
line
Out-
1 1 6 6
group
2.2 Rejection or Acceptance of an Argument
A quick look at the table here would allow us to see that most of what the “men
who would tell you” would tell you will be rejected, in either earlier or later sources
(58/99). A little over a third would still be accepted (36/99). In other words, while
it is likely that an utterance or question from a “man who would tell you” would be
rejected, there is still a very good chance that it would not. As this data does not
discriminate between different types of speakers, either by the type of utterance
they produce (argument or question) or by their identification, further analysis ac-
cording to group is necessary (and will appear after the table).
Tan. PT GenR LevR PdRK Son- LamR EccR Sum BT AdRN Tanh DeuR
nR
Con-
4 2 2 4 4 1 4 21 5 1 7 2
firmed
Rejected 2 14 7 1 3 2 2 1 32 8 13 5
Neither 3 1 4 1
The majority of the arguments made by the hypothetical speakers (G1) in the early
group are rejected, while questions (G2) are usually answered in the affirmative.
Groups 1 and 4 (rejected argument) make up 80% (34/42) of the cases in the arguing
groups. The accepted arguments are a small minority which makes up the remain-
ing 20% (8). In the later Palestinian group, out of the sixteen arguments (i.e., the
sum of G1+G4), fourteen are rejected (87%). In the Babylonian Talmud, while 50%
(7/14) of the arguments are rejected, another 50%, an unprecedented number, is
accepted.
The questions (G2), however, show a different pattern. All of them behave in
the same way. If we accept them as real questions, then the arguments applied in
them are always reaffirmed. If we think of them as ironic or polemical, they are
always rejected.
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2.3 The Empirical Status of the Claims
In the earlier sources, it is easy to see that two groups stand out. Empirically correct
arguments are the biggest group (24), followed by the empirically uncertain (23).
Only three out of fifty-seven arguments or implied arguments can be interpreted as
empirically invalid. This indicates, above all else, that it is not the content of the
claims which functions as the deciding factor of their acceptance. The relationship
to truth here is thus undermined, or the definition of truth itself found inadequate.
In the latter group, we see a clear similarity between the Palestinian and Babylonian
sources. The dominant category of appearances of “if a man would tell you” has
little or no relationship to empirical knowledge (19/42). Such is the case, for exam-
ple, in b. ‘Abod. Zar. 9b, where one is instructed not to buy a field for the price of a
dinar (thus participating in the game of guessing when the eschaton is coming).
This signifies a shift in the function of our discursive marker.
Tan. PT GenR LevR PdRK Son- LamR EccR Sum BT AdRN Tan DeuR
nR
Empirically
11 6 1 2 2 2 24 2 3 2
right
Empirically
1 1 1 3 2
wrong
Empirically
2 3 1 1 7 9 1 9
irrelevant
Empirically
3 4 1 4 5 1 5 23 8 5
uncertain
It is specifically important to notice that within G1, the rejected anonymous argu-
ments, almost half (21/42) of the claims brought forth by the hypothetical speakers
are empirically correct or true.77 By “true,” I mean something which is “empirically”
or exegetically confirmed; that is, something which indeed exists in the world or in
the biblical text (for example, there are indeed seventy-five letters in the quoted
verse, not seventy-two).78 Fourteen cannot be decided;79 for four, the question is
77 y. Ber. 4:3 (32b) (four times); y. Ta‘an. 2:2 (9a–b); y. Ter. 11:2 (56a); Gen. Rab. 17:6 (Theodor and
Albeck edition, 157); Gen. Rab. 69:4 (twice, Theodor and Albeck edition, 793); Gen. Rab. 44:19 (Theo-
dor and Albeck edition, 441–42), Lev. Rab. 23:2 (Margulies edition, 528); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 4:2; 5:11
(Mandelbaum edition, 59, 100); Song. Rab. 114; Song. Rab. 2:2; Lam. Rab. 4:1 (twice).
78 Gen. Rab. 50:10 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 527).
79 m. Ed. 1:6; t. Menaḥ. 13:1; t. Nid. 6:4; y. Mo‘ed Qat. 3:1 (10a); y. Sanh. 10:1 (50b); y. Šeb. 1:1 (4a)
(twice); y. Ta‘an. 2:1 (9a) (three times); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 3:5 (Mandelbaum edition, 43); Lam. Rab.
2:13 (twice); Eccl. Rab. 2:11 (Hirshman edition, 140).
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irrelevant,80 and only three are clearly wrong: the members of the court who state
that left is right and should be listened to anyhow and the man who argues that
Venus and the first lights of dawn appear at the same time in the morning sky.81
The question group (G2) once again follows a different pattern. Two are irrele-
vant to any “right or wrong judgment” (for example, the question asking about the
date of redemption in Eccl. Rab. 12:1:10), and for the remaining twelve, deciding if
the claims are right or wrong is a doctrinal rather than an empirical question (for
example, whether there has ever been a man who was free of sin).
Tan. PT GenR LevR PdRK Son- LamR EccR Sum BT AdRN Tan DeuR
nR
Empirically
3 7 1 4 1+4 1 1+3 25
uncertain
Confirmed 4 1 1 5 4 1 5 6 1 8
Rejected 1 10 7 3 2 2 7 1 10
Other 1
3 Conclusion: Truth, Epistemology, and Doubt
Looking closer at the group of speakers who ask or tell something, who express
doubt about a given or speculated assumption, gives us a glimpse into rabbinic
epistemology and its somewhat flexible nature. The expression of doubt from hypo-
thetical people who make claims or ask questions focuses our attention on the arbi-
trariness or ideological bias of the claims made against them. At times, this focus
leads to a change of heart in the collocutor. At others, it does not. This very differ-
ence forces us to accept that we cannot say anything certain about the relationship
between positivism and truth in the group of texts studied here. On the one hand,
in the cases where the doubt raised does lead to a change of heart, such as the case
of the man arguing for the existence of nineteen benedictions in the ‘amidah before
R. Huna, it may seem that positivism/objectivism is an adequate epistemology.
However, it is in the cases where the observed reality or textual reality is rejected
that we find that “seeing is not believing.” Otherwise acceptable means of argumen-
tation may be rejected in favour of either the authority of the person making the
claim, the “dogmatic” status of the claim made, or a different, more important claim
that someone may wish to make. This is not the familiar rejection of the observed
80 t. ‘Abod. Zar. 1:9 (twice); y. Hor. 1:3 (5b); Gen. Rab. 72:2 (Theodor and Albeck edition, 919).
81 Midrash Tannaim Deut. 17:1 (Hoffman edition, 103); y. Hor. 1:3 (5b); Gen. Rab. 50:10 (Theodor
and Albeck edition, 527).
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world in favour of learning from verses as expressed, for example, by R. Yoḥanan
in b. B. Bat. 75a, with parallels in b. Sanh. 100a, and Pesiq. Rab Kah. 18:5 (Mandel-
baum edition, 297–8), who kills his student who only believes his interpretation of
a verse after seeing it manifest in reality,82 but at times, a rejection of a reading of
a verse in light of “a greater argument” which needs to be made. This argument is
at times expressed and at times left for us to understand by ourselves. These cases
come close to threatening what may be labelled as rabbinic dogma, or rather they
can be identified as attempts to dogmatise claims which have no epistemological
superiority over others. To put it differently, what the hypothetical interlocutors are
really asking is whether this is a final answer and also whether we favour one de-
monstrable truth over performative aesthetics; ultimately, they wonder whether we
can know.
If we had to reconstruct rabbinic dogma from this genre, we would end up with
a rather frightening list. The questions may give us more or less familiar themes:
the dead will be resurrected, the world was created of water alone, the borders
between the sea and dry land are not stable, a man cannot be a god, nor a son of
God, and no one can tell when redemption will come; God rewards the righteous.
However, they also give us rather unusual themes: God will dwell in Rome until the
eschaton, a man can live without sin, and a man may live forever. If we add to this
the questions from the later sources, we must also add the rather familiar list: God
opens the wombs of barren women, God accepts those who repent, and God can
save people from fire. However, we must also add the entirely unacceptable ones:
David did not sin, Joshua did not fight on the Sabbath, Gideon did not sacrifice
outside of Jerusalem, and Elijah did not sacrifice outside of Jerusalem. If we read
the claims as having dogmatic implications, we may get an even stranger picture,
including that right is indeed left, that nineteen is indeed eighteen, that counting
is an unstable practice, that Satan and woman are internally bound together, and
that Jerusalem and Caesarea cannot coexist.
However, we can learn that the mindset specific to rabbinic epistemology as-
sumes that a dichotomy between true and false does indeed exist. In it, while false
is always false, truth has many forms. In other words, while there may be more
than one truth, not everything is true. It is also clear that there are mechanisms that
allow one to distinguish a true argument from a false one; however, they are not
always explicitly defined. With respect to the limitations in participating in the pro-
duction of knowledge, rabbinic literature seems to be egalitarian in the sense that
every person who uses the agreed-upon rules of knowledge production may add to
the community’s body of knowledge. The quality of performing such an act of pro-
duction must nevertheless be evaluated, and it may still be rejected.
82 See Dina Stein, “Believing Is Seeing: A Reading of Baba Batra 73a–75b” [Hebrew], Jerusalem
Studies in Hebrew Literature 17 (1999): 9–32 (especially 23–25).
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This epistemological soup is created by the very same problem I presented at
the start of this chapter: attempting to read rabbinic literature through philosophi-
cal terms that are foreign to it. If we accept the rabbinic truth-making procedure
and relationship to truth as being different from that of philosophy, the smoke
clears. The place where this group of texts takes its meaning is a place where truth
exists—albeit a polymorphic rather than a philosophical logocentric truth—and
where its performative, memorable value outweighs logic as a vehicle for reaching
it. The “if a man would tell you” group, then, indeed signifies the existence of
doubt. But this doubt is not necessarily in the minds of those Others who ask the
questions or make the claims in the texts, but in the mind of the implied rabbinic
narrator.
The fact that some of the answers to the questions asked are theologically dan-
gerous, combined with the lack of epistemic stability in the group of those who
make claims, leads me to believe that the function of the discursive marker “if a
man would tell you” is somewhat homoeopathic: a small dose of doubt is used to
eradicate even larger doubts. If rabbinic culture allows its members and its “extend-
ed family” to raise doubts about accepting the rabbis’ authority, in trusting them,
paradoxically, it remains protected. The way this group of texts functions may be
compared to the parables of Jesus as he himself defined them in Mathew 13:10–16:
to reinforce the sense of belonging and favoured status of the members of the group.
One person may argue that he is God, another that he is without sin, some may
say that nineteen is actually eighteen, or that God is in exile—all can be equally
accepted or rejected based on the same lines of argument and the same modes of
knowledge-production, as long as the people trust the rabbis, their leadership, their
spiritual and interpretative authority. The only reason we are not to believe a speak-
er who is introduced by the words “if a man would tell you,” as we have learnt, is
not because his claims may not be true, or because he is not a “good Jew.” It is
simply because he falls under the discursive marker that tells the audience that
even though the counter-argument may be bad, and even if the person who is ask-
ing is one of us, or not one of us, the important thing is that the one who answers
the question must be believed, accepted, and followed, and all of this without a
shadow of a doubt.
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